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The Internet has changed China profoundly. For the government, the Internet 
offers prospects to develop economics, education, and technology. For the public, the 
Internet provides unprecedented opportunities for the free flow of information and 
communication. Many believe that the Internet will ultimately bring democracy to China, 
one of the few Communist countries remaining in the world. Relying on multiple 
methods, including secondary analysis, survey, and in-depth interviews, this study is one 
of the first attempts to systematically understand how the Internet has been adopted in 
China, on both provincial and individual levels; and more importantly, how Internet use 
is associated with people‘s real world political lives. Ultimately, this research tries to 
understand if the Internet could bring a fundamental change in political system to China, 
and if so, how and when. This research concludes that the Internet is unlikely to offer 
democratic hope for China, at least not in the near future. Since the Internet is not 
 ix 
developed universally, and only a small portion of users are employing it for political 
activities due to individual characteristics and people‘s perceptions of Internet 
censorship, the Internet‘s mobilizing effects are rather constrained. Moreover, due to the 
rising nationalistic sentiments, the Chinese public were found to be willing to participate 
in government supported political activity and avoid protests. Nevertheless, the 
association between nationalism and political participation became less clear when 





Today, any attempt to understand modern Chinese politics needs to include the 
Internet. In its momentous transitioning stage, China‘s economy, policy, culture and 
social life are all shaped by information technology, especially the Internet. According to 
China‘s leaders such as former premier Zhu Rongji, the Internet is what China needs for 
future economic development and integration into the global economy ―…the Chinese 
government can be said to have displayed a great deal of vision in its policy of closing 
the gap with the industrialized countries by placing digital communications technologies 
at the heart of its development policy‖ (Dai, 2003, p. 25). 
China has embraced the idea of informationization. China is one of the earliest 
developing countries to undertake the deep structural reform of telecommunication 
governance, including reorganizing the Ministry of Information Industry (MII). 
Information technology, especially the Internet, became the focus of the national Ninth 
and Tenth Five-Year Plans (1995-2005). Building an information society is viewed as 
one of the strategic developments for the industrialization and modernization of China. 
The approach is to employ the current digital network technology for commercial, 
political, and social purposes, and plans are being made to attract more domestic and 
international investment in the information and communication technology section. The 
government even uses the Internet to launch e-government through projects like 
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―Government Online.‖ By making more government information accessible to citizens, 
the government aims to enhance the transparency of government activities and 
accountability of government agencies. Overall, recent Chinese economic development 
strategies are linked directly to the information revolution.
1
  
These attempts have been very successful. According to the China Internet 
Network Information Center (CNNIC), ever since the Internet took root in China in the 
early 1990s, the number of Internet users grew from 620,000 in 1997 to 33.7 million by 
the end of 2001 and is estimated to reach 253 million by 2008 (CNNIC, 2008). However, 
the rapid Internet growth is not a universal phenomenon in China. A typical Internet user 
in China is educated, young, and lives in a big city. Only 25% of Internet users are from 
rural areas (CNNIC, 2008). The disparity is also salient in terms of regional comparisons. 
The Internet adoption is concentrated along the coastal provinces, whereas the inland 
western provinces lag far behind. This disparity reflects the existing regional differences 
in both the economic and social environments. What is really disturbing is that the digital 
divide observed today may widen even further with the present economic and social 
disparities, where knowledge intensive activities are increasingly important. Nonetheless, 
with its ever-growing application in China, the Internet has had profound impacts on 
China technologically, economically, politically, and socially. This is especially the case 
in urban areas. 
Because of its intricate democratizing function and seemingly uncontrollable 
characteristics, the Internet has attracted much attention from observers of modern China 
particularly respective to its political impacts. As argued, the Internet creates ―ideational 
                                                 
1
 See Harwit and Clark (2001) and Hughes and Wacker (2003) for more detailed discussion about the 
history.   
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pluralism‖ in China (Taubman 1998), expands venues of becoming involved in politics 
(Zhou, 2006), and helps strengthen ties of unofficial social organizations (Yang, 2003), 
which in turn fosters demands for more freedom and individual rights, and may 
eventually generate forces for democracy (Lacharite, 2002).  
A good example of an online uprising event comes from the Sun Zhigang case 
(―Sun Zhigang‘s brutal killers sentenced‖, 2003). On March 17, 2003, college student 
Sun Zhigang was detained by the police in Guangzhou for not having a ―temporary 
resident permit‖ that was required for all migrants who look for jobs outside of their 
hometown. He was severely beaten in the infirmary of a Custody and Repatriation (C & 
R) Center and died three days later while still in police custody. When authorities refused 
to investigate the circumstances of Sun‘s death, his parents took the case online.  
The parents first posted his case and a petition letter on China‘s largest news 
portal www.sina.com. Then a reporter from Southern Metropolis News, one of China‘s 
most progressive papers, picked up the story (Pan, 2004). Within two hours after being 
posted online, this news item generated 4,000 comments from readers. Within days, 
thousands of Internet users had forwarded this news to online forums or email groups; 
many more protest messages appeared online grieving Sun‘s death and condemning 
police abuse. In the final approximation, nearly one million pages of comments were 
generated on sina.com. By this time, even the official media, including China Central TV 
picked up on the public outrage and heated debates over Sun‘s case and the Custody and 




Although C & R centers were originally invented to provide shelters for homeless 
people, they later became means for local governments to detain migrants from other 
areas. Millions of poor or migrant workers were held. For many years, international 
human rights organizations and Chinese legal reforms‘ advocators have appealed to 
abolish the C & R system. Sun Zhigang‘s death finally evoked protests from the entire 
country. On May 29th, in an unprecedented appeal to the National People‘s Congress, 
four legal scholars called on the state prosecutor to investigate Sun‘s death. They had 
written to the government asking for abolishment of the temporary resident permit and 
migrant detention centers. Three months later, the government changed the C & R system 
into a voluntary service, and the officials responsible for Sun Zhigang‘s death were 
convicted in court. 
Sun Zhigang‘s case shows how Internet activists can turn online uprising events 
into a real world political agenda. Without the Internet, stories like this could never be 
published in the traditional media that remain under tight editorial controls. Without the 
Internet, people could never exchange opinions and share views so easily. Furthermore, 
publishing politically sensitive stories online first would also reduce the risk of traditional 
media in reporting these issues. Although public politics continues to be a rarity in China, 
the Internet is able to break the top-down censorship and propaganda regime, and 
promote the bottom-up force to increase public participation in national politics.   
Yet, questions remain. Is Sun Zhigang‘s case just a rare incident, or is it an 
indicator of an ongoing trend? In other words, is this a sign that the Internet will bring 
more opportunities for the Chinese public to participate in politics? Might it even nurture 
a fundamental political change? In order to understand the Internet‘s political 
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implications in China, this study relied on secondary analysis, first hand survey data, as 
well as in-depth interviews to analyze how the Internet has been developed and regulated 
by the Chinese government, how the information technology has been used by the public, 
especially for political purposes, how Internet use interacts with China‘s specific political 




In order to uncover the political implications of Internet use, this study reviewed 
several conceptual areas that are related to the Internet study in China. First, studies on 
the Internet‘s impacts on politics in both democratic and authoritarian contexts were 
explored to understand the rationales behind the mobilizing effects of the new technology. 
Second, the specific characteristics of Internet development in China were discussed. As 
an authoritarian country, the Chinese government welcomes the Internet for its economic 
and educational functions but worries the technology could erode the information control 
that has been executed with traditional media for years in China. Internet censorship of 
China has attracted numerous criticisms from Western scholars. However, will these 
censorship approaches succeed in controlling the Internet? More importantly, but perhaps 
often overlooked, how would these regulations affect people‘s ways of using the 
technology? Furthermore, with nationalism rising to be one of the most visible ideologies 
in China, whether the Internet would promote democratic values, or nationalistic ones is 




Political Implications of Internet Use 
Optimistic scholars would argue for a positive linkage between the Internet and 
democracy (Tsagarousianou, Tambini, & Bryan, 1998; Alexander & Pal, 1998; Ferdinand 
& McCormick, 2000; Hague & Loader, 1999; Hoff, Horrocks, & Tops, 2000). Popular 
terms like ―digital democracy‖ or ―cyber-democracy‖ all reflect the belief that the 
Internet reinforces the democratic process (Alexander & Pal, 1998; Hague & Loader, 
1999). 
While many scholars have tried to understand the relationship between the 
Internet and political participation in a democratic context, they often times have found a 
null effect, or limited effects of Internet use on mobilizing the public (Bimber, 1998a; 
Hill & Hughes, 1998). Some say that active Internet users are people who are active even 
before their use of the Internet (Owen & Davis, 1998). Norris (1998) suggested this as 
well and found that Internet users who use the Internet for political purposes had higher 
levels of political interest, knowledge, efficacy, and were of a higher Social Economic 
Status (SES). Apparently, the rich information environment does not automatically 
translate into more knowledgeable users and more active ones. What is crucial, ultimately, 
is when and how it does. 
Although these Internet studies have mostly been conducted in Western 
democratic countries, the Internet‘s mobilizing effects are even more celebrated in newly 
emerging democracies or authoritarian contexts (e.g., Spassov & Todorov, 2004; Simon, 
Corrales, & Wolfensberger, 2002). For instance, scholars have argued that the Internet 
had a crucial impact in the collapse of the Suhato regime in Indonesia (Hill & Sen, 2000). 
The Internet‘s inherent democratizing function has also frequently been mentioned in 
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studies of the Internet in China (Zhou, 2006; Zheng & Wu, 2005; Yang, 2003), where 
individuals were rarely able to obtain information and express their opinions freely before 
the Internet‘s availability.  
 
Internet Censorship in China 
 In spite of its celebrated democratizing functions, several recent applications of 
the communication technology have also shown that the Internet can be used to maintain 
undemocratic regimes as well (Bimber, 2003; Kalathil & Boas, 2003). For instance, 
groups such as the Taliban, Al-Qaeda, and German neo-Nazis have all been using the 
Internet enthusiastically to disseminate their messages. In China, too, the Internet is 
claimed to be used by the government to tighten information control (Zhou, 2006). 
Although technological determinism would argue that it is inevitable for new technology 
to drive the characteristics of societies (Smith & Marx, 1994), and we may also agree that 
in China‘s case, the society is bound to change with the Internet, it is still hard to say in 
what ways the Chinese public will use the information technology, and in what directions 
these changes will happen. After all, the Internet is only a technology. It is how the 
technology is used by people and society that determines its influences. 
In China, where the Internet has been heavily regulated, it is not surprising to see 
that scholars are anxious to find out what role Internet control plays in the relationship 
between Internet use and political participation. Indeed, one look at the studies of the 
Internet and China shows that most studies are centered on how the Chinese government 
has been blocking the information flow online and suppressing dissidents (e.g., Chase & 
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Mulvenon, 2002). While some people are optimistic that the Chinese government‘s 
efforts will be vain (e.g., Xiao, 2005), others are not so optimistic (e.g., Beans, 2005). 
The Internet presents the Chinese government with a paradox, where the goal of 
economic growth conflicts with the goal of political and ideological control. To ensure 
the legitimacy of the authoritarian rule, China has impeded Internet development by 
engaging in legal and technical control strategies. Yet, to maintain the growth of 
information technology, the Chinese government is not likely to have tight control at the 
expense of slowing down Internet development. As a result, although the censorship 
appears strict and abundant, it is not likely to be practiced firmly all the time. As Wacker 
(2003) pointed out, the most effective censorship is not by regulations, but through the 
means of self-censorship. This makes China a distinct case from most Western countries, 
where information control is not a major concern for Internet users. Although cyber 
optimists expect the Internet to fuel the democratic process in China, the perception and 
evaluation of the threat from government censorship may restrain people from using the 
net for certain purposes, especially political ones.  
 
Chinese Nationalism 
Another distinctive characteristic about China is its political culture. In Western 
democracies, individual autonomy, freedom of information and expression, and equal 
rights are highly valued. However, the Chinese public may sacrifice these values for 
strong defense and political leadership, a stable economy, and maintaining order. In fact, 
the so-called state nationalism, which claims that individual rights should be sacrificed 
for collective interests, is one of the most powerful political forces in today‘s China 
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(Friedman & McCormick, 2000). According to Zhao (2000b), Chinese nationalism, or 
patriotism as the Chinese government labels it, is ―a result of a volatile mix of rising 
pride and lingering insecurity in response to profound domestic crises‖ (p. 254). As one 
of the most influential ideologies in today‘s China, nationalism is very likely to influence 
people‘s political lives. For instance, although both a nationalist and a democratic would 
be likely to become involved in political activities, a nationalistic person who values 
national interests and social stability over individual rights is not likely to support an 
immediate democratic revolution, which is more likely to be pursued by a democratic. In 
addition, according to Wu (2005), the Chinese cyberspace is full of nationalistic 
sentiments. It is possible that exposure to the Internet could also intertwine with people‘s 
political values and behaviors. 
 
Research Question 
This dissertation aims to answer two research questions. The first regards Internet 
diffusion. On the aggregate level, this study sets out to understand the Internet diffusion 
in China and macro-level predictors of these diffusion patterns. To what extent has the 
Internet been adopted in Chinese provinces? What are the important predictors of the 
adoption, including institutional level factors and individual factors? Is there a widening 
gap among the western, central, and eastern regions of China in adopting the technology? 
What could be done to reduce that gap?  
Although it has been said that the Internet would reduce inequality by lowering 
the cost of information and thus facilitate disadvantaged groups to better compete in their 
lives (Anderson, Bikson, Law, & Mitchell, 1995), later studies have shown that 
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differential adoptions of the Internet across segments in the population increase 
inequalities between those who are already privileged and those who are already 
underprivileged (DiMaggio, Hargittai, Neuman, & Robinson, 2001). Information is 
becoming an increasingly important component of the economy and has significant 
implications on inequality. As the Internet functions as a powerful information source, it 
is especially critical if certain groups are systematically excluded from adopting the 
communication technology.  
Given that the majority of China‘s population lives in rural areas, what 
particularly striking is that the rural Chinese Internet users constitutes merely one quarter 
of the total Internet users. According to CNNIC‘s 2006 report, students are more than 
thirty times as likely as farmers to have Internet access. People from big cities like 
Shanghai and Beijing are more than eight times as likely to have Internet access as people 
from poor provinces like Tibet or Guizhou are. Moreover, fewer than 10 percent of 
websites registered in mainland China were owned by businesses and organizations in the 
western region (―Survey Shows China's East-west Digital Divide Growing‖, 2003).  
Although telecommunications access has long been linked to economic growth in 
a positive way,
2
 they could also marginalize the economically or educationally 
disadvantaged regions. The digital divide between China‘s east and west, urban and rural, 
may be a reflection of their existing differences in economic and social development, yet 
access to information and communication technology could broaden that disparity by 
promoting the information haves‘ levels of productivity, and simultaneously, their 
educational level. The Chinese government is starting to realize the gap and is claiming 
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to make efforts to close it.
3
 Nevertheless, whether or not the gap will be closing soon 
remains to be seen. As Giese (2003) pointed out, although the government has engaged in 
strategies such as increasing Chinese language-based web content and encouraging the 
application of the net for more sectors, the digital divide is not likely to be alleviated 
without more systematic and stronger approaches.    
Researchers have described the diffusion of the Internet in China and pointed out 
the divide between the east and the west, and rural and urban areas. However, little has 
been done to examine the trend empirically, what causes such trends, and what the 
consequences might be (Giese, 2003; Dai, 2003; Tan, 1999). Diffusion of a new 
technology is always related to many factors, such as the political system, regulation, 
government affluence and individual income, computer literacy, and so on (Hargittai, 
1999; Wallsten, 2005, Robinson & Crenshaw, 2002; Lucas & Sylla, 2003; Norris, 2001; 
Goodman, Press, Ruth, & Rutkowski, 1994; and Kiiski & Pohjola, 2002). Scholars have 
also identified income and education as the most important individual factors of the 
digital divide in Western contexts (Norris, 2001). Drawing on the previous research, this 
study would be an early attempt to investigate the determinants of Internet connectivity in 
China including multiple factors on both individual and institutional levels. 
Moreover, little work has been done to document the trend of the digital disparity 
in China. Is the gap narrowing with the intervention of the government? Or as the 
penetration rate of Internet access increases, is the gap reducing over time? While some 
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predict that the current digital divide will close up as Internet diffusion progresses 
(Compaine, 2000), others point out that inequalities in access to information services 
such as telephone or cable are likely to persist since these services require continuous 
investments, unlike information goods (e.g., TV or radio) that only require a one-time 
purchase (Schement, 2001). Thus, it is important to understand the patterns of access 
disparities as they reflect changing factors like service availability or individual 
characteristics. Understanding these changing predictors of Internet adoptions will help 
create corresponding approaches in order to diminish these information gaps.    
The second research question concerns whether or not Internet usage for political 
purposes correlates with various political outcomes. Cyber-optimists predict that the 
Internet has the potential to help the public become more knowledgeable about politics, 
more deliberate in expressing their political opinions, and more active in participating in 
political activities (Budge, 1996; Schwartz, 1996; Rash, 1997). However, evidence shows 
that the political consequences of the Internet usage depend on many factors, including 
the purposes of using the Internet, users‘ educational and age level (Shah, Kwak, & 
Holbert, 2001; Bimber, 2001; Norris, 2001).  
In China, where information and expression have traditionally been censored, the 
public‘s perception of threats is also likely to have a critical influence in predicting the 
political and social outcomes of using the net. If the perceived threat is high, the public 
may limit their Internet usage to ―safe‖ areas — politically benign ones. The perceived 
threat may be based on users‘ assessment of feasible censorship, their sheer fear resulting 
from hundreds of years of government suppression, their trust in the Internet, or trust in 
themselves in avoiding Internet monitoring. Consequently, the decision on whether or not 
13 
 
using the Internet for political purposes is not only dependent on individual 
characteristics, but also affected by the perceived threat.  
Users‘ values could also alter their political attitudes or behaviors in association 
with Internet usage. As Inglehart (2005) put it, democracy depends on people‘s political 
values. As some political values motivate people to demand more freedom and 
democratic systems, others are conducive to authoritarian rules. For instance, 
nationalistic users might not want to criticize the state or sign a petition for certain public 
policies because they support strong government and social stability. Similarly, a user 
who holds democratic views is more likely to express his/her disapproval of social 
problems like corruption and would be more likely to participate in online/offline 
petitions against the government.  
 
Operational Structure 
There is great scholarly interest in whether or not the Internet facilitates China‘s 
democratization process. Earlier studies focused primarily on the Internet‘s physical 
networks and state censorship (Zheng & Wu, 2005). Few empirical studies have tried to 
directly tackle the relationship between Internet usage and mass political orientations in 
China. Varying from previous researches, this study has tried to systematically examine 
individual usage of the Internet – who uses the Internet for political purposes; how 
political usages of the Internet would affect the public‘s political actions in different ways; 
and how individuals‘ beliefs in nationalism and perceptions of censorship intertwine with 
Internet usage and political outcomes.  
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This study documents the state of Internet adoption in China. Macro level factors 
such as government policies or economic development as well as micro level factors such 
as education and income have been employed to understand the regional provincial 
digital divide and individual uses of the Internet. Although the growth of the Internet in 
China has been remarkable, its growth rate is likely to decrease due to the approaching 
saturation point in urban and wealthier coastal markets. The current positive Internet 
development may take a downward turn if the problem of the digital divide remains 
overlooked. In addition, it is possible that the digital divide in Internet adoption may 
reinforce the existing economic and political gaps between the wealthier coastal areas and 
urban areas, and poorer inland areas and rural areas by excluding certain groups from 
having access to the Internet.   
This study is by nature preliminary, considering the fact that the Internet has yet 
to penetrate into the entire Chinese society and Internet services are ever-changing. But it 
will greatly advance the understanding of how the new technology interacts with the 
political society in a non-democratic country. Chapter Two lays out the theoretical 
framework and methods for this study. By theorizing relationships among main concepts, 
this chapter provides a theoretical foundation for later analysis. Also, different methods 
used in this study are discussed. As an ever-changing technology, no single approach is 
sufficient to study the Internet. By using secondary analysis, survey data, and in-depth 
interviews, this study relies on both quantitative and qualitative approaches to understand 
the political impacts of Internet use.  
Chapter Three discusses how the Internet is developed in China. While some 
authoritarian countries may choose to have a totally controlled Internet regardless of their 
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economic and educational development, China instead allows a certain degree of 
competition in order to advance the Internet services. Indeed, realizing the educational 
and economic potentials in the technology, China has made steps to reform its 
government agencies to regulate the new technology (Harwit & Clark, 2001). By looking 
at the multi-level factors and the trend of Internet penetration, investigation of what 
determines Internet connectivity was performed. Subsequently, comparison of the extent 
of provincial disparities, and what might help to close the gaps was accomplished.   
Chapter Four examines literature on Internet use and its political consequences. 
Since the Internet is studied most in the Western world, studies about the Internet in the 
developed and democratic countries were analyzed and applied to the Chinese context. 
Ever since the Internet was introduced to the world, scholars as well as activists have 
advocated the Internet for its rejuvenating potential for democracy. Nevertheless, the 
existing results in studying Internet effects are rather mixed. While some positive effects 
have been found for Internet use (Bimber, 1998), harmful consequences such as a 
displacement effect with traditional media use or time spent with family members and 
friends are also revealed (Nie & Erbring, 2000). A closer look at the Internet effect in 
political and civic engagement shows that this relationship depends on many factors, such 
as the characteristics of users and their different online behaviors (Shah, Kwak, & 
Holbert, 2001). Clearly, the Internet effect is not the same for everyone and for every 
application of the technology.  
With the original survey data, this chapter explored what individual level factors 
affect Internet adoption and use for political purposes in particular, and whether using the 
Internet for political activities might have impacts on users‘ political lives. By analyzing 
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patterns of Internet use and their political consequences, this study has attempted to 
understand what role the Internet plays in China‘s political world today, and whether any 
real political changes are expected to follow.   
Chapter Five is devoted to Internet censorship. Although the Chinese government 
has often been criticized for its Internet control, the censorship is not so strict that 
economic and academic usages of the Internet would have been stifled (Zhou, 2006). 
Nevertheless, with the long existing history of censorship in China, as well as highly 
publicized punishments for violating Internet regulations, many users in China 
voluntarily engage in self-censorship to avoid any possible consequences (Sohmen, 2001). 
Thus, whether or not users realize the existence of censorship and the seriousness of it is 
likely to have significant impacts on how they use the Internet. It is also possible that 
when users have high levels of confidence in the Internet‘s uncontrollable nature or their 
own ability to bypass the censorship, they could ignore the censorship regardless of how 
it is perceived. As a result, when perceived threat is high and powerful, users would 
restrain themselves from using the Internet for sensitive purposes, such as voicing their 
political opinions about certain policies or political leaders.  
Chapter Six investigates the origin and characteristics of rising nationalism, and 
more importantly, its implications for democratization in China. Many scholars have 
touched upon the issue of nationalism in China (Zhao, 2000a, 2000b, 2004a, 2004b, 
2005/6; Downs & Saunders, 1998; Friedman & McCormick, 2000). These studies 
suggest that the Chinese nationalism is a special phenomenon that combines national 
pride and pragmatic concerns of enforcing national power and interests. It is partially 
state-led, but also appeals to the general public. By emphasizing China‘s economic 
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accomplishments in the past decades, Chinese nationalism gives priority to economic 
success and political stability. Originated from national pride n China‘s history and agony 
resulting from China‘s defeats by Western countries in the past century, the grassroots 
nationalism is most reactive when the national interest of China is threatened by a foreign 
force. Although research has been conducted to understand the Chinese nationalism, few 
have sought to examine the behavioral consequences of nationalistic beliefs. 
In recent years, China has witnessed a few episodes of protests from its public. 
Demonstrations against Japan and the U.S. have attracted many people across the country. 
While previous studies have tried to understand the Chinese people‘s political protests 
and used protests as an indicator for political activism, such research has failed to see the 
distinction between political protests against a foreign force and a domestic one (e.g., 
Inglehart, 2005). Nationalists, especially the grassroots nationalists, tend to be active 
online and even participate in protests offline against a foreign force in order to fight for 
China‘s interests in world politics. But led by the state, the top down nationalists are not 
likely to put democratic reform before economic success and political stability on their 
political agendas, and would refrain from any forms of protests. Therefore, how strong a 
person believes in nationalism is expected to influence how they behave politically.  
Chapter Seven reviews the results from in-depth interviews. In-depth interviews 
are especially useful ―when the topic being explored involves change, novelty, or 
uniqueness and the people being interviewed play influential or unique roles‖ (Poindexter 
and McCombs, 2000, p. 269). Understanding how users use the Internet in a detailed 
fashion, how they think about different forms of political participation, how they look at 
Internet censorship, how nationalistic they are, and how likely they would engage in 
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political actions, this chapter will shed some light on the complex dynamics of the 
Internet use and political consequences for Chinese users, which cannot be easily 
determined from a standardized survey approach. 
Finally Chapter Eight concludes the dissertation by summarizing the findings, 
evaluating this study‘s contribution to Internet study in China, and discussing the 







THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK & METHODS 
This chapter constructs the theoretical frameworks for this dissertation and 
introduces the methods used to answer the research questions. To understand the 
Internet‘s political use and its consequences, the theoretical structure was divided into 
two stages. The first stage explains how the Internet is adopted and used on the provincial 
and individual level in China. The second stage studies the political implications of 
political net use on the individual level. The two-stage model was further expanded to 
two sets of models. The main relationship model hypothesizes the relationship between 
aggregate and individual levels of predictors and patterns of Internet use as well as 
behavioral consequences of using the Internet for political purpose, specifically. The 
second part refers to two moderation models, where perceived censorship and values of 
nationalism are expected to interact with various constructs in the main relationships. 
The method section reviews secondary analysis and in-depth interviews, as well 




To understand the political implications of Internet use in China, the conceptual 
framework is summarized in a two-stage model (see Figure 2-1). Drawing upon the 
nested model in Norris‘ 2001 book, Digital Divide, the two-stage model includes multiple 
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level indicators to determine the diffusion on the Internet. Singling out using the Internet 
for political purposes on the individual level, this study specifically investigates the 
political implications of Internet use. The first stage shows the causes of Internet adoption; 
the second stage explains the consequences of it. Ultimately, this study aims at answering 
the question of whether the Internet facilitates or impedes the process of democratization 
in China. To fully understand the conceptual relationships, the two-stage model is further 
broken down into two sets of models: the main-relationship models and the moderating 
models. 
Figure 2-1. The Two-Stage Model 
 
Multi-Level Indicators Internet Use  Political Participation 
 
 
The Main-Relationship Model 
The main-relationship models (see Figure 2-2) are extended versions of the two-
stage model. It illustrates the main relationship between multi-level predictors and 
Internet adoption/political Internet use, and the main relationship between Internet use 
and its political consequences on individual users. The multi-level factors include macro-
level ones like economic development, policy initiatives, and technological infrastructure 
and individual level factors such as users‘ income, education, and how they perceive the 
Internet. While aggregate level predictors are expected to influence Internet penetrations 
across different provinces in China, the individual factors could be linked to diverse 
patterns of using the Internet. 
As previous studies show, using the Internet for different purposes could vary the 
consequences of usage (Shah, Kwak, & Hobert, 2001). Thus, the distinction is drawn 
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between using the Internet for political purpose and non-political purpose. As Bimber 
(2003) discovered, certain groups are more likely to use the Internet for political purposes, 
such as young people. This is in part due to their reliance on the Internet as an 
information source. In this study, using the Internet for political purpose is singled out, 
since it relates most closely to the main question of this study: Internet and 
democratization of China. 
The consequences of Internet use are examined through various political 
behaviors: traditional political actions that are supported by the government, and 
unconventional actions like protests against domestic or international forces.  
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To fully understand the main-relationship model, the two main relationships are 
explained. First, a variety of factors that may influence Internet adoption are analyzed, 
including aggregate factors and individual ones. In China, where the economic 
development and political context are developed in a highly unbalanced way in eastern 
and western areas, the Internet adoption rates are expected to differ drastically in the west 
versus the east. This is to some extent due to the different macro-level environments, 
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such as the market condition and technological infrastructure, and is also caused by 
different user characteristics across regions. Although most studies on the digital divide 
are cross-national comparisons, the same logic could be extended to internal provincial 
comparisons within a country.  
Second, to understand the main relationship between Internet use and political 
engagement, the concept of Internet use is revisited. Unlike traditional media, the Internet 
offers a variety of information, activities, and services. Research has shown that specific 
usage of the Internet leads to different results (Norris, 1998; Shah, Kwak, & Holber, 
2001). For instance, informational use and communicational use might have positive 
impacts on users‘ political interests, but recreational use might not. That is why to 
understand the impact of Internet usage, one must first take into consideration patterns of 
Internet use and characteristics of users.    
 
Internet Adoption  
There are many factors that predict Internet adoption, both at the macro level and 
micro level. First of all, regulations of the Internet, especially the policies related to 
Internet accessibility and affordability are significant factors in determining Internet 
growth (Hargittai, 1999; Wallsten, 2005). According to Wallsten (2005), countries that 
regulate entry by Internet Service Providers (ISPs) have fewer Internet hosts and users, 
whereas countries that regulate Internet pricing have higher prices for Internet access.   
Similarly, Robinson and Crenshaw (2002) identified that the Internet is more 
likely to be adopted in democratic societies rather than authoritarian ones. Others 
(Goodman, Press, Ruth, & Rutkowski, 1994) found similar positive influences of an 
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―open society‖. According to the modernization theory, an open society, most likely a 
democratic one, enjoys competitiveness both in both economics and politics, and 
property rights, which are crucial in developing information technology (Robinson & 
Crenshaw, 2002). Finally, limited evidence also suggests a positive impact of foreign 
investment (Robinson & Crenshaw, 2002). 
Hargittai (1996, 1998) found that a country‘s human development level is related 
to its level of Internet connectivity.  Factors such as adult literacy rate, education, Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), and life expectancy are all associated with Internet 
connectivity. In studying 18 nations, Hargittai (1999) discovered a highly significant 
influence of affluence (GDP) on Internet development; the same relation was later 
confirmed by Kiiski & Pohjola (2002). Lucas and Sylla (2003) also showed that general 
affluence is an important factor in developing the Internet in terms of building the 
telecommunication infrastructure and users‘ literacy levels. In studying the diffusion of 
telephone in Germany, Thomas (1988) found that the spread of technology is also 
dependent on existing technological and infrastructural factors. Logically, it is easier for 
an advanced economic and technological environment to provide sufficient resources to 
develop the Internet, as well as a mature market to distribute the technology, than an area 
with a less developed economy and technological infrastructure. Norris (2001) also found 
that economic development and R&D investment are important predictors of Internet 
adoption.  
Other than political and economic factors, education, especially university-level 
education, plays a critical role in growing the Internet. On the individual level, those with 
a university-level education are more likely to have the knowledge and other resources 
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needed for adopting the Internet (Robinson & Crenshaw, 2002). At the macro level, an 
educated workforce with advanced technological knowledge can accelerate the pace of 
technological development, better utilize, and more extensively apply the technology in 
various aspects (Goodman, Press, Ruth, & Rutkowski, 1994; Kiiski & Pohjola, 2002; 
Robinson & Crenshaw, 2002). 
Finally, individual factors such as income, age, or trust are also important 
predictors of Internet adoption (Goodman, Press, Ruth, & Rutkowski, 1994; Robinson & 
Crenshaw, 2002). Focusing on using the Internet specifically for political purposes, 
Norris (1998) discovered that political Internet users had higher levels of political interest, 
knowledge, efficacy, and were of higher Social Economic Status.  
 
Provincial Digital Divide 
The Internet is recognized by the government as well as the economic players for 
its financial value. Certainly, the Internet narrows the gap between China and the rest of 
the world in terms of providing information and channels of communication, and greatly 
enhances China‘s economic competitiveness. But will the technology reinforce the long-
existing disparity between the wealthy coastal provinces and poor inland parts of China, 
and between the rural and urban markets?  
It has been noticed that Internet development has left China an internal digital 
divide between ―haves‖ and ―have nots‖ (Harwit, 2004; Giese, 2003). For instance, 
according to CNNIC reports, the ratio of Internet access among the most developed parts 
of China such as Beijing and Shanghai is several times more than the poorest regions like 
Yunnan or Guizhou provinces. Until the mid 1990s, Internet development centered 
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around cities like Beijing or Shanghai. Even though the gap has been narrowing over the 
years, the inland provinces still have a long way to go in order to catch up.  
As Harwit (2004) described it, there are two types of internal digital divides in 
China. The first gap comes from the rural-urban divide. With such a small percentage of 
Internet users from rural areas, the majority of rural residents still cannot afford Internet 
access. The second divide is a regional gap, mainly between the eastern coastal provinces 
and the inland provinces. Cities like Beijing or Shanghai have almost 50% of residences 
accessed to the Internet, but provinces like Tibet or Guizhou have no more than 10% of 
such residences accessed (CNNIC, 2008).  
There are many reasons for the regional digital divide. Lower revenue from less 
developed areas is one of the main reasons why telecommunication providers are 
reluctant to go to these regions. Throughout the 1990s, China Telecom was the only 
enterprise to profit from the telecommunication sector development (Giese, 2003). 
According to Giese, using its monopoly, China Telecom was able to establish national 
telecommunication and data networks. But now the company is listed on the stock market 
and faces national control and forced price reduction,  it has little incentive to enter new 
markets where the profitability cannot be guaranteed. The same is true for other network 
companies and especially Internet Service Providers (ISPs) who often avoid regions that 
show little promise of short-term profits.  
While the commercial sectors have little incentive to narrow the 
telecommunications and Internet gap, neither is the government willing to sacrifice the 
pace of telecommunication development in wealthier areas (Hughes & Wacker, 2003). 
The government has launched several programs including the ―Go West‖ project in trying 
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to help the west catch up with the economic development happening in the eastern part of 
the country. Nevertheless, other than laying approximately one million kilometers of 
fiber-optic cable and installation of satellite telecommunications, these projects mainly 
focus on the transport infrastructure (Giese, 2003).    
In addition, in China where government plays a central role in the marketplace for 
information technology, government policies related to the Internet are likely to have a 
significant impact on Internet development. For instance, in less developed provinces, 
solving the basic survival needs might be more important concerns; but for more affluent 
areas, developing information technology such as the Internet is more likely to make the 
top agenda. 
By and large, the Internet adoption rates have been increasing across regions. 
However, the disparities between different regions are still considerable. As the following 
figures (see Figure 2-3) illustrate, although the number of Internet users in various 
regions is increasing, the rate of growth is still the highest in the eastern region. Also, 
looking at the compositions of total Internet users in China, clearly the eastern proportion 
is not decreasing significantly.  
Although many researchers have identified the gap between provinces, few have 
tried to systematically record or understand what caused such gaps. Is the gap closing up, 
and for what reasons? Are these reasons political factors, economic factors, educational 
levels, or perhaps a combination of all the factors? By employing a dataset with macro-
level predictors on the provincial level, this study will be one of the first to understand at 
what dimensions and to what extent the provinces differ from one another, and what 






Figure 2-3. Provincial Internet Penetrations in China, 1997-2008 
 
Source: CNNIC, 1997-2008 
 
Internet and Its Political Impacts 
The global nature of the Internet and its wide use in China have drawn 
international firms, human rights groups, international development organizations, 
political critics or researchers and many others‘ attention to the overall influences of the 
































































































technology. Millions of hits can be received when searching for China and the Internet 
with Google. It is interesting and important to see whether or not the Internet can and if 
so, will change the current political structure and public discourse in China. Being one of 
the few Communist countries and the largest one remaining in the world, many are 
anxious to see how communism will evolve there, and intrigued to evaluate what role the 
Internet plays in the process.  
With its scope and great ease of obtaining information, communication capacity, 
and particularly its decentralized nature, the development of the Internet in China has 
made many believe that the Internet will greatly help advance freedom and democracy in 
China, where the state is still under authoritarian rule (Liu, 2001). As they argue, unlike 
other communication tools, the Internet can penetrate the information censorship 
employed by the Chinese government for years and break the official hegemony. The 
Internet is capable of exposing China‘s people to alternative norms, liberal values, and 
democratic principles that are not normally available through traditional media; 
consequently, Chinese people can make better judgments of political and economic issues 
and eventually turn China into a democracy (Taubman, 1998; Lacharite, 2002; Qiang, 
2003; Chase & Mulvenon, 2002). Other scholars like Yang (2003), identified new ways 
to get involved in political activities, which are only made possible by the Internet. 
Voting is not available for most Chinese citizens and there are not a lot of 
institutionalized ways for citizens to participate in politics. However, the Internet has 
changed the situation—now online petitions, discussions of various social and political 
affairs, easy communication with media and even government officials have all become 
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Using a multi-dimensional approach to conceptualize Internet use, Shah, Kwak,  
& Holbert (2001) have uncovered four distinctive patterns of Internet use: information 
search and exchange; financial management; product purchase; and social-recreational 
use. Research shows that use of the Internet for information search and exchange is 
significantly correlated to participation in volunteer and other cooperative activities (Shah, 
Kwak,  & d Holbert, 2001; Shah, McLeod, & Yoon, 2001). Applying this finding in the 
Chinese context, it is expected that Internet users who use the Internet for political 
reasons are more likely to be engaged in civic or political activities. 
On the other hand, cyber pessimist Hachigian (2001) made an observation that 
since most Internet users in China are young, well educated, and live in big cities, they 
have little incentive to risk their career and life by getting involved in politically sensitive 
online activities. What this argument implies, other than that political application of the 
Internet may not be a mainstream usage, is that if users do get involved in politically 
sensitive activities, the Internet might have a positive influence on political activism.  
 
The Moderation Models 
In addition to the main-relation model, this study took into consideration the 
specific political context in China: Internet censorship and the rising Chinese nationalism. 
The moderating models evaluate the moderating effects of perceived threat on political 
Internet use and impacts of nationalistic value on political participation.  
 
                                                 
4
 See more discussions on The World Internet Project. 
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Censorship and Perceived Censorship 
The Internet has created a complex situation for the Chinese government. On the 
one hand, the government is convinced that the Internet will enhance the country‘s 
economic competitiveness. The Internet enables China to compete more effectively in the 
global market, thanks to its remarkable ability to enhance communications and its easy 
and cheap access to global information. On the other hand, the Internet has threatened the 
Chinese government‘s ability to insulate the Chinese people from certain information and 
ideas, including pornography, violence, and more importantly, political views that differ 
from the Central Communist Party (CCP) views.  
The Chinese approach is to endorse and promote the Internet for economic, 
propaganda, and educational uses, while relying on a variety of high-tech methods and 
legal approaches to minimize the freedom of expression. Government monopoly is 
established at the level of International connectivity; ISPs, and users are required to 
register with the local Public Security Bureau (PSB), thousands of URLs are blocked, 
Internet cafés are heavily regulated, and severe punishments including fines and 
imprisonments are occasionally used as a warning technique (Sohmen, 2001). Technical 
approaches like filtering software and human monitoring of online behaviors are also 
employed to deter possible dissenting online behaviors (Zittrain & Edelman, 2002; Tsui, 
2001). In addition to the traditional regulation and technological surveillance, the state 
also relies on self-censorship to maintain its political power (Cullen & Choy, 1999; Tan, 
1999; Sohmen, 2001; Tsui, 2001).  
Despite the seeming strictness of Internet control, in reality, the actual regulations 
of the Internet are not likely to be exercised so rigorously. There are two reasons to 
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believe that. First, as many scholars have pointed out, the Internet simply cannot be fully 
controlled (Tan, Mueller, & Foster, 1997; Hachigian, 2001; Qiang, 2003; Boas, 2004). 
With the sheer amount of information online, it would be unrealistic both financially and 
technically to censor all information or online activities. In addition, Chinese Internet 
users can attempt to circumvent controls in a variety of ways, from the use of peer-to-
peer file-sharing systems to using proxy servers to enter the blocked URLs. 
Second, as Boas (2004) pointed out, there is a difference between perfect control 
and effective control. Although perfect control is not possible, ―the self-censorship that 
the regime promotes among individuals and domestic Internet content providers (ICPs) is 
the primary way officials control what Chinese viewers see‖ (Hachigian, 2001, p. 48). 
The Chinese government understands that in a country like China where people have 
lived with censorship for years, the sense of ―insecurity‖ is deeply rooted in people‘s 
minds. In this sense, the objective sense of security that is determined by the reliability of 
technical functions and factual knowledge is not as crucial in determining people‘s online 
behavior, as the subjective sense of security, which is derived from individual perception 
and social norm (Wacker, 2003). Naturally, how the public perceives the censorship, and 
how they trust the Internet for its security would influence people‘s activities online. 
Thus, as the government‘s official newspaper, People’s Daily puts it, the trick for the 
state is to cultivate a ―firewall within one‘s head‖, instead of building an actual 
unbreakable firewall (―Party Daily calls for action against Internet pollution‖, 2001). This 
also explains why Internet-related arrests and penalties are often highly publicized. If the 
public believes that the government is capable of monitoring their online activities, both 
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ISPs and users alike are inclined to engage in voluntary self-control, which probably is 
the most effective element in Chinese Internet control strategies. 
 The theory of threat explains this phenomenon well. According to Singer (1958) 
and Pruitt (1965), perceived threat derives from the target evaluation of the threatener‘s 
intention to harm and capability of carrying out harmful acts. A threat can be subjective, 
in that individuals are different in dealing with possible threats. Paranoid people are more 
likely to perceive threats than others are. Characteristics of threateners and targets, and 
the content of threats can all mediate how threats are perceived. For instance, according 
to Milburn and Watman (1981), structural threats — ones embedded in the structure of a 
situation, such as the treat of arrest when you commit a crime, or threat of harming long-
standing national interests, are the most credible threats. In a situation like structural 
threat scenario, the targets could still engage in punishable behaviors if they doubt the 
effectiveness of the possible punishment. When it comes to Internet censorship in China, 
it is reasonable to believe that users would perceive the censorship as a structural threat, 
partially due to the history of censorship in China, and partially due to the legitimate 
status of the government in executing such threats. As Asch (1952) and Kohler (1938) 
describe, when the position of the threatener is considered legitimate by the target, the 
threat itself carries a sense of ―requiredness‖ or ―ought‖. 
 Milburn and Watman (1981) draw a distinction between intended threat and 
perceived threat. The threatener may intend to communicate a threat, but an intended 
threat may not necessarily be perceived as one. Especially when the target possesses a 
sense of control in the situation, they may not act on the threats after all. For instance, 
when Chinese Internet users believe in the uncontrollable power of the Internet, or when 
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they believe that they have the necessary skills to bypass Internet censorship, they may 
choose to ignore the punishments for using the Internet for possibly dangerous political 
purposes after all. In contrast, when the perceived threat of Internet censorship is high 
and the trust of the Internet or themselves is low, users are likely to restrain themselves 
from using the Internet in potentially dangerous areas.  
As the following figure (see Figure 2-4) demonstrates, perceived threats may have 
direct and moderating effects on Internet use. Perceived threats may influence the ways 
people use the Internet. When perceived threats are high and effective, users are likely to 
shy away from using the Internet for political purposes. In addition, as the previous 
section illustrates, political Internet use is determined by personal characteristics. For 
instance, users who are more educated, younger, and wealthier, and the ones who are 
interested in politics are more likely to engage in online political activities. But the 
influence of perceived threat can moderate the relationship between individual factors 
and Internet use. In other words, when perceived threat is low, young, wealthier, more 
educated, and more politically interested users are more likely to use the Internet for 
political purposes; when perceived threat is high, however, these relationships between 
individual attributes and political Internet use are likely to diminish or even reverse. More 
educated users may have achieved more compared to less educated users, and therefore 
have more to lose. Hence, when these users identify a high level of threat, they will avoid 
trouble by not using the Internet for political purposes, even though they may be 
interested in doing so otherwise.  
Many efforts have been made to understand what determines various ways of 
using the Internet. It is not difficult to imagine that people who use the Internet mainly 
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for political purposes are different from people who use the Internet mainly for 
entertainment, but this difference may not be detected if the moderating effect of 
perceived threat is not taken into account.  
 
Figure 2-4. The Moderating Model of Perceived Threats 
 
                           Perceived Threats 
                       ↓↘ 




 ―With communism discredited and democracy distrusted, China is in research of a 
new ideology…nationalism may be filling the gap‖ (―China saying no‖, 1996, p. 30). 
To sustain the legitimacy of their rule, the Chinese government has resorted to 
promoting new ideologies or doctrines. Today‘s China can be said to be far from a 
socialist country. Socialism, communism, and Maoism all seem obsolete. Although the 
political system is still a one-party monopoly, the economy is a mixture of capitalism and 
state control. In order to build a new ideological foundation, the state has turned to 
nationalism in that nationalism represents the entire country instead of certain classes 
(Zhou, 2006). Indeed, nationalism provides a sense of solidarity that is badly needed in 
the country.
5
 While nationalism has become one of the most visible ideologies in China 
today, many people, including the ones who believe in capitalism, tend to value economic 
development and social stability over democratic ideas (Friedman & McCormick, 2000; 
                                                 
5
 See Zhou (2006) and Zhao (2000) for more discussions about nationalism in China. 
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Downs & Saunders, 1998/1999). As Zhao (2000b) pointed out, many Chinese 
intellectuals emphasize that ―they are patriots first and democrats second‖ (p. 22).   
Nationalism has attracted great academic attention over the years, but there is 
very little consistency in defining the concept. In fact, many studies about nationalism 
focus on what the concept means, and where, when and how it originated. What has been 
agreed upon, however, is that nationalism is a modern phenomenon that is specially 
associated with the nation-state system (e.g., Emerson, 1960; Cottam & Cottam, 2001; 
Zhao, 2004a). It‘s becoming commonplace to treat nationalism as an enemy of 
democracy, especially since World War II, where nationalism seemed to be inextricably 
bound up with fascism. For instance, Vesna Pesic—a Serbian leading democrat has 
attacked nationalism for being ethnocentric and antidemocratic (Diamond & Platter, 
1994). Disagreeing with the view that nationalism and democracy are mutually hostile, 
however, Nodia (1994) argues that nationalism is intertwined with the tradition of 
democracy, evidenced in the French revolution or the United States‘ Revolutionary War 
from the Britain, where nationalism was the core political force in building a democratic 
government. Nationalism and democracy could definitely coexist under certain 
circumstances. Nevertheless, even Nodia himself admitted that there are always tensions 
between democracy and nationalism, since democracy is based on the notion that 
government is only legitimized by the will of the people, whereas nationalism tends to 
subordinate individual rights to collective ―national rights‖, which runs contradictory to 
democracy, fundamentally.    
Although Chinese history stretches back more than two millennia, China has 
traditionally been governed by Confucianism and specific ethnic structures, which is not 
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considered a nation-state today (Zhao, 2004a). Along with many other Western 
ideologies, nationalism was first introduced to China in the 19
th
 century. It emerged as a 
painful response to foreign invasion and maintained its powerful appeal in China‘s fight 
against international imperialism until 1949 when Marxism-Leninism became the official 
ideology. In the 1980s, however, Communist ideology faced a legitimacy crisis when 
challenged by liberal democratic ideas. The ―three spiritual crises‖—a crisis of faith in 
socialism, a crisis of confidence in the future of the country, and a crisis of trust in the 
party (Zhao, 2004a), troubled the regime so deeply that the restoration of state legitimacy 
became the most serious task for the Chinese leadership. The government needed a new 
ideology to integrate as many Chinese people as possible. Nationalism was their answer.  
Nationalism has gained great popularity in China. Nationalistic books like The 
China that can say no became an instant bestseller in 1996; the nationwide outrage broke 
out after the May 1999 mistaken U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade; and 
protesters took it to street after a US spy airplane accident. These incidents are all 
indicators of growing nationalistic sentiments (Gries, 2004). China‘s nationalism has 
oftentimes been described as state-driven. It is partially true, since the state does play a 
proactive role in cultivating nationalism in the official propaganda. However, it would 
oversimplify the reality to believe that the rising nationalism in China today is entirely a 
government-led phenomenon. The state-driven nationalism in China must converge with 
the public on some grounds. Other than the historical and cultural dimensions, the most 
appealing feature of Chinese nationalism is pragmatism or instrumentalism.  
According to Zhou (2006), what comprises the paradigm of Chinese nationalism 
are concepts like ―comprehensive national power‖ –which emphasizes the economic 
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development of the country, ―national interests‖ –which concern China‘s position in 
world politics, and ―the rules of the game‖ –which conveys political, economic or social 
interactions with other countries as game playing. Under this ―interest-driven‖ and 
―game-playing‖ paradigm, the Chinese nationalists consider national power as the top 
priority. To sustain that economic development, the internal stability is also a necessary 
condition. Since the United States is often perceived as impeding China‘s reunification 
with Taiwan and China‘s ascension as a major force in world politics, the democratic 
values and human rights that the United States endorses have stopped attracting the 
Chinese public as they once did. Although a democratic government is still desirable, the 
public in China may no longer recognize it as the most important goal.    
Nationalism certainly plays an essential role in China‘s political world now. It is 
especially crucial to consider its impact in this study because like democratic values in 
the 1980s, nationalism has become the most celebrated ideology in China and has 
profound implications for political participation. For nationalists, democracy could be a 
chaotic force in today‘s China and even hinder China‘s economic development. As a 
result, they are more likely to comply with authoritarian controls in maintaining the social 
order. This theory is confirmed by a 2004 study that found a positive correlation between 
nationalism and political support (Chen, 2004). Findings from the Beijing survey (Chen, 
2004) reveals that people who have strong beliefs in nationalism and preference for 
stability are more likely to be proud, respectful, and supportive of the political institutions 
in China.  
Although there has been relatively little interest in understanding the participatory 
consequences of nationalism, Cottam and Cottam (2001) did identify a few behavioral 
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patterns of a nationalistic public. These include: 1) A greater tendency for political 
integration with the communities outside the official borders of the state but considered 
inherently part of their own existing. In terms of policy preference in China, a 
nationalistic Chinese would have a stronger will to include areas like Taiwan, Hong Kong, 
and Macau in a unified China. 2) A greater concern with protecting national dignity and a 
greater willingness to take action when threats occur. What this pattern implies is that a 
nationalistic Chinese would be more likely to be politically active, or at least reactive 
when he/she perceives threats from an outside force. 3) A greater likelihood to sacrifice 
for the greater good or collective interests. This could explain the results of the World 
Internet Project, which shows that 7.9% of Internet users and 7.4% of non-users in China 
agree that online political information needs to be controlled.
6
 Apparently, for some 
people, individual rights such as freedom of expression could be sacrificed for greater 
goals such as stable political environment. 4) More likely to grant a nation-state‘s leaders 
the decisional latitude to take risks in defending state interests, but less likely to grant 
such latitude when the leaders accept defeats.  
The 1999 Belgrade embassy bombing incident exemplifies the heated 
nationalistic sentiments in the Chinese public (Symonds, 1999). On May 8, 1999, an 
American B-2 bomber dropped five two-thousand-pound guided missiles that hit the 
Chinese embassy in Belgrade. Three journalists were killed, and twenty-three others were 
injured. While U.S. President Bill Clinton proclaimed the bombing as a ―tragic mistake,‖ 
many Chinese people believe it was premeditated. Protests quickly erupted throughout 
the country. At first, the government rejected American and NATO‘s apologies, which 
the public applauded; however, in the end, the Chinese government accepted the apology 
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 More results are available at http://www.worldInternetproject.net/. 
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and agreed to the compensation. It was at this point the government found themselves 
incongruent with the public, and they had to shut down the continuing protests against the 
United States and NATO.  
During the protests against NATO and the U.S. in 1999, the protests did not only 
occur outside of the U.S. Embassy or Consulates, they happened online too. Flooded by 
emails sent from China, the White House website was temporarily shut down. Protesters 
hacked the U.S. Embassy‘s website in Beijing and wrote ―Down with the Barbarians‖ on 
the homepage. Chinese chat rooms and websites were swamped with discussions of the 
incident.  
When the Internet was first introduced to China, many assumed that the free flow 
of information would advance people‘s quest for a democratic reform. Ironically, what 
they have found instead, is that with the increasingly popular use of the Internet, users 
have relied on the newly accessible channels to voice nationalistic views, such as anti-
Japan or anti-U.S. discussions, reunification with Taiwan, and redeeming the 
humiliations of the past and urging for a powerful future, resulted from recent economic 
developments (Zhou, 2006; Zhao, 2004; Zhao, 2000). 
At first glance, discerning the differences between political actions caused by 
nationalism and political actions caused by democratic values is probably difficult. 
Ingelhart (2005) for example, has treated protests in China as indicators of pro-
democratic actions. But a closer look at protests like those in 1999 reveals that it is quite 
different to protest against a foreign country and to protest against the Chinese 
government. When it comes to protesting against a foreign force, nationalists could be 
very active. But if the protest is against a domestic issue or a leader, it is likely that the 
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nationalists will restrain themselves from doing anything subversive in order to maintain 
the social order, which they tend to view as more important than democracy at the current 
phase.  
Indeed, drawing a distinction between ―inward-directed‖ sentiments and 
―outward-directed‖ sentiments, John Comaroff and Paul Stern (1995) noted that inwardly, 
nationalism strives for solidification of a nation-state through the modernization 
movement or liberation from alien rules, whereas outwardly, nationalism could generate 
hostility toward other states—an extreme case would be the experiences of Germany and 
Italy in World War II (Carmaroff & Stern, 1995). 
The state-led nationalism has opposed democratic values in a number of ways, 
including prioritizing pragmatic concerns like strong government, stable economic gains, 
and social order at the expense of democratization (Zhao, 2004a). Rooted in the century 
of China‘s defeats by foreign countries, grassroots nationalism reacts most strongly when 
the national interest is being threatened by an outside force. Protests against Japan in 
1996 and 2005, the United States in 1998, or France in 2008 are all manifestations of the 
grassroots oriented nationalism. 
As nationalism rises as one of the most influential values in China, it is important 
to understand its behavioral consequences. Likely, citizens who value national interests 
and social stability would engage in different political activities in contrast to democrats 
who favor a democratic political structure and individual rights. Moreover, the Internet 
use could work as a moderator between nationalism and political engagements. For 
example, the Internet could help disseminate grassroots nationalistic views that often 
criticize the government‘s International policies for being too soft. Consequently, 
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although state-led nationalistic people are more likely to support the state and less likely 
to support sudden political change towards democracy (Chen, 2004), their exposure to 
online critical coverage of the government‘s international policy may change the 
association between people‘s nationalistic ideology and political participation. Figure 2-5 
demonstrates the direct effect of nationalistic values on political participation and the 
potential moderating effects of political Internet use.  
 
Figure 2-5. Nationalism, Net Political Use and Political Participation 
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This section discusses research design, data collection, and the validity of the 
research methods used. Given the complexity of studying politics in China and the 
relatively new nature of Internet use, this study draws upon multiple datasets and 
methods to understand the Internet‘s political impacts.  
Secondary Analysis 
To answer the first research question about the Internet adoption and divide on the 
aggregate level, two existing datasets were used. The first dataset was obtained from the 
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) in China and is composed of macro-level indicators 
such as economic development, technology infrastructure, and educational level broken 
down by provinces in China. The most recent statistics were collected in 2007. The 
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second dataset is the CNNIC‘s annual report of Internet development. These reports run 
from 1997 to 2009 and were conducted twice every year. The number of users and 
penetration rates from each province in China are documented by these reports. 
Using the combination of the macro-level predictors and Internet diffusion data, 
this study explored what institutional level factors explained Internet penetrations and the 
provincial variances of Internet penetration in China. Specifically, determinants of 
Internet connectivity in different regions were analyzed, so that possible approaches to 
close the regional disparity in Internet diffusion were discussed. 
To understand what determines Internet adoption and use on an individual level, 
as well as the Internet use‘s political consequences, in-depth interview and original 
survey data were conducted and analyzed. Both the interview and survey were reviewed 
and approved by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at the University of Michigan. 
Both one-on-one in-depth interviews and survey interviews were conducted in the capital 
city Beijing and a western provincial capital Urumqi. These two cities were chosen 
because Beijing represents the area where the Internet is most developed and applied, 
whereas Urumqi is a western city where the Internet penetration rate is significantly 
lower. Political, economic, and educational levels from the two cities are vastly different, 
which therefore makes them appropriate choices for understanding different patterns of 
Internet adoptions. In addition, the political environment in the two cities is diverse, too. 
Beijing, as the political center of China, is much more liberal and open than the remote 
western city, Urumqi. It would be interesting to investigate if Internet use for political 




In-depth interviews are particularly useful to elicit information in order to achieve 
a holistic understanding of the interviewee‘s point of view or situation. In-depth 
interviews are also useful for further investigation since they provide detailed contexts for 
standardized methods such as survey. Prior to running the standardized survey, in-depth 
interviews were performed to understand the main variables and their intervening 
relationships involved in this study. For instance, questions like how the Internet is used 
exactly by each individual, what factors are involved in determining what to do online, 
what nationalism or democracy means to the Chinese public, and whether or not the 
perception of censorship is really vital in determining people‘s political Internet use could 
be explored first. As a result, a clearer picture about the Internet in China can be drawn, 
and questions in surveys can be tailored to the specific characteristics of the Chinese 
public. Detailed knowledge of the respondents‘ Internet use habits and political behaviors 
offline enriched the understanding of the contextual factors of the two-stage relationships, 
and also shed some light on the impact of using the Internet on respondents‘ engagement 
in the political world.    
To recruit participants for the interviews, 30 flyers were distributed in business 
districts in each of two cities: Beijing and Urumqi in February of 2007. In addition, the 
flyer was published on two Chinese websites www.sina.com.cn and www.tianyaclub.cn 
in February as well. These two websites are two of the most popular portals in China, and 
both have forums or bulletin boards for different regions. On these two portals, the flyer 
was specifically published in the board of Beijing and Xinjiang, of which Urumqi is the 
capital city. The flyer states that a graduate student is recruiting informants to understand 
people‘s media use habits, especially the Internet, as well as some of their world views. 
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Interested participants were instructed to contact a cell phone number listed on the flyer 
and meet with the interviewer at a later time.  
Dozens of people contacted the researcher after reading the flyer either on the 
street or online. In the end, only Internet users were interviewed since Internet use is the 
focus of the study. After each interview, the informant was asked to suggest friends or 
acquaintances who might want to participate as well. To maximize the representativeness 
of subjects, 5 females and 5 males in each city, across various age ranges and occupations, 
were chosen to participate in the interviews. 
The interviews were semi-structured and took place in public settings like coffee 
shop or tea-house. The interview conversations were audio taped. Before each interview, 
the informant was assured of anonymity and signed a consensus form. The researcher 
was the only interviewer.  
I started the interview by asking informants to recall as much detail as possible 
about their Internet use habits. How long they had used the Internet on a daily basis, what 
they had used the Internet for, and if they had used the net for political purposes, what 
activities would they be most likely to engage in. Then, the interview proceeded 
according to various narratives of the informant. For instance, if the informant had used 
the Internet for political purposes, I would probe into a few issues that I perceived vitally 
important: how they perceive the Internet censorship and if the perceived censorship 
could affect their political Internet activities. Evaluations of all informants‘ nationalistic 
levels were attempted by asking participants to describe how pride they were of being a 
Chinese, if they thought China should become a stronger power, and how they looked at 
economic development and political stability versus democratization and freedom of 
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expressions. They were also asked about their opinions on political actions; if they would 
want to get involved in conventional political participation such as voting and contacting, 
as well as political protests. Their demographic information was also recorded at the end 
of the interviews.  
Survey 
The cross-sectional survey data were also collected in Beijing and Urumqi in June 
and July of 2007. To recruit participants, a similar flyer was distributed in the university 
district of two cities asking participants to answer a questionnaire about their media use 
and world views, which took about 30 minutes. Each participant was promised to be 
given $10 at the end of the survey. First, two hundred flyers were distributed in each city 
and then another two hundred flyers were distributed later to attract more participants. 
Interested informants were asked to go to a university classroom at night to answer the 
questionnaires in person, where the researcher was present to monitor the interviews. The 
participants were assured of anonymity and signed a consensus form as well. The data 
collection took one to two weeks in each city. 
 
The Validity & Reliability of the Methods 
 To study political implications of Internet use in China validly and reliably, both 
qualitative and quantitative research methods were used. The two methods have their 
own merits and flaws. In-depth interviews are helpful in understanding the holistic 
situation of individuals but lack standardization and generalizability. Surveys are good in 
capturing relationships among important constructs in a systematic way, but often 
overlook the complex dynamics of human activities. Using the combined research 
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methods in this study, the validity of results can be increased, and reliability can be cross 
checked through different methods. 
Ideally, a random sample should be used to understand Internet use and its 
political consequences. However, ―obtaining a nation-wide probability sample of the 
Chinese population is both impossible and impractical‖ (Manion, 1994, P. 765). There 
are two reasons for this. First, it is very costly to generate a random sample; and second, 
survey research in China requires a permit from the local authority, which is difficult to 
obtain as the topic of survey is about politics. Thus, the most feasible sampling approach 
was to use a small convenient sample and not inform the local authority.  
While the generalizability of the data may be constrained, the results of this study 
can still provide important insights and inferences about the patterns of relationships 
between Internet use and political activism. Furthermore, as Manion (1994) argues, 
although unrepresentative samples may not be reliable to evaluate single variables, like 
political participation, these samples can help make generalizable inferences about 
relationships among variables, such as the relationship between Internet use and political 
participation. An unrepresentative sample would pose a bigger problem when the sample 
has unusual values in the variables that are in the theorized relationships. 
Concerns should be raised about the truthfulness of the survey answers since it is 
possible for respondents to conceal their true feelings or opinions in order to avoid 
possible trouble from the local authorities. To minimize political contamination of survey 
responses, precautions need to be taken to ensure the validity of the answers and safety 
for respondents. First, as one of the first scholars to collect survey data in China, Shi 
(1997) pointed out that attitude questions are usually more sensitive and more likely to 
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worry Chinese respondents than behavioral questions. Therefore, attitudinal questions 
were only asked when absolutely necessary in the survey. In addition, the respondents 
were offered confidentiality and encouraged to choose the answer, which was the closest 
to their true feelings.  
Second, since residents of Beijing are considered to be the most politically 
outspoken in China (Shi, 1997), responses from Beijing and Urumqi were compared and 
examined to see if there were any differences in answering politically sensitive questions. 
If any differences presented between the two cities, it would reflect either their true 
attitudinal or behavioral differences or distinct levels of openness.  
Finally, as Tessler and Jamal (2006) described in the data-collecting experiences 
in the Arab world, one of the key approaches to conducting surveys in a semi-democratic 
environment where people often fear and are skeptical of the survey researchers from 
abroad, is to network with the local academic institutions and elites. By associating 
himself with the local academic community, Jamal was able to build credibility for his 
projects and generate reliable responses. Since these survey interviews were conducted in 
a university classroom, Tsinghua University in Beijing and Xinjiang Agriculture 
University in Urumqi, two well-established universities in China, participants were under 
the impression that this study was in cooperation with the respected university.  
Although it is often assumed in the West that Chinese respondents may not feel 
free to talk about their true opinions, more recent studies show that Chinese respondents 
feel much freer to express their views and feelings in surveys than expected in the West 
(Shi, 1997; Chen, 2004). As Chen (2004) argued, this is partially because the Chinese 
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regulations regarding survey research at the grassroots level are inconsistent and 
ineffective. 
Having discussed the theoretical framework and methodology, the following 
chapters will explore different areas in understanding the Internet and political world in 
China. To estimate the political implication of Internet use, I first reviewed how the 






INERNET DIFFUSION AND PROVINCIAL DIGITAL DIVIDE IN CHINA 
 
 
The past twenty years have witnessed an exponential growth in Internet diffusion 
in China. It‘s estimated that the number of Chinese Internet users reached 253 million by 
mid 2008, overtaking the U.S. as the country with the most number of Internet users in 
the world (CNNIC, 2008). The number of websites in China also reached 1.919 million 
by 2008, with an annual growth rate of 46.3%. Although the Internet penetration rate is 
relatively low, with two people out of ten using the Internet,
7
 the growth rate is striking, 
considering that China is still a developing country, in which many citizens cannot make 
their basic needs. 
Unlike some may have expected, the Chinese government is taking a proactive 
role in promoting the development of the Internet and regards the Internet as one of the 
top priorities on China‘s policy agenda. Information technology, especially the Internet, 
was the focus of the national Ninth and Tenth Five-Year Plans (1995-2005). The Internet 
was embraced particularly to help economic, educational, and social development in 
China. China is also one of the first developing countries to reform its telecommunication 
regulating agencies to facilitate the growth of the Internet (Dai, 2003). The highly rapid 
growth of the Internet in China, without doubt, benefits a great deal from these national 
policies and strategies.  
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 China‘s population is estimated to be at 1.3 billion (Worldbank, 2006). 
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Nevertheless, the result of Internet development in China is rather unbalanced. 
According to the CNNIC reports, Internet users in China are better educated, young, and 
live in a big city. Students are the largest group to use the Internet. The population in 
rural areas represents roughly 60% of the Chinese population, but only 25% of Internet 
users are from the rural area. Notably, the growing rate of Internet users in the rural area 
has been increasing rapidly in the recent years. In 2007, the annual growth rate for the 
rural Internet users reached 127.7%. Out of the 73 million new Internet users, 40%, i.e., 
29.17 million, comes from the rural areas. The urban and rural difference seems to be 
closing, but remains evident.  
Still, the provincial gaps between the coastline and inland are wide. The 
provincial-level cities like Beijing and Shanghai have almost 50% of the Internet users; 
whereas less developed provinces like Anhui and Gansu have less than 10% of the 
penetration rate within provinces. Scholars have warned that in the international digital 
divide, the disparity of information technology diffusion between developed and 
developing countries may deepen the disadvantage of developing countries (Rodriguez & 
Wilson, 2000). Applying the same logic to domestic China, the digital divide in Internet 
adoption could also potentially widen the gap between the developed coastline provinces 
and the inland west, and push rural areas further away from the cities.  
Various factors contributed to the unbalanced fashion of Internet development in 
China, such as the economic condition, educational level, or government spending within 
distinct areas. Wealthier provinces or municipalities have a better infrastructure and 
educational system, as well as an open social environment to accept and develop the 
Internet. Less developed provinces, on the other hand, often lack the necessary economic, 
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educational, technological or social environment for developing information technology 
and are often short of sufficient demand. But how do the different provinces differ from 
each other? Furthermore, what exactly caused the gaps in Internet penetration across 
provinces? 
To understand what determines Internet penetration and the digital divide on the 
provincial level, this chapter first reviewed the relatively short history of the Internet 
development in China. Then, macro factors that could influence Internet diffusion on the 
aggregate level were discussed. Finally, a secondary analysis using provincial data was 
conducted to analyze what factors are most important in facilitating Internet penetration 
rates in 27 Chinese provinces or municipalities; and what remedies could be applied to 
bridge the digital divide between rich coastal areas and poor inland provinces.  
 
The History of Internet Development in China 
Development of the Internet in China did not occur until 1987 when China built 
its first computer network — the China Academic Network (CANET, Cullen & Choy, 
1999). The purpose of this network was primarily academic; it was aimed to provide 
research support for computer science studies. The network offered e-mail service with 
the international Internet through a channel provided by Kalsruhe University in Germany 
(Mueller & Tan, 1997).  
Following the CANET, the local network of the Institute of High Energy Physics 
(IHEP), which is part of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), was established in 
1988. The purpose of this network was to enable scientists at the National Science 
Foundation of China (NSFC) to participate in an international collaboration on high 
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energy physics, and also offer the scientists e-mail services (Taylor, 1997). In 1993, the 
IHEP network was directly linked to the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center for high 
physics international collaboration via a 64 Kbps leased satellite circuit from AT&T, and 
became the first official Internet link to the international Internet (Cullen & Choy, 1999). 
In March 1994, this link was formally provided with full Internet access, and in July 1994, 




In 1989, the National Computer Networking Facilities of China (NCFC) within 
CAS launched another network, CASNET, which was a joint development of the Chinese 
Academy of Sciences, Tsinghua University and the Beijing University funded by the 
State Planning Commission and the World Bank. This network provides the ―most 
powerful computing capability for scientists in China‖, and was owned and administered 
by China‘s Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT, Cullen & Choy, 1999). In 
September 1994, The Beijing University of Chemical Technology (MUCT) joined the 
CASNET to have full Internet connectivity via a 64Kbps MCI satellite circuit connected 
to CAREN (Consortium of Asian Research and Education Network) and JVNCNET 
(John Von Neumann Center Network-Princeton University, Yurcik & Tan, 1996).   
In 1990, China registered its domain name as ―cn‖ with the US Network 
Information Center (Cullen & Choy, 1999). Then the China Education and Research 
Network (CERNET) was launched in 1995 and was connected with more than one 
hundred Chinese Universities within the first two years (Taylor, 1997). While originally 
connected to the Internet through NCFC and CASNET, CERNET obtained its separate 
Internet connection via a 128 Kbps circuit in May 1995 (Yurcik & Tan, 1996).   
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The first commercial network, CHINANET, was set up by the MPT in 1995 
(Cullen & Choy, 1999).  CHINANET functioned as a wholesale provider of bandwidth. 
Its customers were state corporations and private companies as well as wealthy 
individuals who were able to afford the rather expensive connection fees at the time. In 
addition, CHINANET also constitutes a brand name for the regional provincial 
telecommunications administrations (PTAs) to sell their own retail service provision (Tan, 
1996a). CHINANET remains the largest network in China today (CNNIC, 2008).  
Currently, China has eight interconnecting networks. As the dominant network, 
China Telecom‘s CHINANET has held nearly 54% of the nation‘s total international 
connection capacity (CNNIC, 2008), but CHINANET‘s share of bandwidth has fallen 
over the recent years.   
Before 1995, most of the networks in China were used primarily for academic and 
research purposes. However, the academic networks began to sell ―shell accounts‖ to 
commercial users and provide email services and Usenet connectivity to bulletin board 
operators. Government organizations also started creating national computer networks for 
commercial use. In 1995, PTAs in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangdong, Liaoning and Zhejiang 
all started commercial services under control of the MPT‘s regional companies. 
Subsequently, more private Internet Service Providers (ISPs) began offering full-fledged 
Internet services to individuals (Cullen & Choy, 1999). The desirability of ISPs was 
further strengthened by the explosion of Internet users in the late 1990s. Within the first 
month after CHINANET was launched, more than 800 subscribers signed up for the 





Rogers (1983) defined diffusion as ―the process by which an innovation is 
communicated through certain channels over time among the members of a social system‖ 
(Rodgers, 1983, p. 10). Rogers pointed out that the innovation spreads in an S-shaped 
curve. The number of adopters increases slowly at first due to uncertainty about the 
innovation, but as the innovation gains more exposure, the adoption rate increases rapidly 
until reaching a saturation point, at which point the curve flattens again. If China‘s 
Internet growth follows the S-shape closely, China is expected to be in a stage where the 
growth rate continues to climb (CNNIC, 2008).  
According to the first national survey on the Internet in China, there were 820,000 
Internet users by the end of March 1998. By the end of 1999, the Internet users had 
reached 4.5 million (―China's Internet Users Exceed 2 million‖, 1999).
9
 According to the 
most recent report from CINNC (July 2008), the number of Internet users in China has 
reached more than 253 million, the number one in the world. Figure 3-1 shows the trend 
of Internet growth in China from 1997 to 2008. 
Figure 3-1. Number of Internet Users in China, 1997-2008 
 
Source: CNNIC 1997-2008 
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Although the number of Internet users in China has continued to grow rapidly 
during the past decade, the penetration rate in China is still relatively low compared to 
more developed Western European, North American and various Asian countries. As 
Figure 3-2 shows, the penetration rate in China is slightly lower than the world 
penetration rate. 
Figure 3-2. Comparisons of Internet Penetration Rates 
 
Source: http://www.internetworldstats.com/, 2008 
 
The increases in the number of Internet users are still skewed towards more 
developed areas in China. For instance, the number of new Internet users in Guangdong 
province was the largest among the provinces surveyed in 2007, showing an increase of 
15 million new users in one year; followed by Jiangsu, Zhejiang having increases of 7.3 
and 5.3 millions users, respectively. In terms of growing penetration rates, central 
provinces like Jiangxi, Henan, and Anhui all show growing rates higher than 70%. 
Nevertheless, in terms of absolute penetration rates, the penetration rates in developed 
cities like Beijing and Shanghai almost reached 50%, whereas the penetration rates in 






































































provinces below 10%. Table 3-1 illustrates how the concentrations of Internet users 
across the three regions differ. 
















Beijing          46.6 3.5 737 East 
Tianjin          26.7 1.4 287 East 
Hebei            11.1 3.6 762 East 
Shanxi           15.9 3.7 183 Central 
Mongolia         13.4 4 830 Central 
Liaoning         18.3 8.4 1757 East 
Jilin            15.9 7.2 1509 Central 
Heilongjiang     12.5 4.1 866 Central 
Shanghai         45.8 6 1256 East 
Jiangsu          23.3 15.9 3344 East 
Zhejiang         30.3 2.7 560 East 
Anhui            9.6 0.7 144 Central 
Fujian           24.3 2.6 15.9 East 
Jiangxi          11.8 1.5 13.4 Central 
Shandong         13.5 2.1 434 East 
Henan            10.2 2.3 476 Central 
Hubei            12.4 2.8 587 Central 
Hunan            10.9 2.4 511 Central 
Guangdong        35.9 4.6 956 East 
Guangxi          11.9 3.4 706 East 
Hainan           17.2 3.3 690 East 
Chongqing        12.7 1.7 356 West 
Sichuan          9.9 3.9 809 West 
Guizhou          6 1.1 224 West 
Yunnan           6.8 1.4 303 West 
Tibet            12.7 0.2 36 West 
Shanxi           13.9 2.5 517 West 
Gansu            8.4 1 219 West 
Qinghai          11 0.3 60 West 
Ningxia          10.1 0.3 61 West 
Xinjiang         17.7 1.7 363 West 
Source: CNNIC 2008. 
                                                 
10
 The second column is the number of Internet users out of the total population within each province; the 




The number of rural internet users increased sharply in 2007, with an annual 
increase rate of 127.7%, which is much higher than the increase rate of urban users 
(38.2%). Yet, although the urban-rural gap has narrowed, the majority of users still reside 
in urban areas (74.9%). By the end of 2007, Internet users in urban areas reached 157 
million, while the rural users constituted only 52.62 million. The Internet penetration rate 
presented was 27.3% for urban residents and only 7.1% for rural residents (CNNIC, 
2007). 
In terms of access method, the 2007 CNNIC reports that by the end of 2007, 163 
million Internet users (77.6%) were connected through broadband, 50.4 million Internet 
users (24%) used dial-up accounts.  
Currently, the average cost of Internet access for home Internet connection is 
RMB 74.9 Yuan/month. The average surfing expense for Internet café users is 51.6 
Yuan/month. Averaging access time is 16.2 hours per week.
11
  
Based on CNNIC‘s survey on non-users, four main reasons prevent people from 
surfing the Internet: 1) lack of knowledge of computer or network; 2) lack of surfing 
equipment or Internet access; 3) no interest; and 4) poor quality of the Internet. As 
Internet development was once again given great priority in the 2006 Five-Year Plan, the 
government will continue spending great efforts to work on the access problem in the 
foreseeable future. In addition, the Ministry of Education has established guidelines to 
teach computer skills and Internet knowledge in schools in order to help children adopt 
the Internet (Fallows, 2008). With the assistance of proactive national policies, Internet 
growth is likely to persist in China.  
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Macro-Level Factors Influencing the Internet Growth and Digital Divide 
In digital divide literature, a few factors that influenced the development of the 
Internet have been identified, including national policies, economic wealth, 
telecommunication infrastructure, affordability of Internet services, education, and other 
social/political factors (Hargittai, 1999; Norris, 2001; Robinson & Crenshaw, 2002; 
Lucas & Sylla, 2003; Dasgupta, Lall, & Wheeler, 2001). Although these studies mostly 
compared different countries, their results can be extended to understand provincial 
divides within China as well. 
Telecommunication Policy 
Past studies have suggested that among all the macro level factors influencing 
Internet penetrations, government policy is one of the most important predictors, 
especially the competition policy (Hargittai, 2000; Wallsten, 2005). In China, the 
government has given tremendous support to develop a telecommunication infrastructure. 
Starting from the mid-1980s, for example, the state has massively expanded telephone 
networks (Giese, 2003). In the Tenth and Eleventh Five-Year Plans (2001 and 2006) 
published by the Central Committee for CCP, clearly, priority has been given to the grand 
project of informatization. The plan includes widening of computer usage and digital 
networks (Giese, 2003). Ever since 1996, there had been a series of high priority projects 
proposed for the development of the information infrastructure — the ―Golden Project‖. 
These projects were proposed and operated directly under the guidance of former Premier 
Zhu Rongji. The main focus of these projects was to expand the application of the 
Internet. In addition, projects like ―Government Online‖ are also examples of the 
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government trying to proliferate the Internet content. Web content in the Chinese 
language has been enormously expanded and diversified,  partially as a result of the 
authoritative encouragement. Although some authoritarian countries have controlled the 
Internet by limiting the bandwidth, China did not do so. The CNNIC (2008) reports the 
total Internet bandwidth of international connections as 368,927 Mbps.  
The Beijing government also makes a remarkable effort to have a more 
competitive market for information technology. In 1993, the Ministry of Electronic 
Industry (MEI) began to compete with the MPT by launching a new corporation, called 
Jitong. The new company‘s original goal was to promote the ―Golden Projects‖, which 
was meant to connect China‘s customs and financial networks so that better information 
and service could be provided for users. Jitong‘s ChinaGBN (Golden Bridge Network) 
was established in 1996. In 1994, the State Council approved Unicom as the second state-
owned player. China Unicom‘s new network, UniNet was also created to compete with 
MPT‘s China Telecom (Harwit, 1998). This was a milestone in the development of 
China‘s telecommunication infrastructure since now there were two enterprises outside 
the realm of government ministries.  
Since being established in 1998, the Ministry of Information Industry (MII) has 
had significant commercial interest in the Internet. The MII used to own and in many 
ways still connects to China Telecom, which owns CHINANET, the dominant network in 
China. There were many debates about whether alternative national backbones should be 
allowed to compete with China Telecom, without threatening national security (Sohmen, 
2001). At that time, CHINANET was the only network that provided international 
connectivity to the private ISPs, and constituted more than 80 percent of international 
60 
 
connections by the end of 1999 (Anderson, 2000). Alternative networks such as 
ChinaGBN, which was affiliated with the old MEI, was still required to buy its 
international circuits through China Telecom. Finally, in 1998, Unicom was allowed to 
interconnect with the global Internet backbone. Unicom was authorized to participate in 
the Voice over IP trials and to deploy IP telephony service in over 100 cities. According 
to the MII, ―China Telecom and China Unicom, the two telecom enterprises, will 
compete with each other according to new market regulations and rules of the games‖ 
(―Minister Wu Jichuan‘s new initiative‖, 1998, p. 4). By creating a competitor for China 
Telecom, the Chinese government hoped that better and faster services would be 
provided by both former monopolies, China Telecom and Unicom, in the 
telecommunications market.  
After Unicom, several other backbone networks were launched, including China 
Communication Network Corporation (CCNC), which is sponsored by the Chinese 
Academy of Science (CAS), the Shanghai government, the Ministry of Railways, and the 
State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television (SARFT); China Mobile 
Telecommunication Network and China Satellite, which were both originally part of 
China Telecom.    
By 1997, the government had started to consider whether competition should be 
allowed at the national level, and decided to allow a few domestic organizations to run an 
ISP as long as some minimum requirements would be met. At the same time however, 
the government was concerned about the national security issues because control of 
private companies would be more difficult compared to the state-owned ones. It was 
finally decided that only a limited number of government organizations have the right to 
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run Interconnecting Networks in order for the State Council to retain control of the 
international connectivity. Choosing the limited number of Interconnecting Networks 
provided challenges for the State Council. In the end, the State Council chose the China 
and Research Network (CERNET) and the China Science and Technology Network 
(CSTNet) for the research and educational community. Failing to become the only 
commercial Interconnecting Network, the MPT settled for being one of two commercial 
Interconnecting Networks; the MEI was selected for launching another commercial 
network (Sohmen, 2001).    
The rapid development of the Internet in China today is certainly a result of these 
favorable national policies. However, while at the backbone level China engages 
―managed and controlled‖ competition, its rule that ISPs need to obtain government 
approval before operation commences and must lease global Internet access through 
government-controlled networks, will likely hinder the development of the Internet use. 
According to Wallsten (2005), higher ISP barriers are associated with fewer Internet 
users. He also suggested that Internet cafés would be more expensive to operate in 
countries where regulations are stricter and extensive. 
While this study tries to understand the provincial gaps within China, the unit of 
analysis here is the sub national entity, which needs to operate under the given national 
policy regime. Being a province or a municipal city, these units cannot initiate their own 
major policy changes regarding Internet development. However, each province does have 
different foci for developing economics. For provinces containing numerous tourist 
attractions, investments tend to be more on tourist destinations‘ development. For 
provinces having natural resources, natural resources are emphasized more. For instance, 
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western provinces like Guizhou and Ningxia spend 5% of their government expenditure 
on agriculture and forestry, whereas an advanced city like Shanghai only spends 1% and 
0.5% on these industries, respectively. Given the diverse rationale for promoting different 
productions or industries in a particular province, the Internet can receive varying degrees 
of government support. 
 
Economic Factor 
Other than government policies, the economic factor has been repeatedly 
identified as a major predictor in Internet development. The GDP was often used to 
measure the economic condition, and has been discovered as one of the most important 
factors in Internet development (Hargittai, 1999; Kiiski & Pohjola, 2000). Norris (2001) 
also identified economic development and R&D investment as important factors in 
Internet development. Unlike Western countries, where R&D investments are mostly 
from private sectors, in China, the primary R&D investment for the Internet is generally 
from either government or state sponsored universities, and therefore, more of a policy 
factor. 
Moss and Townsend (1998) found that less urbanized, economically and socially 
depressed cities with less information infrastructure fell behind the rest of the U.S. in 
Internet concentration. Income level in an area is another common measurement for 
economic conditions. For instance, both Elie (1998) and Beilock and Dimitrova (2003)‘s 
researches discovered that per capita income is a significant predictor for Internet 
adoption. Naturally, a country or an area would need enough money on an aggregate 
63 
 
level to develop the Internet and have wealthy enough customers to consume the Internet 
services. 
A larger service sector, which includes strong information science, technology, 
and other knowledge-intensive sectors in an economical dimension, could also help the 
diffusion of the Internet (Robinson & Crenshaw, 2002; Castells, 2000). This is because a 
complex service sector indicates a socially and occupationally specialized society, which 
requests and contributes to advanced communications and transportations (Bell, 1973). 
Oppositely, agriculture‘s importance in an economy is negatively associated with the 
diffusion of information and communication technology (Pohjola, 2003). 
In China, the economic conditions within each province vary widely. The urban 
family income level for Shanghai, an eastern city, is more than twice that of Guizhou, a 
western province. The Gross Regional Product (GRP) ranges from 2 billion RMB in 
Guangzhou, a coastline province, to less than 0.03 billion RMB in Tibet (―China 
Statistics Yearbook‖, 2007). The variations in economic conditions are likely to create 
different demands for the Internet. When people have less money to spend, they would 
tend to spend it on more needed areas, such as food or clothes, instead of luxury 
information services like the Internet. 
 
Telecommunication Infrastructure 
The importance of the telecommunication infrastructure is revealed by many 
studies as well (Arnum & Conti, 1998; Corrocher & Ordanini, 2002; Dimitrova, 2002; 
Hargittai, 1999; Kiiski & Pohjola, 2001; Lucas & Sylla, 2003; Robinson & Crenshaw, 
2002; Danowitz, Nassef, & Goodman, 1995). The most frequently used measurement for 
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the infrastructure is the number of telephones per capita (Beilock & Dimitrova, 2003; 
Clarke, 2001; Hawkins & Hawkins, 2003; Kiiski & Pohjola, 2001). In the earlier years, 
dial-up from telephone lines was the main mode for connecting to the Internet. Recently, 
broadband through cable line and mobile phone have started to compete with dial-up 
connections (CNNIC, 2008). Therefore, the telephone, mobile and cable infrastructures 
should all be considered as measurements for the telecommunication infrastructure.  
In China, the telecommunication constructions differ across provinces partially 
because of geographic characteristics. The geographic features of provinces from east to 
central to west can be roughly described as plain, hill and mountain, respectively (Wang, 
2002). The geographic accessibility is greatly associated with telecommunication access 
due to the associated levels of difficulties in constructing infrastructures in different 





Social openness could also help nurture the Internet development. According to 
Robinson and Crenshaw (2002), politically open societies are more accepting of 
technology because it could help political mobilization and global economic competition. 
Their study shows that the Internet is more easily adopted by democratic nations. Yang 
(2003) also argued that the civil society in China could facilitate adoptions of the Internet. 
Not only could the existing organizations provide a user base for the Internet, the 
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The relationship between the Internet and an open society are probably reciprocal. As an open society 
provides user bases to help Internet development, Internet use could also strengthen ties of social 
organizations, and foster the openness of the environment. Nevertheless, at the early stage of Internet 
diffusion, the nurturing effect of open society on Internet adoption is likely to be more influential. As the 




dynamics of civil society—expansion of the public sphere and active participation in 
public life are also prerequisites for a live online environment.  
While previous studies looked at democratic levels in different countries to 
understand the impact of social openness on Internet penetrations, the units of analysis 
here – Chinese provinces or municipal cities — have the same political system. However, 
this does not mean all provinces have the same level of openness. In China, while eastern 
provinces like Guangdong or Shanghai, with longer history and more frequent 
communications with the outside world, tend to be open and liberal, the inland provinces 
that are closed out from the outside longer tend to be conservative and more difficult to 
adapt.  
One indicator for that openness is foreign investment. The Ministry of Foreign 
Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOTEC) and the MII formally banned the foreign 
investment in telecommunication industry (Ure, 1997). Nevertheless, when China joined 
the WTO in 2001, foreign investment in the telecommunication section finally became 
possible (Allen, 2002). Higher levels of foreign investment could indicate a greater 
political/social openness to external changes, which are prerequisites for technological 
diffusions. Indeed, Robinson and Crenshaw (2002) found some evidence for the 
importance of foreign investment, as a measurement for the globalization variable. 
Media or cultural industry could also be used to measure the openness of a society, 
since a liberal environment is usually more nurturing to diversified and liberal news, 





The educational level of a society is also a major prerequisite for Internet 
adoption (Kiiski & Pohjola, 2002; Lucas & Sylla, 2003). First of all, an educated 
workforce has made the creation and advancement of information technology possible. 
Additionally, as Rogers (1983) argued, mass education lays ground for the diffusion of 
innovation by providing unified literacy and necessary technical skills. Also, as the 
educational level increases, so rises the demand for computer and information 
technologies (Robinson & Crenshaw, 2002). 
 
Density & Urbanization 
Other factors that have been identified to be potentially related to Internet 
diffusion are population density and urbanization. A dense population indicates a more 
developed history. According to Wheeler and O‘Kelly (1999), a dense population forces 
occupational and technical specialization, which facilitate telecommunication 
developments.  
Similarly, urbanization is also a good measurement for a mature economic 
environment. Dasgupta, Lall, and Wheeler (2001) for instance found that a larger urban 
population is positively related to Internet use. In China, the eastern provinces have the 
highest population density, followed by the central and western regions (Wang, 2002). As 
cities have the greatest population, these eastern provinces also have more urban 
residents as well. According to the CNNIC reports, the Internet penetration has been 
much higher in urban areas than rural areas for the past decade.  
Finally, regional disparity is expected to exist among Chinese provinces. As 
discussed earlier, eastern provinces tend to be wealthier, of better educational level and 
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more developed, whereas western provinces tend to be poorer and less developed. 
Although much difference between the east and the rest of the country may be accounted 
for by the predictors discussed earlier in this section, some disparity may still remain 
unexplained by these identified indicators, such as historical or geographical factors. 
Therefore, the regional factor is also included in the analysis. It is expected to see much 
higher penetration rates of Internet in the east. Based on literature review expounded 
upon in the above section, the following hypotheses are proposed:  
 
H3a: The higher priority given to Internet development of a provincial policy, the 
higher its Internet adoption rate.  
 
H3b: The more economically developed a province is, the higher its Internet 
adoption rate. 
 
H3c: The better the telecommunication infrastructure of a province, the higher its 
Internet adoption rate. 
 
H3d: The more socially/politically open a province is, the higher its Internet 
adoption rate. 
 
H3e: The higher the educational level of a province, the higher its Internet adoption 
rate.  
 
H3f: The higher the level of urbanization and population density of a province, the 
higher its Internet adoption rate. 
 
As noted earlier, the Internet development in China is fast but heavily unbalanced. 
The Internet growth favors the more developed areas like Beijing and Shanghai, while 
leaving the inland areas to lag behind. To understand the Internet diffusion in China, one 
has to answer the question of what determines the Internet diffusion across different 
regions, and hopefully, some insights can be generated regarding what could be done to 




This chapter looked at different macro level factors in predicting Internet 
penetrations across eastern, central, and western provinces. Data on Internet penetrations 
were derived from the CNNICs‘ latest report (January 2008).
13
 The report is available at 
CNNIC‘s website. The 2008 CNNIC survey relies on a stratified random sample with 
telephone interviews (including mobile phones), and an online survey, where 
questionnaires were published on CNNIC and other ISP websites for people to fill out 
voluntarily. The total number of 46,300 respondents participated in telephone interviews, 
and 73,332 respondents participated in online interviews for the January 2008 survey. 
The CNNIC defines an Internet user as any Chinese citizen aged 6 or above, having used 
the Internet in the past half year. The CNNIC reports have been employed by many 
scholars to study the Internet in China (e.g., Wang, 2002). 
 Data for the independent variables come from the latest China‘s Statistical 
Yearbook (2007). Factors including measurements for economic wealth, 
telecommunication infrastructure, levels of education, and income level of a region were 
used to analyze what determines the Internet diffusion in 27 provinces and four 
municipalities (Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and Chongqing). 
Dependent Variable The dependent variable is operationalized as percentage of 
Internet users out of the total provincial population. The populations in Chinese provinces 
are very diverse, ranging from 2.8 million in Tibet to 93.92 million in Henan. Using the 
percentage of Internet users out of the provincial population instead of the absolute 
number of users would better estimate the Internet penetrations across regions. The 
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 Although there is a more recent report (July, 2008), that report does not publish data across regions. 
Hence,  the older version of January 2008 was used here. 
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penetration rates (Mean 16.99%, SD 10.33%) ranged from 6% in Guizhou to 46% in 
Beijing in 2008. 
Policy It‘s not straightforward to measure policies across provinces since policy 
cannot be easily quantified. Naturally, if a regional government promotes technology, the 
Internet development is more likely benefited. Here, government expenditure on science 
and technology out of total government expenditure is used to measure how favorable a 
provincial policy is towards technology. As Norris (2001) showed, the expense on R&D 
is one of the top predictors of Internet diffusion. 
The expenditure on science and technology per 10k people (Mean 28.97, SD 28.85) 
ranges from 139.25 (10k Yuan) in the coastline municipal city Tianjin to 7.31 in the 
central province, Jiangxi.  
 Economic Wealth Economic wealth is measured by Gross Regional Product (GRP) 
per 10k people in 100 million RMB (Mean 1.86, SD 1.21), the service sector GRP per 
10k people in 100 million RMB (Mean 0.79, SD 0.72), and average annual income per 
household in each province (including both urban and rural).  
The highest GRP is in Shanghai with 571 Million RMB, and the lowest is in 
Guizhou, a western province, with 61 Million RMB. The service GRP is highest in 
Beijing with 353 Million RMB and lowest in Guizhou with 24 Million RMB. The urban 
annual family income (Mean 12273.30, SD 3763.85) and the rural annual family income 
(Mean 3871.50, SD 1787.63) are still very different from each other. The scale on 
average household income was then created by summing urban annual family income and 
rural annual family income together (Mean: 16144.34 Yuan; SD: 5490.58 Yuan). The 
richest place, in terms of family annual income, is in Shanghai (Urban: 22808.57 Yuan, 
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Rural 9138.65 Yuan), and the poorest is in Guizhou (Urban: 9439.31 Yuan, Rural: 
1983.62 Yuan).  
Telecommunication Infrastructure Three measurements are used to measure the 
telecommunication infrastructure: capacity of long-distance telephone exchange per 10K 
people (Mean 0.41, SD 0.17), the length of optical cable line per area (Mean 1376.00, SD 
1011.68), and capacity of mobile phone exchange per 10K people (Mean 0.50, SD 0.27). 
The best telephone infrastructure is in Beijing, and the worst is in Guizhou; the best 
mobile phone infrastructure is in Shanghai, and the worst is still in Guizhou; the best 
cable line infrastructure is in Shanghai, and the worst is in Tibet. In China, the top three 
methods of accessing the Internet are broadband (normally by cable line), dial-up, and 
mobile (CNNIC, 2008). Therefore, the capacities for the three methods are measured 
respectively. 
Educational Level Marco-level education in each province is measured by the 
number of colleges for every 10k people (Mean 0.02, SD 0.01), and the number of 
enrolled students in the universities for every 10k people (Mean 141.65, SD 69.54). As 
CNNIC reports repeatedly show, among all professions, college students are most likely 
to use the Internet. The province with the highest number of enrolled college students per 
10k population is Beijing, and the lowest number is in Guizhou.
14
  
Political/Social Openness No good objective measurement is available for 
political and social openness. A previous study showed that foreign investment could 
indicate levels of openness in a given nation (Robinson & Crenshaw, 2002). Here, the 
foreign investment per 10k people in 100 million USD (Mean 0.16, SD 0.25) is used to 
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 The province with most universities per 10k people is also Beijing, while several provinces have the 
same number of universities per 10k people. 
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measure the openness and readiness to cooperate with foreign companies. The province 
that has the most foreign investment is Shanghai.
15
 
In addition, the numbers of publications per 10k people including books (Mean 
1.35, SD 1.76), magazines (Mean 0.07, SD 0.06), and newspapers (Mean 0.02, SD 0.02) 
are used to measure the openness of a province. It‘s expected that an open environment 
would encourage more cultural publications such as newspapers, books or magazines.
16
 
Density & Urbanization Population density, which is measured by population 
divided by area (Mean 389.99, SD 533.64), and urbanization, which is calculated by the 
number of urban residents out of the total provincial population (Mean 46.42%, SD 
15.15%), are also considered in the explanatory model. Shanghai has most density and 
urbanization, while Tibet has the lowest density and Guizhou has the lowest urbanization.  
Region Chinese provinces are divided into twelve eastern, nine central, and ten 
western provinces (Wang, 2002). 
 
Findings 
 In Norris‘s 2001 book, Digital Divide, she also analyzed multiple predictors of 
Internet penetrations of different countries. She used two methods in her book: simple 
correlation and multivariate analysis. In the simple correlation analysis, each of the 
predictors analyzed in her study was significantly correlated with Internet penetration. 
However, since many of these predictors are closely related with each other, the 
multivariate analysis found that only economic predictors were significant while others 
failed to make the final list.  
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 Multiple provinces have the same lowest amount of foreign investment. 
16
 Shanghai has the most books and magazines. Multiple provinces have the least kinds of publications. 
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In this dissertation, similar approaches were used to understand the Internet 
penetrations across provinces in China. First, each individual measurement was 
correlated with Internet penetration. Second, to add one more dimension to Norris‘s 
approach, predictors were further broken down to seven different groups: policy, 
economic factors, education, telecommunication infrastructure, social openness, density 
and urbanization of a region, and area. Separate models with each group of predictor 
were run on Internet penetration.  
Finally, to solve the problem of mulicollinearity among predictors using 
multivariate analysis, a hierarchical regression model was run with economic predictors 
as base predictors and other groups of factors explored upon the base. As Norris (2001) 
and Hargittai (1999) discovered, economic factors are the strongest predictors of Internet 
penetrations, and usually related to other predictors such as education or infrastructure. In 
Norris‘s 2001 study, when economic indicators and social or political development were 
analyzed together, only economic indicators remained significant. These results however, 
could be spurious due to the high correlations among predictors. Therefore, in order to 
tangle the complex interactions among multiple groups of predictors, a hierarchical 
regression model was more appropriate. It analyzed the effects of each group of 
indicators while controlling for the most important area of economic indicators.  
 Table 3-2 shows the results for the first two steps. In step one, each variable was 
correlated with Internet penetration in provinces separately. As the first column shows, 





                                                 
17
 The item of newspaper variable was dropped from further analysis due to its insignificance. 
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Table 3-2. Predictors of Internet Diffusion 
 
N=31 
# p <.10; * p <.05; ** p <.01 
 
Pearson R is as high as .97 for mobile phone capacities. These results suggest that 
all hypothesized factors – policy, economic condition, educational level, 
telecommunication infrastructure, urbanization and population density, social openness, 
Predictors Pearson 
r 
Models in Each Area R
2
 





Economic Factors   R
2
=95.5% 
   GRP  .93** .11 .51  
   GRP in Service Sector  .92** .32# 1.77  
   Annual Income per Family .94** .55** 3.05  
Policy Factors   R
2
=61% 
   Government Expenditure on 
Science & Technology 






   Telephone Capacities  .94** .35** 3.21  
   Mobile Phone Capacities  .97** .60** 4.79  
   Length of Optical Cable Line by 
Area 
.68** .07 1.20  
Educational Level in Province   R
2
=71.5% 
   Number of Colleges  .69** .33 1.35  
   Number of Enrolled Students in 
Colleges  
.68** .42# 1.74  
Density & Urbanization   R
2
=90.2% 
   Population Density .72** .14 1.19  
   Urbanization .90** .79** 6.68  
Social Openness   R
2
=85.1% 
   Foreign Investment .83** 1.1** 4.89  
   # of Books Published  .69** -.01 -.03  
   # of Magazines Published  .61** -.31 -1.25  
   # of Newspaper Published  .15    
Region     





and region, are positively associated with Internet penetrations. However, as stated earlier, 
all predictors are also correlated with each other. 
The second column reports the individual regression within each group of 
predictors: policy, economic factors, telecommunication infrastructure, educational level, 
urbanization and density, social openness, and region, respectively. As Table 3-2 shows, 
the only policy variable explained 60% of the variance in Internet penetration on 
provincial level. Economic factors explained 95.5% of the variance in Internet 
penetration. While annual income is still highly significant (β=.55), service sector GRP 
became only marginally significant (β=.32), and GRP itself became insignificant in this 
model. The telecommunication infrastructure explained a significant 97.7% variance in 
Internet penetration on the provincial level. Telephone capacity (β=.35) and mobile 
phone (β=.60) capacity are highly correlated with penetration rates, whereas cable line is 
not significant.  
The block for educational measurements explained 71.5% of the variance in 
penetration rates. However, the only marginally significant variable is the number of 
students enrolled in colleges (β=.42). The two variables about urbanization and 
population density explained 90.2% of the variance. Only urbanization turned out to be 
significant (β=.79). For social openness predictors, although the entire block explained 
85.1% of the variance in provincial level Internet penetrations, the only significant 
predictor is foreign investment (β=1.1). The regional factor is also highly significant, 
with eastern provinces are more likely to have Internet adoption than western or central 
provinces (β=.66). The regional block accounted for 43.3% of the variance. 
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By analyzing each group of predictors individually, step two suggests that among 
all the factors, the telecommunication infrastructure, economic factors, as well as 
urbanization and density are the most predictive indicators, followed by social openness, 
education, and policy. 





# p <.10; * p <.05; ** p <.01 
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 The Beta reported for all predictors (excluding economic predictors from the base block) are upon entry 
Beta. 




 Standardized β t value  
Economic Factors (Base Block) R
2
=95.5%  
   GRP  .11 .51  
   GRP in Service Sector  .32# 1.77  
   Annual Income per Family .55** 3.05  
Policy Factors  R
2
=.001% 
   Government Expenditure on Science 
& Technology 
.04 .43  
Telecommunication Infrastructure  R
2
=4.6% 
   Telephone Capacities  .42** 3.07  
   Mobile Phone Capacities  .74** 3.78  
   Length of Optical Cable Line by Area -.01 -.96  
Educational Level in Province  R
2
=.2% 
   Number of Colleges  .02 .17  
   Number of Enrolled Students in 
Colleges  
-.06 -.61  
Density & Urbanization  R
2
=1.4% 
   Population Density -.13 -1.28  
   Urbanization .31# 1.93  
Social Openness  R
2
=.1% 
   Foreign Investment .08 .53  
   # of Books Published  .04 .42  
   # of Magazines Published  .06 .56  
Region   R
2
=.2% 
   East .06 .73  
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For the hierarchical regression models, each group of predictors was entered 
separately while controlling for the base economic indicators. Again, economic factors 
are used as base predictors, since it has been identified as one of the most consistent and 
important predictors of Internet diffusion (Norris, 2001). The predictors include 
government expenditure in technology & science, telephone and mobile phone capacity, 
number of enrolled college students, urbanization, and foreign investment.  
As Table 3-3 indicates, the base block of economic factors accounted for a 95.5% 
variance in the Internet penetration. Among all groups of predictors, the 
telecommunication infrastructure added the most incremental R square (Incremental 
R
2
=4.6%). Both measurements for the telecommunication infrastructure are highly 
significant with β =.42 for telephone capacity and β =.74 for mobile phone capacity at 
p<.01. This is in line with the previous analysis, which shows that the telecommunication 
infrastructure explained the most variance in Internet penetration. Urbanization is 
marginally significant with β =.31. 
This study indicates that the major predictors for different Internet penetration 
rates across provinces in China are the economic factor, telecommunication infrastructure, 
and urbanization. The hypotheses about relationships between economic condition, 
policy, telecommunication infrastructure, education, social openness, density and 
urbanization, and region and Internet penetration rates were supported, but with different 
levels of strength. Although all factors are correlated with Internet penetration, economic 
factor, infrastructure, and urbanization appear to be strongest indicators of penetration 
across three models. This finding is in line with the CNNIC semi-yearly reports, where it 
has consistently shown that more urbanized coastline provinces with better economic 
77 
 
conditions and telecommunication infrastructures tend to have higher levels of Internet 
penetration rates. 
In order to understand what factors need to be given special emphasis within each 
region, three separate hierarchical regressions with the economic factors as the base block 
and using the most significant variables from each group of predictors were run in three 
regions respectively: east, central, and west.
19
 Although overall, economic factors, 
telecommunication infrastructure, and urbanization are the most important predictors of 
Internet connection, it is possible that, within each region, where political circumstance, 
economic condition, technological environment, and social openness are very diverse, 
Internet access might be explained by different factors. This expectation is supported by 
the analysis here. 
As Table 3-4 indicates, each region has different significant predictors in Internet 
penetration rates. For instance, in the east, the economic factor alone explained 90.6% of 
the variance in Internet adoption, whereas in the western and central regions, the 
economic factor only accounted for 65.8% and 34.7% of the variance in Internet 
penetration.  
In the east, the telecommunication infrastructure only contributed to an 
incremental 5.8% of the variance. With telephone capacity no longer a significant 
predictor, this finding suggests that most provinces in this region have reached a plateau, 
where comparable telephone infrastructures have been established across the eastern 
provinces. Mobile phone capacity (β =1.23) still has explanatory power in predicting 
Internet penetrations in the east, however. In both central and western regions, the 
telecommunication infrastructures contribute a significant incremental R square, 
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 Since the sample size is too small, only a certain number of predictors can be examined here. 
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suggesting how much predictive power infrastructure still has for these areas. Both 
telephone and mobile infrastructures are marginally significant in the western and central 
regions.  




# p <.10; * p <.05; ** p <.01 
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 All Beta other than for base block indicators are upon entry beta. 
Predictors East (N=12) West (N=10) Central (N=9) 










  GRP in Service 
Sector  
.34 1.52 .90** 3.97 .61 1.67 
  Annual Income per 
Family 
.64* 2.85 -.24 -.94 -.15 .89 
 
Policy Factors 












   Gov Expend on Sci 
& Tech 
















   Telephone 
Capacities  
.21 .65 1.01# 2.25 1.03# 2. 65 
   Mobile Phone 
Capacities  
1.23* 3.25 .56# 2.35 .96# 2.39 
 
Educational Level in 
Province 












   # of Enrolled 
Students in Colleges  
















   Urbanization -.06 -.35 .20 .50 -.57 -1.02 
 
Social Openness 












   Foreign Investment .07 .44 -.11 -.43 .44 1.15 
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Although the number of enrolled students in college is not significant in either of 
the areas, the education predictor adds another 9.9% and 10.6% of the variance in the 
western and central zones, respectively, suggesting how much incremental value the 
educational level of these regions could still help in predicting Internet adoption. 
Perhaps the most surprising finding is that in the west, the policy predictor adds 
18% of incremental R square and is highly significant (β =.72), demonstrating that more 
government expenditure in science and technology is greatly associated with Internet 
penetration in this region. In central area, too, both density and social openness add great 
explanatory power to Internet penetration, although the individual variables are not 
significant.  
These findings suggest that although on an overall level, economic factor, 
infrastructure, and urbanization are the top areas to consider in predicting Internet 
development, within each region, the Internet connection is explained by quite different 
factors. Consequently, to speed up the Internet adoption rate and for western and central 
areas to catch up with the east, different regions should focus on different factors. In the 
east, household income is the single most important factor; in the central, infrastructure, 
education, density, and social openness need to be worked on; whereas in the west, the 
provincial government must invest more on science and technology and the 
telecommunication infrastructure in order to catch up with the eastern regions in Internet 
development.  
These findings have important implications for government policies. This is 
especially true since as the Internet is still evolving, China is in the process of constant 
change and rewriting of telecommunication regulations. To speed up the Internet 
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penetrations across regions, policy makers should give special attention to diverse areas 
according to their different political, economic, and technological conditions. For 
instance, if the macro-level economic factor is the single important predictor for Internet 
connection, policies that regulate price for Internet access might not help the Internet 
adoption significantly unless the fundamental inequality in economic condition is 
addressed. But as our findings here suggest, the economic factors are not equally 
important to all regions. To develop the Internet in the west for instance, not only should 
the policy makers pay attention to economic factors and infrastructure, the policies that 
could have a strong effect on increasing Internet access appear to be investment in 
science and technology. Similarly, for the central area, the single important policy 
initiative should be the telecommunication infrastructure.  
This study used provincial level data for analysis of the Internet access. Relying 
on three steps of analysis, the findings here suggest that residence within a metropolitan 
area with better economic conditions and telecommunication infrastructures is 
consistently associated with higher level of Internet adoption. The most important finding 
from this analysis confirms previous studies, and finds that the economic factors and 
technological infrastructure outweighed all others in predicting Internet adoption (Norris, 
2001). Economic development, measured by per capita GRP, per capita service GRP, and 
household income, was consistently important across all three models, suggesting that 
more affluent areas have broader access to the Internet connection. The 
telecommunication infrastructure, measured by telephone, cable and mobile phone 
capacities, are also consistently associated with Internet connectivity. Thus, continuing 
economic development and the establishment of good telecommunications‘ 
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infrastructures will slowly broaden access to the Internet in China overall. Within each 
region however, different sets of variables stand out. If possible, the government 
initiatives should be tailored according to the diverse environments evidenced in each 
region. 
Of course, as the Internet continues to be adopted, the future trend may change.  
For instance, with the cost of access declining every year, both rich and poor people 
could be able to afford the technology. Eventually, the gap between different regions may 
narrow. Nevertheless, for the time being, the general economic development, 
technological infrastructure, and urbanization could strongly predict the Internet access. 
To help close the digital divide, the government needs to pay specific attention to each 
region‘s diverse patterns. After all, as Williams and Edge (1996) wrote, "technology does 
not develop according to an inner technical logic, but is instead a social product, 
patterned by the conditions of its creation and use" (p. 866). 
After reviewing the context of Internet development in China on the aggregate 
level, the following chapters tried to understand the main question of this study, 
specifically, would political Internet use mobilize users in real life? Furthermore, would 
any possible changes the Internet brought ultimately lead to democratization in China? 
Analysis began with the main dynamics among individual users, political net use, and 




GOING BEYOND THE INTERNET?  
IMPLICATIONS OF POLITICAL USE OF THE INTERNET IN CHINA 
 
 In January, 2009, a 24-year-old male, Li Qiaoming was detained in Jinning, 
Yunnan province for illegally logging trees. He was hospitalized on February, 8
th
 and 
died four days later from brain injuries (―China netizens join probe into ‗hide and seek‘ 
prison death‖, 2009). The Jinning public security bureau reported that Li was fatally 
injured while playing hide-and-seek with other inmates, one of whom allegedly punched 
Li when Li uncovered his hiding place. According to the official report, Li lost balance 
during the dispute with the inmate, fell into a sharp corner of the wall and the door, and 
consequently died. Li‘s parents did not buy the official report and neither did many other 
netizens. On Sina.com, the incident generated over 54,000 comments expressing 
suspicion and anger over the official report (Flanagan, 2009). 
This is only one of the many examples where the Internet provides an alternative 
information source other than official reports, and facilitates public discussions on these 
public issues. Last June, too, the public was enraged by allegations of a cover-up over a 
15-year-old girl‘s death. According to the son of a senior local official, a girl, Li Shufen 
committed suicide while a boy was doing pushups on a nearby bridge. The story and 
seeming immunity of the boy sparked massive rioting, where an estimated 30,000 people 
joined. Rioters torched the local police building and vehicles (Buckley, 2008). Despite 
the State censorship, the story erupted on the Internet, and pictures of people surrounding 
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the police building while police guarding the burning shell of the building and police 
vehicles were circulated on popular blogs. 
Perhaps what is most interesting about these incidents is that the government 
started to take the online opinions seriously. In Li Qiaoming‘s case, shortly after the 
online discussions questioning the cause of his death, the Yunnan government announced 
that they would permit an independent investigation led by netizens. One of the active 
posters of a web forum dedicated to Li Qiaoming‘s case was selected to head the 
investigation committee (Flanagan, 2009).    
It is hard to know whether the Chinese government is starting to include more of 
the general public in political matters, or whether this is a single gesture from the 
government in order to quiet down the potential riots. However, the Internet has proved 
to play an important role in China‘s political scene, as shown in several incidents. It 
publishes information that would otherwise be censored by the traditional media, 
provides forums for people to communicate and deliberate over public matters, and 
facilitates political participation, including permitted participation or even protests.   
As the number of Chinese Internet users has grown exponentially in the past 
decade, the Internet has undoubtedly changed the landscape of political communication 
in China. Like Cavanaugh (2000) described, the Internet works as a political Wal-Mart, 
where users can find all kinds of political information, video clips, candidate speeches, 
issue positions, up-to-date results, and ballot information (Cavanaugh, 2000). In China, 
the Internet also brings a special hope, in that unlike traditional media that are tightly 
controlled by the Chinese government, the Internet allows its users to access information 
from alternative sources, express their political opinions more freely, and even help some 
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users organize political actions. Though the Chinese government is trying very hard to 
manage the Internet as it did with traditional media, many Chinese users can still find 
ways to circumvent the censorship.  
This brings up the fundamental question of this study: Does the Internet offer 
democratic promise for China? There are really two parts to this question. First, how 
influential is the Internet? In other words, who is using the Internet? More importantly, 
who is using the Internet for political purposes? Then comes the second question: Would 
the political use of the Internet change these people‘s political behaviors in China? 
Would these changes then lead to democracy?  
Although these questions bear important research and practical significances, very 
few researchers have attempted to empirically address these problems. There are several 
difficulties in conducting such research in China. First, the Internet is still at its early 
stage in China. The online environment is ever changing. New formats or contents appear 
almost every day. For instance, blogs did not gain popularity until fairly recently. In 
addition, the profile of Internet users in China is evolving. Not long ago, only privileged 
college students have access to the Internet, however now, according to recent CNNIC 
reports, more rural and less educated people have also started adopting the Internet. To 
systematically analyze something evolving so rapidly is rather difficult.  
Second, the political life of Chinese people is still a sensitive topic. Even though 
China has experienced drastic changes economically for the past several decades, its 
political regime remains authoritarian. It is not easy to get truthful answers from the 
people when it comes to political topics. As a matter of fact, it is not easy to conduct 
empirical studies about political topics at all. Given the difficulties involved in studying 
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the Internet and politics in China, the current study managed to conduct a small scaled 
survey and in-depth interview. It is one of the few empirical attempts in trying to shed 
some light on political implications of the Internet in China. 
In this chapter, I first reviewed literature on Internet use and its political 
consequences. Since not many researchers have studied China‘s Internet and politics, 
most of the literature reviewed here was accomplished in a Western context. By applying 
the results from Western literature to China, however, I could form some logical 
hypotheses about implications of political net use. Second, the few studies regarding the 
Internet and its political influences in China, specifically, were discussed. Although these 
studies are mostly descriptive, they offer a starting point to understand the nature, 
characteristics, and implications of political Internet use in China. The Internet has some 
special meaning in the Chinese context, where free flow of information was not available 
through traditional media. Therefore, the Internet may have different functions for 
Western users and Chinese users. Third, the literature on Internet adoption on the 
individual level was reviewed. The previous chapter discussed Internet penetration on the 
aggregate level; here I examined what personal characteristics would lead to adopting the 
Internet, particularly political use of the Internet. Last, findings from the survey data were 
presented to answer the two main questions of this chapter: What individual 
characteristics are associated with using the Internet for political purposes? How would 
political use of the Internet influence people‘s political participation? 
 
Internet Use and Political Engagement 
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Scholars who believe in the modernization theory long ago contended that 
information technology is vital to democracy. Robert Dahl (1971) for example, argued 
that democracy is more susceptible to inequality of information and knowledge than 
inequality of wealth. More recently, the rapid development of the Internet has evoked 
various discussions over the impact of the new technology in politics. Some scholars 
believe in the Internet‘s force in revitalizing the democratic process. They argue that 
instead of passively receiving messages from an elite-controlled traditional news media 
such as television or newspaper, a rich Internet offers a unique opportunity for users to 
seek for more meaningful information, according to personal believes (Jacques & Ratzan, 
1997). Users can use e-mail to directly communicate with elected officials, candidates, 
candidates‘ campaigns, and newsgroups (Grossman, 1995) and are able to express their 
concerns and opinions on issues through electronic bulletin board or news group 
discussion forum (Johnson & Kaye, 1998). Moreover, the increased information and 
access online make it easier and less costly for web users to engage in political actions, 
for instance, now they can vote online (Owen & Davis, 1998; Hall, 1997). This process, it 
is claimed, would eventually shift the power in political life from elites to the general 
public (Delli Carpini, 2000).  
Following these arguments, many empirical studies have documented positive 
evidence for the Internet‘s mobilizing power. Compared to non-users, Internet users are 
more politically interested and active (Bimber, 1997; Johnson and Kaye, 1998); 
politically knowledgeable (Hill & Hughes, 1998), politically efficacious (Bonchek, 1997), 
are more likely to donate money online (Bimber, 2001), and to vote online (Katz, 1997; 
Hill & Hughes, 1998; Bimber, 1997). In a 1998 study, Bimber (1998a) found that the 
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level of engagement and propensity to vote increased after individuals had Internet access, 
specifically suggesting that going online itself can foster political involvement, although 
this effect was only true for traditional participation. 
Furthermore, the Internet may stimulate civic associations (Weber, Loumakis, & 
Bergmen, 2003). While direct political activity such as voting is one important aspect of a 
healthy democracy, participating in other sociopolitical organizations can also facilitate 
the democratic process. For example, Putnam (2000) points out that social capital — 
mainly interpersonal trust and social networks is vital for a smooth political life, since it 
provides means for the public to discuss and work on joint issues, therefore, increases the 
involvement in public affairs. Likewise, involvement in informal social associations is 
associated with political interests, political efficacy, and political participation (Kwak, 
Shah, & Holbert, 2000). While the current civic involvement is low in American society, 
some researchers advocate that the Internet can help build a sense of community in public 
life among Internet users. Since Internet communication is not constrained by 
geographical distance, it can enhance a sense of connectedness among people, which is a 
crucial element of democracy (Bimber, 1996). 
Disagreeing with these optimistic views, some political observers fear that since 
the Internet offers more autonomy, users could only pay selective attention to opinions 
and views that conform to their existing views, which may weaken the political and 
cultural commonality that is created by traditional media, and cause fragmentation and 
polarization on societal level (Neuman, 2000). Referring to selective exposure, Shapiro 
(1999) also warned, ―We can also build virtual gated communities where we never have 
to interact with people who are different from ourselves‖ (p. 25). However, some 
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empirical findings have shown that individuals expose themselves to both conforming 
and opposing views (DiMaggio, Hargittai, Neuman & Robinson, 2001).  
Drawing on the knowledge gap theory, other scholars were concerned that given 
the uneven levels of access to the Internet, the Internet will increase the knowledge divide 
between information ―haves‖ and ―have nots‖ (Norris, 2001). While privileged Internet 
users could obtain more information, become more interested and active, the non-users 
could become further disadvantaged in the information age.  
The time displacement argument also states that the time spent on chatting, 
playing games, and surfing online could replace traditional face-to-face interactions and 
erode civic engagement, which in turn, is likely to hold back political life (Kraut et al., 
1998; Nie & Erbring, 2000).  
Some are concerned that the Internet would deepen the political cynicism or 
distrust that already exists in today‘s Western world. These warnings have been 
supported in several studies, which indicated that Internet users are more politically 
distrusting than non-users (Katz, 1997; Johnson & Kaye, 1998), and more alienated (Hill 
& Hughes, 1998). 
Among all the research on Internet and politics, the large bulk of studies painted a 
rather unexciting picture, where the new media does not do much at all to people‘s 
political life. For instance, Hill and Hughes (1998) posit that the Internet merely allows 
people to do the same thing in a different way. According to these researchers, the 
Internet is essentially a self-selection process, where politically active people are still 
active online, and politically inactive people remain inactive. While Bimber (2001) 
reported that Internet users are more likely to donate money online, his finding also 
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showed that the Internet users are no more politically active than non-users. Furthermore, 
studies have demonstrated that deliberation in discussion groups was minimal (Wilhelm, 
1998), and the democratic participation online was irrelevant to participation in the real 
world (Streck, 1997). A survey by GVU (1997) also revealed that although Internet users 
are politically active and become even more involved politically after adopting the 
Internet, they are not more likely to vote than non-users are. In studying the relationship 
between Internet use and interpersonal trust, Uslaner in his 2004 study concluded that 
there is no reason to link technology to civic engagement, in other words, ―No matter 
what you do on-line, you don‘t become more (or less) trusting‖, or engage in more civic 
activities (p. 239). Another study conducted in Europe also found that the Internet is 
unable to make previously apathetic individuals become more politically involved, while 
it is not widening any gap between politically interested and not-so-interested people 
either (Gibson, Lusoli, & Ward, 2005).  
These researchers argue that an increased access to political information and 
increased opportunity to political activity would not automatically transform to more 
participation. While the information environment may change, people‘s capacity and 
willingness to participate in political life may not (Bimber, 1998a).  
Similar to these arguments, some researchers found empirical evidence that 
politically interested people would become more active with the Internet, whereas less 
politically interested individuals will become even more politically alienated (Murdock & 
Golding, 1989). As Norris (2001) expressed, ―…the rise of the virtual political system 
seems most likely to facilitate further knowledge, interest, and activism of those who are 
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already most predisposed toward civic engagement, reinforcing patterns of political 
participation‖ (p. 228). 
To summarize this empirical evidence, Owen and Davis (1998) and Hill and 
Hughes (1998) concluded that the Internet itself does not mobilize the public. The public 
is still doing the same thing online—active users are people who are active even before 
their use of the Internet. This trend, according to these researchers, will cause the 
broadening gap between higher and lower SES groups. Their claim finds evidence in 
Norris‘s 1998 study, where she found that Internet users who use the Internet for political 
purposes had higher levels of political interest, knowledge, efficacy, and were of higher 
SES. Therefore, it is not the Internet that helps people mobilize, it is the mobilized ones 
who choose to use the Internet.  
Although it is true that early adopters of the Internet tend to have higher SES 
levels, the continuous penetration of the technology has changed profiles of adopters 
greatly. Like the CNNIC reports in China indicate, the users today have lower average 
education levels than previous years, and more rural people have started going online. 
When these less advantaged users go online, they probably will start using the Internet 
for various purposes, which could include political usages. 
Moreover, as the Internet evolves into a full-fledged communication medium 
offering information, communication, entertainment, and so much more, the 
straightforward dichotomous definition of users versus non-users would inadequately 
depict the action of Internet use. Davis (1998) for instance, differentiated particular 
applications of the Internet, contending that certain people use the Internet to learn 
information, while others maintain relationships with family members or friends. Only 
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when they search for information online are they most likely to encounter opportunities 
for civic activities, and possibly political participation. Similarly, Grossman (1995) also 
believes that effects of Internet use would vary depending on different applications of the 
net. While entertainment usages of the Internet may not relate to civic or political 
participation, communicative, informational or political usages of the Internet are more 
likely to mobilize people. 
Aligning with these positions, Norris and Jones (1998) also criticized the simple 
―hour-of-use‖ measurement for Internet consumption. They suggested that informational 
and communicative uses of the Internet may increase civic engagement, whereas 
recreational and entertainment uses may erode it. Their exploratory study was one of the 
first empirical studies to specify various applications of the Internet. Moreover, their 
findings identified four types of Internet users: ―researchers‖, who use the Internet for 
investigative purposes and email; ―consumers‖, who shop online and use the Internet as 
financial and travel resources; ―expressives‖, who discuss or express opinions in chat 
rooms, discussion forums or other online groups; and ―party animals‖, who go online to 
play games and to be entertained. Indeed, their findings support their hypothesis that 
―researchers‖ are more politically knowledgeable than other Internet users. In another 
study, Norris (1998) confirmed the finding that those who use the Internet for political 
purposes (seeking information, contacting officials, or discussing politics) have higher 
levels of political interest, knowledge, and efficacy.   
These arguments were supported by Shah, Kwak, and Holbert (2001), where who 
also took into account of the complexity involved in Internet consumption, and 
differentiated multiple usages of the Internet. Their findings also suggested that while 
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recreational uses of the Internet are negatively related to production of social capital and 
civic engagement, informational uses of the Internet are positively related to civic 
participation as well as interpersonal trust. Studying Internet effects on political 
participation, Tolbert and McNeal (2003) also reported that Internet use was positively 
associated with voting, and this relationship was particularly strong when users employed 
the Internet for information gathering.  
Using the political Internet usage specifically as a predictor, both Jennings and 
Zeitner (2003), and Gibson, Lusoli, and Ward (2005) identified that political net use had 
a positive impact on civic engagement, as well as mobilizing the ones who are normally 
less active. Similarly, Tolbert and McNeal (2003) and Kenski and Stroud (2006) 
identified positive associations between access to the Internet and campaign news and 
political outcomes. By differentiating different functions of Internet use, these more 
recent studies have been able to identify positive mobilizing effects of the Internet.           
Internet use has rather complex dynamics. Not only it is used for information, or 
entertainment, it can be used for communication, expression, and numerous other 
purposes. The earlier findings about ―non-effect‖ of the Internet seem to reflect the 
simple measurement of Internet use. By looking at political net use in particular, this 
study attempted to specifically understand the Internet‘s political influences. 
 
Studies on Internet’s Political Implications in China 
Given the unique decentralized nature of the Internet, there have been tremendous 
research interests on whether or not the new technology could have political impacts in 
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China. Would the Internet, which offers free flow of information and communication, 
ultimately bring democracy? 
Lessig (1999) claimed that what the Internet could do to free speech in 
authoritarian countries exceeds all diplomatic, economic, and military approaches the U.S. 
government has tried during the past 50 years. As Lessig articulated, as long as a country 
goes online, it must abide by the ―First Amendment in code more extreme than our own 
First Amendment in law‖ (p. 167). It has been suggested by many scholars that the 
Internet and democracy could reinforce each other (e.g., Alexander & Pal, 1998; Hagure 
& Loader, 1999; Hoff, Horrocks, & Tops, 2000; Tsagarousianou, Tambini, & Bryan, 
1998). Not only could the Internet improve democracies in democratic societies, some 
believe the technology may help transform an authoritarian society into a democratic one 
(e.g., Diamond, 1992; Schmitter, 1996; Linz & Stephan, 1996). Media have long been 
praised for their democratizing function. Huntington (1991), for instance, suggested that 
television played an important role in Eastern European transitions. Similarly, it has been 
speculated that the Internet helped bring down the Suhato regime in Indonesia (Till & 
Sen, 2000). In China, too, many scholars have claimed to observe that the use of the 
Internet by the mass public could potentially pose a threat to the regime (Chase & 
Mulvenon, 2002). 
The Internet certainly brings a more open and free information flow to Chinese 
users. It also provides a forum for people to express, communicate, and even participate 
in the political world. The Li Qiaoming case is a perfect example illustrating how Internet 
users in China could obtain alternative information via the Internet, express their anger 
and suspicion, which eventually turned into political action that was led and participated 
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in by the general public – specifically Internet users. Now, as Internet users in China 
grow rapidly, more could participate in online political activities, which could lead to real 
world political changes. 
Although there are great hopes about the Internet‘s power in mobilizing the 
Chinese public or even democratizing China, the lack of empirical evidence leaves these 
statements speculative at best. Recent studies on the Internet in China have mostly 
focused on its physical networks, state censorship, or case studies about the Internet‘s 
political impact on China‘s civil society. Zixiang Tan and Wu Wei are two of the earliest 
scholars to work on the development of the network in China (Tan, 1995, 1999; Wu, 
1996). However, those works are almost completely technical, lacking discussion of 
socio political impacts of the new technology. Questions such as how people use the 
Internet and how that influences people‘s social or political lives remain unanswered.  
Later works by Mueller and Tan (1997) present a detailed review of the physical 
network and content regulation of the Internet in China, but still leave political impacts of 
the Internet untouched. Moreover, since their work was done before the Internet really 
took off in China, they were not able to predict how widely the Internet has been applied 
in almost every aspect of people‘s lives in China, and how powerful the technology has 
become.  
Unlike the earlier scholars, Taubman (1998) tried to understand how Internet 
development would change the authoritarian rule in China. He believed that governments 
who have tight control over information, ideas, or images are more likely to preserve 
their political power. As the Internet increases in popularity, however, the new 
technology is able to create what he calls ―ideational pluralism‖, where multiple sources 
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of information and ideas become available to the public. As a result, the government 
hegemony can lose their monopoly over the public‘s ideologies and opinions, and non-
democratic rules are likely to fall. Taubman also pointed out that the communicative 
function of the Internet such as email, chat rooms, and news group help people create 
informal social networks existing outside the realm of state control. People are presented 
with unprecedented opportunities to communicate with each other on social, political, 
and personal issues. Although these organizations are mostly apolitical, they are expected 
to build foundation for a real public sphere that did not exist in China anywhere else 
before, and push the boundaries of associative freedom. Taubman concluded that the 
Internet would diminish the state‘s control over ideologies and civil life in China, 
therefore helping to facilitate the democratic process.  
Similarly, other researchers (Lacharite, 2002, Qiang, 2003) assert that China‘s 
―netizens‖ have begun to understand how to use the Internet to access a diverse range of 
information and perspectives, express their pro-democratic opinions, and communicate 
these ideas in anonymous ways.  Eventually, their rising demands for greater freedom of 
expression will challenge the existing authoritarian rule, and facilitate the transition to a 
more democratic society.  
Although seemingly appealing, Taubman‘s work and Lacharite‘s alike didn‘t even 
attempt to understand how exactly the Chinese public uses the Internet, ignoring the 
complex dynamics among the individual users, the Internet, and the state. Although it is 
clear that the Internet expands the freedom of self-expression for Chinese users, its exact 
impact on people‘s political life awaits more understanding.  
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Focusing on dissident groups specifically, Chase and Mulvenon‘s study (2002) 
centered on Internet censorship in China. Their research demonstrated that Internet use 
by dissident groups could challenge the state and enhance pluralism. In trying to 
understand the relationship between Internet use and the civil society, Yang (2003) also 
identified that the Internet fosters public debate and articulations; facilitates the activities 
of existing civic groups while creating new online organizations at the same time; and 
finally, the Internet could introduce new forms for political activism. 
Unlike these optimistic researchers, Harwit and Clark (2001) argue that in China, 
only a small proportion of the population is using the Internet. Most of them are young, 
well educated, living in big cities, and have little incentive to get involved in any 
disruptive political discussions or participation that might endanger their future career. 
Additionally, most of the users employ the net for entertainment purposes instead of 
political reasons. Consequently, the current censorship employed by the Chinese 
government might be effective enough to put off any immediate political challenge. 
Admittedly, the early adapters tend to be young and privileged, and are not 
interested in political application of the Internet. However, as the Internet has continued 
the rapid growth during the past years, nearly 50% of the population in big cities like 
Beijing or Shanghai has started to get online.  Even though the Internet users are still 
early adapters, considering the large population in China, the profile of Internet users has 
been evolving over the years. Soon, the argument regarding privileged users not willing 
to risk their future might become obsolete.  
Furthermore, despite the large portion of the population using the Internet only for 
entertainment purposes, many people still use the technology for political information, 
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deliberation or even action. One survey conducted by UCLA and the Chinese Academy 
of Social Science shows that nearly 80% of Chinese people believe that by using the 
Internet they can better understand politics, compared to 43% in the United States. Nearly 
61% of Chinese Internet users think that by using the Internet, they can have more say 
about what the government does, compared to 20% in the United States (―Surveying 
Internet usage and impact in five Chinese cities‖, 2005). As Zheng and Wu (2005) 
pointed out, this distinction is caused by the different political systems in the two 
countries; in China, the Internet was probably the most important channel for the general 
public to become involved in politics. 
In their study about Internet use and collective action in China, Zheng and Wu 
(2005) argued that the Internet has changed the relationship between the state and society 
in China, and greatly enhanced civic engagement, as well as political participation. They 
concluded that the Internet facilitates the free flow of information, provides an alternative 
information source, helps form a civic society and organize collective actions. They 
suggested that even though it is naïve to expect that the Internet alone will bring political 
democratization, the technology has certainly helped political liberation.  
Clearly the Internet has changed the landscape of political life for Chinese users. 
But how exactly does the Internet relate to all kinds of political participation? While there 
is very sparse systematic research about Internet impacts on Chinese users‘ political lives 
in the real world, this study would be one of the first to offer some empirical evidence.  
 
Use of the Internet for Political Purposes in China 
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The previous chapter addressed the Internet development and divide in China. 
The secondary analysis shows that the economic factor, technological infrastructure, and 
urbanization are all likely to have an impact on Internet penetration on the provincial 
level in China. On the individual level, the earlier studies on Internet adoption in the U.S. 
have shown that users tend to be male, younger, better educated, more affluent, White 
and urban (e.g., Hoffman, 1998; Katz & Aspden, 1997). China is still in its early stage in 
adopting the Internet. Although the absolute number of Internet users in China has topped 
the world record, the penetration rate is still relatively low compared to developed 
countries. Therefore, based on the studies from early adopters in the U.S., it is expected 
that the Internet users in China are also likely to have a similar profile. 
These expectations are confirmed by the semi annual CNNIC reports. According 
to the most recent CNNIC report (2008), it was estimated that 57.2% of users were male 
and 42.8 % were female, which is close to the gender distribution in China. However, the 
January 2008 CNNIC reports that Internet penetration rates were still higher for males 
(17.7%) compared to females (14.1%) by the end of 2007. This is mainly caused by the 
different educational levels of males and females, according to CNNIC. The educational 
level of primary schooling and above in China is 53% for males and 47% for females. 
Nonetheless, the difference between male and female Internet users is narrowing as time 
passes. 
The biggest age cohort of users was from 18 to 24, accounting for 31.8% of users. 
Among all the professions, students were most likely to use the Internet, comprising 28.8% 
of the users. Of users who have regular jobs, 41.8% worked for private enterprises. The 
educational levels of Internet users were higher than the general public. Since 1999, 
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however, the ratio of Internet users with college or above education has dropped from 86% 
to the current 36.2%. This partially attributes to the growing number of rural Internet 
users. Of the urban users, 37.6% have college educations, whereas of the rural users, only 
13% have the educational level of college or above. 
Marital status closely correlates with age. Due to the relative young age of 
Internet users, the majority of Internet users were unmarried (55.1%). For access 
locations, most users (67.3%) went online from home. This number has increased by 35.7% 
compared to 2006. Others use the Internet from Internet cafes (33.9%) or the workplace 
(24.3%). Of users who surf at Internet cafés, 74.8% have a high school education or 
below, representing a lower educational level than the general Internet user profile. 
The applications of the Internet are listed below from high to low in terms of 
popularity: online music, instant message, online video, online news, search engine, 
Internet games, and email. The list shows that using the Internet for entertainment and 
communication purposes surpass information-seeking purposes. Unfortunately, CNNIC 
reports do not measure political use of the Internet.  
In fact, very few studies have tried to document the profile of political users of the 
Internet. Norris (1998) identified that political Internet users had higher levels of political 
interest, knowledge, efficacy, and were of higher Social Economic Status (SES). In 
Bimber‘s 2001 study, he found that demographically, people who use the Internet as a 
political resource do not differ from the general population as much as one might guess. 
The only difference concerns education and income: political users of the Internet tend to 
be more educated and affluent, but the difference is not great. In the UK, Gibson, Lusoli, 
and Ward (2005) found that people who engaged in online political activity tend to be 
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male, highly educated, and of a high socioeconomic status. Although the findings are not 
entirely consistent, they indicate that the political net users tend to be male, more affluent, 





When examining the Internet and its political impact in China, I have singled out two 
questions. First, who is using the Internet, and specifically, who is using the Internet for 
political purposes? Second, how Internet use for political purposes affects people‘s 
political lives? As survey evidence in the Western context has shown, Internet users for 
political purposes tend to be male, better educated, more affluent, and more politically 
interested.  
 
H4a: Male, better-educated, more affluent, and more politically interested 
individuals are more likely to use the Internet for political purposes.  
 
As the literature review in Internet studies in the Western context demonstrates, 
using the Internet alone does not automatically lead to political activism. Findings have 
suggested that politically active users were active before they used the Internet, whereas 
inactive ones were not easily mobilized by simply getting online (Norris, 2001). However, 
a closer look at the Internet use experience reveals that different purposes of using the 
Internet matter. While using the Internet for entertainment purposes may not have any 
great impact on people‘s political lives at all, using the Internet for informational or 
political purposes are found to be associated with political participation (e.g., Tolbert and 
McNeal, 2003; Jennings and Zeitner, 2003).    
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 Since there are a lot of missing values on the political efficacy variable, this variable had to be dropped 




H4b: The higher the level of political net use, the higher the level of political 
participation.  
 
Unlike democratic countries, where political participation is highly 
institutionalized and clearly defined, political participation in China is not as encouraged 
and sometimes even frowned upon. Nevertheless, studies on the Internet‘s political 
impacts in China seem to suggest that the Internet benefits all kinds of activities: civil 
activities from apolitical social organizations (Yang, 2003), individual political 
participation (Zheng & Wu, 2005), or even actions from dissident groups (Chase & 
Mulvenon, 2002). Therefore, the Internet is expected to have a positive association with 
all kinds of political participation, conventional or rebelling.  
As Figure 4-1 demonstrates, the main relationship model entails that certain 
individual characteristics associate with higher likelihood of political Internet use, such as 
educational level, gender, age or political interest level. Subsequently, political Internet 
use also relates to real world political participation, including conventional participation 
such as voting or contacting, and unconventional protests.  
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Political Net Use 
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 To better grasp the essence of political net use, political expression online instead 
of obtaining political information is used. As Bimber (1998a) states, ―It is not simply the 
availability of information that structures engagement; it is human interest and capacity to 
understand many complex issues‖ (p. 142). Robinson and Levy (1986) also suggested 
that political discussion about news was a more significant predictor of news use than 
simple exposure to the political information. Therefore, to express about politics is a 
better measurement than simple exposure to political information. 
To measure political net use, respondents were asked to report on a 10-point scale 
how frequently they use the Internet for expressing their opinions about political issues 
(Mean=1.87, SD=2.75). 
Political Participation 
It‘s been identified that the most common and legal political activities in China 
include two choices: voting and contacting (Chen, 2004). In the late 1970s, CCP 
amended the electoral law for the elections of People‘s Congresses at various levels. 
According to this law, voters are able to nominate and select the final candidates for each 
contested seat. The voting process, including nomination of candidates, electorate 
deliberation and final selection of candidates, however, are closely controlled by the CCP 
(Halpern, 1991; Burns, 1995). As a result, all candidates placed on the ballot are CCP 
members or at least obedient to the party (McCormick, 1996). In addition, all electoral 
activities and deliberations are required to be carried out within a work unit under firm 
control by the election committees, which are dominated by CCP members (Shi and Lei, 




Another common way of political participation is contacting. This study includes 
two measures of contacting: complaining to leaders or deputies at the People‘s Congress, 
or contacting the media. According to Tang and Parish‘s (2000) recent survey results, it is 
quite normal for people in China to contact government officials at various levels. They 
complain to leaders about issues ranging from wage, benefits, education, and community 
to government issues (Shi, 1997). Since these issues are low-politics issues and are not 
related to fundamentals of CPP rules, the government encourages the public to contact 
the officials. In fact, the government has set up institutions at various levels to receive 
complaining individuals and letters (Shi, 1997).  
Media is another relatively neutral institution where the public can go and 
complain. Over the years, media commercialization coupled with increased editorial 
discretion has given the Chinese media increased freedom and incentive to challenge the 
party‘s propaganda (Liebman, 2006). The public often turns to Chinese media to report 
anything deemed unfair or unjust. When certain incident gains popular media pressure, 
the party interventions occasionally occur. Although complaining through the media is 
not encouraged by the government, it is indeed acknowledged and accepted as one 
channel for the general public to become involved. 
Unlike traditional participation, protests, petitions, demonstrations or strikes are 
riskier and have the potentially dangerous consequences (Shi, 1997). Nevertheless, 
contrary to what many might expect, ―Public protest in China is now anything but (rare), 
with such incidents numbering in the tens of thousands each year…‖ (Tanner, 2004, p. 
137). According to the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), the nationwide rates of mass 
incidents experienced a 268 percent increase from 1993 to 1999 (from 8,700 to 32,000). 
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As Tanner states, these incidents take forms including small-group petitions, sit-ins and 
rallies, labor strikes, merchant strikes, student demonstrations, and even armed riots. 
Realizing that these incidents cannot be completely prevented, China‘s security leaders 
have acknowledged the magnitude of these occurrences and many of their true causes, 
relying on more sophisticated strategies to contain instead of deter these protests (Tanner, 
2004).  
Tanner (2004) pointed out that while the sizes and frequencies of these incidents 
are rising, these protests mostly focus on concrete local issues rather than broad 
systematic changes. There are two different kinds of protests studied here: inwards and 
outwards protests. Inwards protests happen when protesters try to fight against domestic 
policies or officials. These protesters do not act under permanent organizations; instead, 
they often claim the acceptance of the party‘s leadership, only wanting specific 
rights/benefits (Tanner, 2004). Another kind of protests occurs when China as a country 
is threatened by a foreign force, such as protests about Diaoyu Island or the 1999 U.S. 
bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade.  
Outwards and inwards protests are differentiated here for two reasons. First, the 
government does not encourage protests in general, but is more lenient toward protests 
against international forces. The Chinese leadership has occasionally acknowledged and 
encouraged protests towards foreign forces; for instance, the government tried sending 
messages to the public during the 1999 Belgrade bombing protests (Chase & Mulvenon, 
2002). When it comes to domestic issues, the government tends to be more cautious and 
controlling. Although China‘s security leaders try to minimize popular anger through 
more moderate policing of protests, the inwards protest remains more sensitive. 
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Second, the inwards protests focus more on economic or individual interests, 
whereas the outwards protests tend to aim at fighting for the country‘s sovereignty.  
Furthermore, a nationalistic Chinese and a not so nationalistic Chinese might have very 
different reactions towards threats from inside and from outside.  
Traditional Participation 
 Respondents were asked about three types of traditional forms of participation: 
voting for deputies to the local People‘s Congress, contacting leaders, local people‘s 
deputies or authorities, and contacting editors/reporters from the media about any issue. 
Of all respondents, 27.2% (n=114) voted for the people‘s congress, 16.7% (n=70) people 
reported having contacted leaders, local people‘s deputies or authorities, and 18.9% 
(n=79) reported having contacted media about an issue. An index was created for the 
three items for a traditional participation measurement (Cronbach  = .46; Mean: 0.28; 
SD: 0.35). 
Political Protests 
Outwards Protest Respondents were asked ―Have you done any of the following 
things or whether you might do the following things under certain circumstances when 
your country is threatened by a foreign country: sign a petition, join a boycott, attend a 
demonstration, or join a strike.  
Inwards Protest Respondents were asked the similar question, ―Have you done 
any of the following things or whether you might do the following things when you 
object to a domestic leader or domestic issue: sign a petition, contact media,
22
 attend a 
demonstration, or join a strike.  
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 When the threat comes from within, boycotting is not an appropriate choice to protest. Therefore, 
contacting media is used instead. 
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There were 42% of respondents who said they would petition against an 
international force (30% ―No‖, 28% ―Don‘t know‖), the number was only 24% when 
responders needed to protest against the Chinese government (38% ―No‖, 38% ―Don‘t 
know‖). Of all participants, 25% reported they would demonstrate against an 
international threat (42% ―No‖, 33% ―Don‘t know‖), 15% said they would demonstrate 
against domestic policy or government (47% ―No‖, 38% ―Don‘t know‖). Of all 
participants, 17% said they would go on strike against an outside force (49% ―No‖, 34% 
―Don‘t know‖), and only 11% were willing to go on strike against a domestic issue or 
government (59% ―No‖, 30% ―Don‘t know‖). Those who would boycott another 
country‘s products constituted 54% of the participants (19% ―No‖, 27% ―Don‘t know‖), 
and 39% people would contact the media when concerned about a domestic issue (28% 
―No‖, 33% ―Don‘t know‖). 
The index on outwards protest was created using the four measurements 
(Cronbach  = .62; Mean: 0.56; SD: 0.37). The index on inwards protest was created 
using the four measurements (Cronbach  = .68; Mean: 0.37; SD: 0.35). 
The differences between protests against international and domestic issues are 
clear. People are more willing to engage in protests when they think they are fighting an 
outside force. They tend to feel more conservative when the threat comes from within. 
This is especially true for the question on strike.   
Political Interest 
Political interest was included as a control variable because prior research has 
shown the political significance of this attitudinal measure (Jeffres, Atkin, & Neuendorf, 
2002). Respondents were separately asked to report on a 10-point scale to what extent 
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they were interested in national and local politics. Responses were summed to form an 
index (inter-item correlation = .76; Mean: 6.70; SD: 2.99). 
News Media use 
For both newspaper and television, respondents were asked on a 10-point scale 
how much time they spent on three categories of news content: international affairs, 
national politics, and local politics. A separate additive use index was created for 
newspapers (Cronbach  = .73) and television news (Cronbach  = .75). The scale on 
traditional news media use was then created by summing newspaper and TV news use 
together (Cronbach  = .82; Mean: 5.21; SD: 2.96).  
Demographic variables 
Key demographic variables, age (Mean: 29.16; SD: 9.47), gender (43.7% female), 
location (160 from Beijing and 258 from Urumqi), household income (Mean: 1542 RMB, 
SD=2364 RMB), party ID (19% CCP members, 34% Youth League members, 2% other 
party members, 34% no party affiliation) and education (mean: 14.37 years of schooling; 
SD: 2.48), were included as control variables. 
 
Findings 
Who uses the Internet? 
The completed sample consists of 418 adult Chinese, which yielded a response 
rate of 52.25%. Out of the 418 respondents, 258 were from Urumqi, Xinjiang, a western 
city and 160 were from Beijing, the capital city of China. Among 418 survey subjects, 
70.41% (N=295) were self-report Internet users.
23
 Among the two locations, the Internet 
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 Internet user is measured by self report question, ―Have you used the Internet in the last month?‖ 
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adoption rate for Beijing was 71.88%, slightly higher than the penetration rate in Urumqi, 
which is 69.77%.  
The ratio of Internet users was much higher than the CNNIC reported 27.3% of 
Internet adoption rate in urban area (CNNIC, 2008). Four reasons may have caused the 
higher adoption rate. First, since the flyers for the survey were distributed in the 
university district in both cities, this survey attracted many highly educated people who 
either were college students or worked for the universities. As CNNIC reports 
consistently show, Internet users in China tend to have higher educational levels. Since 
universities provide convenient Internet access, it is much easier for college students or 
university employees to access the Internet. Second, although the survey flyer stated that 
both Internet users and non-users were needed for this survey, some non-users might still 
shy away since the flyer mentioned that the survey topic was about the Internet, 
traditional media use, and people‘s worldviews. Furthermore, the CNNIC surveys 
interviewed both adults and youths, whereas the current study only interviewed people 
aged 18 or higher. Adults tend to have a higher likelihood of using the Internet than youth, 
due to the higher level of education, computer skills, and income. Lastly, students are 
more susceptive to the $10 incentive this survey offered, and therefore more likely to 
participate in this study.  
Consistent with the Internet users‘ profile reported by CNNIC, Internet users in 
this survey were also better educated (Mean=14.75, SD=8.28), younger (Mean=29.06, 
SD=8.27), had higher income (Mean=1786.98, SD=2692.77), and tended to be male 
(54.6% are males, 44.1% are females). CNNIC reports that the biggest cohort of Internet 
user ages from 18 to 24. This survey also identifies that 34.9% of users fall into the 18 to 
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24 age cohort, representing the largest age group. The educational level of these survey 
respondents is much higher than the CNNIC reported user profile. CNNIC reports that 
37.6% of urban users had at least some college education, whereas this survey finds that 
84.41% of users have at least some college education. CNNIC shows that 74% of users 
have monthly incomes below 2000 RMB. This survey reports that 82.9% had incomes 
below $2000. The large proportion of respondents having relatively lower income but 
much higher educational levels likely results from the big percentage of students in this 
sample. The survey also shows that 40.3% of participants were single (N=119) and 38.6% 
were married (N=114).  
Who uses the Internet for political purpose? 
Hypothesis 4a predicts that male, more educated, affluent, and politically 
interested individuals are more likely to use the Internet for political purposes.  

















# p <.10; * p <.05; ** p <.01 
 
 Control Variables Only 
  
 Standardized β t value 
   Age -.21* -2.9 
   Gender (High: Female) .09 1.35 
   Education -.09 -1.23 
   Income .16* 2.35 
   Political Interest .15# 1.94 
   Party ID (Low: CCP Member) . 07 1.01 
   Location (Hi: Beijing) .04 .66 









As Table 4-1 shows, age (β = -.21) is negatively associated with political net use, 
suggesting that political net users tend to be younger. Income (β =.16) is also significant 
in positively associating with political net use, as expected. Political interest (β =.15) and 
traditional news media use (β =.13) are marginally significant in relating to political net 
use. Gender, and education are not significant here.  
The reason that education is not significant may be attributed to the small 
variance in educational level in this particular dataset, as this sample has many college 
students or employees. These findings mostly confirmed earlier studies, where it has been 
suggested that young, wealthier, and politically interested people are more likely to 
engage in political use of the Internet (Norris, 1998). 
Does the Internet affect political participation? 
Hypothesis 4b predicts that Internet utilization for political purposes would lead 
to more political participation, including conventional ones like voting or contacting, as 
well as inwards and outwards protests. As Table 4-2 shows, age (β =.17) is significant 
with traditional participation, and residing in Beijing (β =.11) is marginally associated 
with traditional participation. Also, being a CCP member (β =.26) is strongly associated 
with participating traditionally. These findings are expected. Older people tend to be 
more conservative, and have a higher possibility of working in a work unit, where the 
conventional political participation takes place. Beijing residents have long been argued 
to be the most active among the Chinese public (Shi, 1997). Similarly, party members are 
more likely to get engaged in work unit organized activities, including voting for 
National People‘s Congress representatives. The control block explained 9.3% of the 
variance in traditional participation, while Internet use for political purpose adds another 
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0.4%. Internet use for political purposes however is not associated with traditional 
participation. 





















# p <.10; * p <.05; ** p <.01 
 
















# p <.10; * p <.05; ** p <.01 
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 Income is dropped from the control variables here because its un-standardized β is almost zero. It is also 
dropped for the following analysis. 
 Control Variables Only 
 Standardized β t value 
Control Variables  
   Age .17* 2. 46 
   Gender (High: Female) -.03 -.54 
   Education -.02 -.28 
   Party ID (High: CCP Member) .26** 4.12 
   Location (Hi: Beijing) .11# 1.71 
   Political Interest .08 1.1 









 Control Variables Only 
 Standardized β t value 
Control Variables  
   Age .06 .88 
   Gender (High: Female) -.06 -.95 
   Education .07 1.09 
   Party ID (High: CCP Member) -.03 -.45 
   Location (Hi: Beijing) .002 .04 
   Political Interest .16* 2.2 












Table 4-3 reports findings about outwards protest. The evidence indicates that the 
only significant control variable is political interest (β =.16), with more interest leading to 
more outwards protests. The control block explained 6.1% of the variance in outwards 
protest, while Internet use for political purpose adds another 0.8%. Internet use for 
political activities is not significant here. 
 





# p <.10; * p <.05; ** p <.01 
 
 
As Table 4-4 shows, age (β = -.11) is negatively associated with inwards protests 
at p<.10.  Political interest is still positively associated with inwards protest. The higher 
the political interests (β =.17), the higher the possibility of the users becoming engaged in 
inwards protest. Internet use for political activities is again not significant here. 
Political participation is one of the most important constructs in studies pertaining 
to political communication. A healthy democratic society is based on active participation 
 Control Variables Only 
 Standardized β t value 
Control Variables  
   Age -.11# -1.66 
   Gender (High: Female) -.07 -1.1 
   Education .07 1.13 
   Party ID (High: CCP Member) .07 1.02 
   Location (Hi: Beijing) -.02 -.37 
   Political Interest .17* 2.29 











from the public. Although China is not a democratic country with open elections, its 
political system has been liberalized over the years. The Internet is expected to be 
facilitating that process by providing not just more information and free exchange of 
ideas, but also better and diverse information, multifaceted and anonymous 
communication channels, and alternative participatory opportunities at lower cost, better 
speed, and greater convenience. More importantly, since China is a country without 
freedom of expression, the Internet is expected to provide alternative points of view that 
could differ from government propaganda; and it could be the only channel for people to 
show their voices and participate in the political world. However, the hypotheses 
concerning the political Internet use and political participation are not supported. Political 
net use is not associated with any one of the three types of participation analyzed here: 
traditional participation, inwards or outwards protests.  
It is possible that due to the small sample size, some relationships simply cannot 
be identified, or, responders did not give honest answers to the survey. Since the political 
net use is measured by one single item, also likely is that all facets of Internet use for 
political application were not captured. As Shah, Cho, Eveland, and Kwak (2005) 
discovered, online information seeking fosters political discussion both online and offline, 
which in turn, promotes civic engagement. Since this study only analyzes the association 
between political expression online and political participation offline, it might 
oversimplify the complex process that entails information seeking, issue deliberation, as 
well as online and offline participation. Perhaps some linkage in the chain is overlooked, 
such as political discussion and online political activity; thus, the entire picture of Internet 
use and political outcome cannot be fully understood here.  
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Of course, the findings herein could also suggest that Internet use alone, even use 
specifically for political purpose, does not automatically transform into more or less 
political behaviors in the real world. Although the political activities online have already 
generated much attention from the government and the public, users are content with 
what they can do online, and online only. They are not pondering becoming involved in 
offline behaviors, at least for now.  
This could be partially explained by the political environment in China, where 
serious danger could be resulted by active involvement in politics, both online and offline. 
As the Internet has been closely controlled by the Chinese government, when people 
perceive danger involved in using the Internet for political purposes, they may avoid it to 
stay out of trouble. Moreover, Chinese nationalism could lead people to obey the 
government order in focusing on economic development and social order. Thus, to fully 
understand political implications of Internet use, one must also consider the specific 
political environment in China.  
Using survey data, this chapter tried to understand the main relationships among 
individual characteristics, political net use, and political participation. Unable to identify 
the direct influence of political Internet use on political participation, the next two 
chapters will discuss the specific characteristics of Chinese political culture in trying to 




FEAR FACTOR? PERCEIVED CENSORSHIP & USING THE INTERNET FOR 
POLITICAL PURPOSES 
 
The Internet has posed a dilemma for the Chinese government, who now must 
balance economic benefits and the possible political and social complications the Internet 
brings. In fact, this is not a problem only China faces. Any country, regardless of its 
ideology or political regime, has witnessed both advantages and harmful consequences 
that the Internet is capable of creating. On the positive side, the Internet provides an 
unprecedentedly huge volume of information, greatly lowers the cost of obtaining 
information, and helps communication become much easier, faster, and cheaper. On the 
negative side, harmful messages such as child pornography and violence are also easily 
accessible to the public. For the Chinese government, however, the greatest danger the 
Internet imposes lies at its threats to the Chinese Communist Party‘s (CCP) control over 
information flow.  
China has a long tradition of controlling information to sustain its political 
monopoly. The earliest written record of censorship in Chinese history dates back to the 
Qin Dynasty (221-206BC), when books were burned and scholars were executed in order 
to maintain the hegemony of legalism (Wu, 2005). Under the current CCP governance, 
the media is also considered as the ―mouth piece‖ of the party. As the former President 
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However, with the ever-growing development of new communication 
technologies, especially the Internet, which is open, decentralized, and interactive, the 
control over information flow becomes increasingly difficult. Since the Internet was 
intentionally designed as a distributed network with no central node or hierarchy in order 
to facilitate communication in a nuclear war (Baran, 1964), it has been argued that the 
Internet is immune to any regulations. Former President Bill Clinton once claimed, if an 
authoritarian regime like China wants to control the Internet, they will find it really hard 
to do so – it would be akin to ―trying to nail Jello to the wall‖.
26
 Unlike traditional media 
that are under strict monitoring of the CCP, the Internet with its worldwide network 
provides alternative political views that may be widely divergent from the CCP 
ideologies or values. According to Taubman (1998), the Internet creates a condition of 
―ideational pluralism‖. It has been argued that the ―key features of the Internet can be 
corrosive to the nondemocracies‖, the Internet provides ―the means for undermining the 
pillars of nondemocratic rules‖, and the compatibility between nondemocratic rule and 
the Internet is ―built-in‖ (Taubman, 1998, p. 256).  
Nevertheless, despite of the new challenges posed by the Internet to information 
control, China has actively engaged in various methods in trying to maintain a controlled 
cyberspace. These Internet policies have generated extensive criticism among Western 
countries. The outcry became especially strong when popular websites like The 
Washington Post or CNN were reportedly blocked by the Chinese filtering software 
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 Transcripts of Jiang Zemin in an interview with Mike Wallace of CBS in Beidaihe, 
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(Kahn, 2002), or when Western companies including Yahoo! or Google engaged in self-
regulation to coordinate with the Chinese government (Hu, 2003). 
Will China‘s Internet regulation be successful? Will the Internet undermine the 
authoritarian regime in China? These have become the most discussed topics in China‘s 
Internet studies (Kluver and Yang, 2005). While many people believe that China‘s 
Internet control is doomed due to the nature of the Internet (such as Kedzie, 1997; 
Taubman, 1998; Barney, 2000; Franda, 2002), others argue that the Chinese government 
has been successfully creating an Internet environment under its cautious watch (such as 
Deibert, 2002; Boas, 2004; Kluver & Yang, 2005).  
Notably, self-censorship has been exercised by many Internet users in China. 
Even when the government censorship is not perfect, what really matters is how these 
censorship approaches are perceived by the users. In other words, as long as the users 
assess that there is a real danger involved in accessing sensitive websites or publishing 
contradictory comments online, they are inclined to censorship themselves, no matter 
whether the state control is effective in reality or not. Perceived threats have important 
attitudinal and behavioral consequences. Studies have demonstrated that perceived threats 
can prime individuals‘ responses and cause them to take on more defensive postures 
(Marcus, Sullivan, Theiss-Morse, &Woodand, 1995).  
To understand the political Internet use in China, the question of censorship and 
perceived threats that accompany these censorships are impossible to avoid. Internet 
control in China has been widely recognized and discussed by Western scholars. Users 
can also sense it through blocked websites or online monitoring approaches. Highly 
publicized Internet crimes and Internet café crackdowns all have made it very clear to 
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Chinese users that their Internet use is controlled by the government. As one would 
expect, any Chinese users would use the Internet with a voice in the back of their heads 
telling them that they could be monitored, tracked, or even punished for whatever they do 
online.       
Unfortunately, although a big bulk of published studies on China‘s Internet 
focuses on China‘s Internet control, very little attention has been given to how exactly the 
censorship influences people‘s Internet use. To fully understand the Internet‘s social and 
political significance, one must understand how people use the Internet individually in a 
censored environment. After all, the people are the ones changing the world, not the 
technology itself.   
First in this chapter, the major government entities involved in Internet regulation 
will be introduced. As a relatively new communication technology, the Internet has been 
regulated by various regulatory entities as it develops. Each regulating agency has 
different angles in regulating the Internet, based on their own interests and policy 
emphasis. Numerous legislations or regulations have been passed by these regulatory 
entities over the years and many bureaucratic overlaps exist. Technological control 
methods will also be discussed. A summary of government censorship provides a 
regulatory background for the Internet studies in China. Understanding how the 
government manages the Internet sheds light on how people could perceive these 
censorship approaches, and how the Internet environment is structured by the government. 
Next, by describing perceived threats, which are composed of perceived 
censorship and perceived security, discussion will ensue as to how these two constructs 
can relate to people‘s political Internet use in China. As a country where information has 
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been traditionally censored, China has given much thought to how to regulate the Internet. 
In fact, Internet censorship is so widely applied, it would be almost impossible for users 
not to notice these control approaches from time to time. With such a repressed tradition 
and the tight Internet control, the perceived threats from these censorships and the sense 
of security from personal computer skills or confidence in the Internet are expected to 
significantly change people‘s political net use.  
Finally, using data collected in China, I would explore how Internet censorship 
influences the Chinese people‘s Internet use for political purposes. Would people try to 
avoid using the Internet for political purposes when they perceive a censorship for the 
Internet? On the other hand, would they be more engaged in using the Internet for 
political expressions when they believe that the Internet, as an advanced communication 
tool, could protect them from getting in any trouble? Ultimately, this section attempts to 
answer the question of if the Internet will change China politically, would the perceived 
threats from the general public get in the way? 
 
Internet Control in China 
Several government agencies have regulated the Internet at different points of its 
development. Each issued many regulations about the Internet. Before the regulations and 
control strategies are reviewed, the different regulatory agencies regarding the Internet 
are outlined. 
Key Internet Regulatory Agencies 
 Sohmen (2001) once stated, ―The question of who controls policy concerning the 
Internet in China is not a simple one‖ (Sohmen, 2001, p.18). Due to its diverse nature, the 
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Internet is subjected to regulation from various regulatory agencies, both horizontally and 
vertically. Things are further complicated by constant name changing or creations of new 
Chinese regulatory agencies.  
In China, the State Council is the executive branch of the National People‘s 
Congress and the highest level of state administration. The State Council‘s power is 
broad and the regulations it issues and enforces cover the entire country (Chen, 1992). 
The State Council usually enacts its regulations through the ministries under it (Taylor, 
1997). Before 1998, the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT), which was a 
functional organ of the State Council, was the major regulatory authority and 
telecommunication monopoly for all telecommunication industries in China. The MPT 
formulated policies as well as enforced them. In the meantime, the MPT tried to maintain 
control of the fast-growing telecommunication service market, where the Internet was 
considered as a value-added service (Cullen & Choy, 1999). Nevertheless, other branches 
of the government, especially the MEI regarded the Internet as one of information 
technologies and should fall within its jurisdiction.  
To coordinate regulatory agencies with regard to Internet policy, a Steering 
Committee on National Information Infrastructure (SCSCNII) was set up by the State 
Council. The chair for the Steering Committee was Vice-Premier Zou Jiahua, and the 
first deputy-chair was MEI‘s minister, Hu Qili. Steering Committees are temporary 
regulatory authorities, which are commonly established in China when several 
bureaucratic bodies are involved in one particular area and rapid collective decision-
makings are required (Sohmen, 2001). The major responsibilities of the SCSCNII were 




1. To formulate guiding principles, policies, rules and regulations in the developing 
process of national informationization; 
2. To formulate the strategy for developing national informationization and its 
overall and stage-by-stage plans; 
3. To organize and coordinate the construction of important information projects; 
4. To be responsible for the coordination and finding solutions for important issues 
arising from the computer networks and the Internet; and 
5. To establish the standards for the technology and application related to 
information 
 
(The State Council Steering Committee of National Infrastructure).  
 
In March 1998, the MPT, the MEI, and parts of the Ministry of Radio-Film-
Television (MRFT) were replaced by the Ministry of Information Industry (MII). The 
former minister of the MPT, Wu Jichuan, was appointed as head of the MII, other vice 
ministers and staffs were selected from both the MPT and MEI (Shi & Gelb, 1998). An 
important purpose of setting up the MII was to separate the regulator from the service 
provision under the MPT‘s umbrella, i.e., China Telecom. The Steering Committee was 
abolished and the MII is now the main regulatory agency for the Internet at the day-to-
day level, and responsible for the following areas: 
1. To formulate development strategies, overall policy and plans for the national 
information industry, telecommunications industry, and the software industry;  
2. To draft laws and regulations governing the information industry, 
telecommunications industry, and software industry – to enact administrative 
rules -- to enforce these laws and supervise their implementation;  
3. To make comprehensive plans for government public networks, broadcasting 
networks, and special networks of military and other public entities and to ensure 
proper technical and professional administration;  
4. To formulate technological policies, systems and standards for the information 
industry and the broadcasting industry and the software industry -- to administer 
entry licenses into networks -- to monitor quality supervision and control;  
5. To allocate, organize and coordinate available electronic bandwidth, domain 
names, and Internet addresses;  
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6. To supervise the telecommunications and information service markets -- to 
implement a business licensing regime -- and to formulate methods for 
interconnection between networks and the settlement of interconnection 
conditions;  
7. To formulate pricing policies of the telecommunications and information services 
industries -- to supervise the implementation of pricing policies;  
8. To plan, build and manage special networks that are used by the Communist Party 
and the government -- to coordinate these special networks, emergency networks, 
and other important networks -- to safeguard the security of state communications 
and information;  
9. To guide and assist the development of the information industry according to the 
technological development policy -- to supervise industry structures, industry 
products, and enterprises -- to deploy resources in a rational way;  
10. To promote research and development in the electronic information industry, 
telecommunications industry, and software industry -- to organize large scale 
technological projects and to assist in the development of national industry;  
11. To provide professional administration assistance with regard to military 
electronic systems and to carry out research on development strategies and 
policies and plans related to military electronic systems -- to co-ordinate 
integration of MII plans and plans by the military and the national committee of 
defense technology and industry;  
12. To assist the promotion of informationization of the national economy and 
national key research projects -- to guide, coordinate and organize development 
and utilization of information resources;  
13. To organize and guide the sending, allocation and settlement of accounts by 
monetary means through postal and electronic information transfer systems;  
14. To represent the government in joining relevant international organizations and in 
signing relevant international agreements -- to organize foreign technology 
exchanges;  
15. To carry out research on policies in regard to telecommunications and information 
systems with the HKSAR (The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the 
People's Republic of China), Macau, and Taiwan;  
16. To compile statistics on the information industry and to report news about the 
information industry; and  
17. To deal with matters assigned by the State Council 
(Introduction of the Ministry, http://www.mii.gov.cn). 
 
While the MII is the main regulator of the information technology sector, the 
Internet is so politically sensitive that other regulators, including bureaucratic agencies 
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under the State Council and political bodies under the Central Committee of the CCP, are 
also involved.  
The foremost organization for media control under the CCP is the Department of 
Propaganda (DOP) of the Central Committee of the CCP. The DOP reports directly to the 
Standing Committee of the Political Bureau on matters related to information 
dissemination and control. The Chinese Communist Party‘s Propaganda Department has 
issued unpublished rules regarding news content, which have been applied to online news 
as well (Sohmen, 2001). 
Other than the MII and DOP, the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) and the State 
Secrecy Bureau also play very important roles in the regulation of the Internet in that they 
deal with the surveillance of the computer network, registration of Internet users, and 
investigation of Internet crimes. In addition, the China Internet Information Center 
(CNNIC), which is part of the Chinese Academy of Science, is also involved in the 
regulation of the Internet in domain name registrations in China (Cullen & Choy, 1999). 
The State Information Office, which is the State Council‘s public-relations agency and 
news office, is responsible for drafting the regulations for Internet Content Providers 
(ICPs). Additionally, the official news agency, the Xinhua News Agency, is responsible 
for checking the online content from foreign sources. The State Administration of Radio, 
Film and Television is responsible for checking online broadcasting. The State 
Administration of Industry and Commerce supervises online advertisings. Other than 
these national level agencies, local level governments have also issued numerous 
regulations concerning Internet usage (Sohmen, 2001). 
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The following graph (See Figure 5-1) describes the power structure in regulating 
the internet. 
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Source: Adapted from Zheng, 2008.  
 
When first introduced to China, the unique characteristics of the Internet caused 
some confusion, as it was not clear which ministry should be responsible to regulate the 
Internet. Consequently, there have been numerous overlaps of responsibilities among 
various regulatory agencies in the industry of the Internet. Moreover, there have been 
constant power struggles among these agencies. These problems have worsened due to 
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the rapid development of the Internet. The 1998 reform, where the MPI, MEI, and MRFT 
were replaced by the MII, was one of the government‘s first steps to deal with this 
complicacy. However, the business and regulatory functions of the MII still foster 
jealousy among other ministries. For example, it was alleged that in the case of China 
Telecom, which owns CHINANET — one of the few network organizations operating 
internationally under permits issued by the MII, the economic interest for the MII has 
constituted problems with regulation of the Internet. The MII may put its own interests 
above the overall interest of the industry, and issue regulations that will ultimately hinder 
the development of the Internet. In responding to those concerns, the MII had to give up 
the ownership of China Telecom to further separate its regulatory and operational 
functions. Nevertheless, the MII remains closely linked with China Telecom (Sohmen, 
2001). 
 
Legislations and Regulations 
 With the foremost goal of maintaining political control over the Internet, the 
Chinese government has relied on legislations, regulations over the network, ISPs, and 
individual users. 
Legislations  
 The 1994 ―Rule of Security Protection of Computer Information System‖ was 
issued by the State Council and became the basic guidance for the government to regulate 
computer networks. There are two major provisions in this rule: First, the regulation 
states that any network connecting to an international network must report such systems 
(Article 11). Second, transportation of computer media in or out of the country must be 
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reported to customs (Article 12). In addition, the regulation gave the MPT overall 
responsibility for the supervision of the Internet (Article 17, Zhang, 1997).  
 The first regulation specifically regarding the Internet was the 1996 ―Interim 
Regulation on Administration of International Networking of Computer Information 
Networks‖, which was issued by the State Council Steering Committee. These 
regulations were revised again as the ―Computer Information Network and Internet 
Security, Protection and Management Regulations‖ in May 1997. Article 5 of the Interim 
Provisions assigned the Economic Information Joint Committee (the then SCSCNII) to 
supervise matters about international network connections; Article 6 requires that all 
direct international networking traffic must use channels provided by the MPT's national 
public networks (Cullen & Choy, 1999).  
At the time, the MPT had been entitled monopoly over China's gateway to the 
international Internet. Moreover, all networks with international connections must be pre-
approved by the State Council and regulated under the MPT, the MEI, the State 
Education Commission, and the Chinese Academy of Sciences. Foreign investment was 
banned. The rule further proposed a list of conditions, which must be met by entities in 
order to be granted the international connections rights. The conditions are as follows.   
1. They have to be an enterprise legal person or an institutional legal person 
established in accordance with the law;  
2. They have to have the necessary networking equipment, technicians and 
management personnel;  
3. They have to have comprehensive safety and security control systems and 
technical protection measures; and  
4. They have to comply with all other laws and regulations and other conditions set 
out by the State Council. 
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(Decision of the State Council on Revising the Interim Provisions Governing the 
Management of Computer Information Networks in the People's Republic of China 
Connecting to Internet, http://www.mii.gov.cn).  
On February 13, 1998, the SCSCNII published the ―Provisions for the 
Implementation of the Interim Provisions Governing the Management of Computer 
Information Networks in the People's Republic of China Connecting to the Internet‖ 
("SCSCNII Provisions"). The SCSCNII Provisions basically repeat the previous 
regulations and requirements. On top of those regulations, however, the SCSCNII 
provisions strengthened the regulation of access by setting up a three-tiered system, 
which consists of international networks, interconnecting networks, and connecting 
networks (Cullen & Choy, 1999; Sohmen, 2001). 
International networks are networks connecting China to the international Internet; 
interconnecting networks are the national backbone networks connecting to the 
international networks; connecting networks are the networks connecting to individuals 
and businesses. Therefore, at the international networks level, the government has an 
absolute monopoly power—access to the Internet is exclusively provided by the MII. At 
the interconnecting networks level, although commercial networks can get a license from 
the government, all of the backbone networks in China are under control of state-owned 
enterprises. At the lowest level, connecting networks also need to satisfy several 
requirements in order to apply for a license for connecting to the backbone 
interconnecting networks. The Interconnecting Networks are responsible for the ISPs 
they support, ISPs are responsible for their customers, and work units are responsible for 
their workers. With this mechanism, the Chinese government has successfully extended 
its regulation towards the Internet (Sohmen, 2001). 
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Under another regulation issued in January 1996 — ―the Circular of the Ministry 
of Public Security on Entering on Record the Computer Information System Connected 
with Internet‖ (the PSB circular), ISPs and individual Internet users are required to 
register with the local PSB within 30 days of connection (Sun, 1996). ISPs need to 
provide information such as the location of its host computer, nature and scope of its 
networks. Information the Internet users need to provide include their level of education, 
background, a fee of 400 RMB, and signature of compliance with the regulation. Failure 
to complete the registration may result in punishment (Sohmen, 2001). 
Apart from the Interim Provision, the SCSCNII Provisions, and the PSB Circular, 
the PSB issued one more provision in December 1997 in order to further maintain 
domestic and international security—the ―Provisions on Safeguarding the Security of 
Domestic Computer Networks in Linking with the Internet (the PSB Provisions)‖. This 
provision indicated the responsibilities for the interconnecting networks, ISPs, and the 
Internet users when providing Internet access, service, and use: 
1. They must assume responsibility for network security, protection and 
management and establish a thoroughly secure, protected and well managed 
network;  
2. They must carry out technical measures for network security and protection and 
ensure network operational security and information security;  
3. They must assume responsibility for the security education and training of 
network users;  
4. They must register units and individuals to whom information is provided and 
examine the information provided and make sure that no prohibited information is 
provided.  
5. They must establish a system for registering the users of electronic bulletin board 
systems on the computer information network as well as a system for managing 
bulletin board information;  
6. They must keep records of any violations of the PSB Provisions and report to the 
PSB; and  
7. According to the relevant state regulations, remove from the network any address, 
directory or server that has prohibited contents  
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(PSB Provisions, Cullen & Choy, 1999). 
Regulating the Content 
Other than regulating networks and individuals, the government also tries to 
control the Internet through content regulations. There were four great democracies 
recognized by the Constitution when the People‘s Republic of China (PRC) was first 
established: (1) to speak out fully, (2) air views freely, (3) hold great debates, and (4) 
write big character posters. Although the provision was repealed in 1980, the PRC‘s 
Constitution still grants ―freedom of speech‖ (Reed, 2000).  
The idea of freedom of expression, however, is viewed differently in China 
compared to most Western democracies. The Chinese government believes that 
individual freedom must be sacrificed for the common collective, and the rights are only 
ways to realize the state‘s objective (Reed, 2000). Consequently, individuals are not 
supposed to express views that contradict with the views of the CCP, which controls all 
facets of the government.  
In the meantime, the CCP has traditionally utilized the press as its ―mouthpiece‖ 
to disseminate its principles and values, and even to publish and interpret laws (Reed, 
2000). Due to the importance of the media, the press has been subjected to censorship 
and editing controls. Since all media institutions used to be state-owned, self-censorship 
has been conveniently practiced by the press. Consequently, the flow of information is 
essentially one-way— top-down, only. Nevertheless, with the proliferation of more and 
more independent newspapers, journals and magazines, the strict control from the central 




Extending the control over media coverage to the Internet, the government has 
also proposed regulations specifically regarding the content online. The 1997 Interim 
Provisions provide an extensive list of outlawed content. Article 5 outlines some specific 
contents that are deemed objectionable: 
1. Materials inciting resistance or breaking the Constitution or laws or the 
implementation of administrative regulations;  
2. Materials inciting the overthrow of the government or the socialist system;  
3. Materials inciting division of the country, harming national unification;  
4. Materials inciting hatred or discrimination among nationalities or harming the 
unity of the nationalities;  
5. Materials containing falsehoods or distorting the truth, or spreading rumors, or 
destroying the order of society;  
6. Materials promoting feudal superstitions, sexually suggestive material, gambling, 
violence, murder, terrorism or inciting others to criminal activity;  
7. Materials openly insulting other people or distorting the truth to slander people;  
8. Materials injuring the reputation of state organs and;  
9. Materials encouraging other activities against the Constitution, laws or 
administrative regulations.  
(PSB Provisions, Cullen & Choy, 1999). 
Following the PSB Provision, many other agencies also issued regulations 
regarding Internet content. The wording may be different, but all have similar meanings. 
In January 2000, the State Secrecy Bureau (SSB) issued the ―Regulations for Computer 
Information Systems on the Internet‖ (the SSB Regulation), which further restricts the 
control over content. The SSB Regulation specifically targets information in email, 
bulletin boards, chat rooms, and news groups (Sohmen, 2001). 
In addition, the regulations demand that Internet Access Providers provide 
instruction about protecting secrets as an important part of the Internet related technical 
training. Violation of the regulations mentioned above can lead to fines or closure.  
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In September 2000, the "Measures for Managing the Internet Information 
Services" was issued by the State Council, which further shifted the responsibility over 
content to ISPs. Article 14 stated that the service providers must record their subscribers' 
access to the Internet, their account numbers, the Web addresses they call up as well as 
the telephone numbers they use, and store this information for sixty days. Article 15 
repeats the information that is not to be produced on the Internet. Article 16 continues, 
expounding that if material under these categories is discovered, "it shall immediately 
stop the transmission, keep the relevant records, and report the situation to the relevant 
state authorities" (―China‘s Internet regulations‖, 2000).  
When the Internet was first introduced in China, portals like Sina.com included 
dispatches from foreign news sources, such as Agency France-Press and Reuters 
(Rosenthal, 1999). However, later portals were advised by the government not to provide 
links to foreign news sources, even though some portals have foreign shareholders such 
as Sina.com (Foster & Goodman, 2000). Then in 2000, the Communist Party Propaganda 
Department issued rules to prohibit websites from hiring independent reporters, and using 
content or providing linkage to foreign news sources. In addition, traditional media is not 
allowed to use any content from the Internet (Sohmen, 2001).  
As Sohemen (2001) observed, although many regulations have outlawed content 
like ―damaging to national unity‖ or ―disturbing to social order‖, no definition has been 
given to ―state security‖, ―state secrets‖ or ―social order‖. In the past, terms like ―state 
secret‖ have been interpreted in many ways. The flexibility of the interpretation of those 
terms has been very useful in terms of control. 
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While these laws seem to be very strict, they may not be strictly enforced in 
practice. In China, many laws are only firmly practiced in the beginning, then after a 
while, the enforcement loosens up, until at some point the government feels it needs to 
remind citizens of these regulations, and pursues sudden crackdowns. For instance, 
Internet cafés are swept from time to time; the purpose is to remind the public that they 
are being monitored. When these actions are practiced, enormous media attention would 
also be given in order to maximize the warning effect (Sohmen, 2001).  
  
Technological Approaches 
  Whereas most countries‘ access to the Internet is distributed through multiple 
national nodes and a combination of private and public providers, in China, ISPs and 
ICPs all connect to the global Internet through state-owned corporations (Higgins & 
Azhar, 1996). Such access has a hierarchy that allows for blocking controversial or 
politically contradicting information at the outer layer of control. 
Other than legislations, the China government has also employed several 
technological approaches to control the Internet. In September 1996, the State Council 
ordered the MPT to block access to approximately100 Internet websites. The banned 
websites ranged from U.S. media sites such as CNN, some Taiwan and Hong Kong news 
media sites, and dissident websites, to sexually explicit sites (Brauchli, 1996; Arnold, 
1996). In January 1997, however, it was reported that China had eliminated some of the 
blocking restrictions (Fletcher & Hsieh, 1997).  
After 1997, it was reported that many websites have been blocked again. For 
instance, in August 2002, China blocked access to Google, one of the most popular 
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search engines in China. It was the first time that China had blocked a search engine. 
During the period of blocking, requests to access Google had been rerouted to another 
website that was run by CHINANET. Two weeks later, however, Google was unblocked 
(Tai, 2006). According to a 2002 project conducted by Harvard researchers, currently 
18,931 websites were inaccessible from at least two different proxy servers within China 
on at least two distinct days. Among all the blocked sites, other than sexually explicit 
sites, human rights and democracy sites were blocked the most; thousands of sites about 
Taiwan and Tibet were also blocked; the other blocked sites included news, health, 
education, religion, and some government sites (Zittrain & Edelman, 2002). Despite of 
the wide-range scope of the blocking, the Chinese government‘s primary concern is still 
subversive views and dissident activities obtainable on the Internet.  
Apparently, there are some people who are constantly updating and evaluating all 
the websites, since it does not take long for news sites with sensitive content to be 
blocked, such as the Slashdot website (Zittrain & Edelman, 2002). Many observers have 
noted the inconsistent blocking processes—there is no set pattern on what gets on the 
blacklist, when, and why. For example, while The New York Times is blocked, The 
Washington Post is not. Since each network obtains a different list, some websites may 
be unavailable from some servers, but available from others. Also, some Internet users 
have discovered that while CNN was blocked for a while, it was accessible again later 
(Shaw, 2002). The inconsistent blocking process has made some Internet users believe 
that the government is not making a serious effort to censor the net. Some commentators 
argue that the major function of the blocking skill is to warn the Internet users that the 
Internet can be controlled (Tsui, 2001).  
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Currently, China relies primarily on ISPs to control Internet usage, since as noted 
earlier, ISPs need to be responsible for how citizens use the Internet. By blocking the IP 
address of predetermined blacklisted sites, the ISPs are denying any requests to access 
those websites. In order to block the IP address, however, the ISPs have to program a 
large number of routers, which will inevitably slow down the transmission of data over 
the network. Also, considering the huge number of websites, predetermining all the 
objectionable content cannot be effective. As iterated by an Internet consultant, ―New 
web sites come online everyday, old websites change their addresses. Content from one is 
mirrored on another‖ (Shaw, 2002). Finally, the router level blocking means that there are 
a number of ways for determined users to circumvent the blocks, including using proxy 
servers, requesting information by emails, accessing foreign ISPs, and so on.  
Other than blocking the blacklisted websites, the government strengthened the 
control by employing filtering software to block websites that contain predetermined 
keywords. As Boas (2004) identified, beginning in 2002, the blocking has evolved, 
becoming more sophisticated, where keywords in the URL or actual webpage requested 
can be used for blocking, instead of using a preexisting blacklist of prohibited websites. 
Due to the inaccuracy of using keywords, the effectiveness of filtering programs is 
doubtful. A filtering program may mistakenly block helpful and important information. 
Humans sometimes operate the practice, too. For example, most popular bulletin boards 
in China have hosts to run these operations. Some hosts are paid; some are volunteers. 
They are responsible for monitoring the postings and delete anything they deem 
unacceptable. In responding to these control strategies, users sometimes use a symbolic 
device. For instance, instead of posting ―1989 Tiananmen square incident‖, which they 
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know would be blocked, they would write ―1989 Tian2An2Men square incident‖ so posts 
would not be deleted.  
In addition to blocking and filtering websites, the MPS is also required to monitor 
the flow of online information. How extensive and frequent this monitoring is remains 
unclear. Yet, with the increasing usage of the Internet, the task can be expensive and 
cumbersome.  
Numerous commentators have argued that the technological control of the 
Internet is bound to fail (e.g., Abbate, 1999), because the Internet was designed to 
circumvent any communication breakdowns. It is true that there are a number of ways to 
bypass the blocking and filtering, such as the employment of a proxy server or the 
utilization of a foreign ISP. Zittrain and Edelman (2002) and Chase and Mulvenon (2002) 
listed a number of ways of circumventing censorship. However, there are barriers to these 
circumvention technologies. For instance, dialing to a foreign IPS is very expensive and 
using encryption or a proxy server requires knowledge. While a ―determined‖ user can 
certainly bypass the firewall, most users do not have the motivation to risk involvement 
in using these techniques or lack necessary knowledge and money. As Boas pointed out, 
there is a difference between ―perfect control‖ and ‗effective control‖. Never is it the goal 
of the authoritarian leaders to have perfect control that eliminates all demand for access 
to the Internet; they merely need ―good enough‖ control to deter most Internet uses that 
may challenge the authoritarian regimes.  
 
Self-Censorship by ISPs and Users 
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Sometimes the government falls back on the old method of intimidation to deter 
dissident behaviors. Because the precise identification protocols used by computers to 
connect to the networks leave an electronic trace, the PSB is able to monitor the 
individual account, from where the objectionable websites are assessed. Moreover, the 
penalties for violating the Internet regulations can be serious. For instance, violation of 
certain laws can result in up to 5000 RMB for individuals, and network licenses can be 
suspended. For offenses such as ―leaking national secret‖, penalties can be more severe 
(Sohmen, 2001).  
Several cases have been reported over the years. For instance, in 1998, Shanghai 
police arrested a computer engineer Lin Hai. He was charged with "inciting subversion" 
of the government for selling 30,000 Chinese e-mail addresses to a New York based 
organization that distributes pro-democratic newsletters via email in China. He was 
sentenced with a two-year prison term (Eckholm, Faison and Miller, 1999). Other cases 
include a professor named Li Yibin who operated a website titled Democracy and Liberty 
and Liao Yiwu, who regularly criticized the government online (Zheng, 2005). 
 Although few users or private ISPs have been prosecuted over the years, this 
approach works effectively as a warning technique. Since there is a possibility of harsh 
punishments for anti-government online activities, many people would restrain 
themselves from getting involved in anything they consider dangerous. This is different 
from users in the United States or Europe, where users would rarely consider if their 
online behaviors or expressions would leave a trace, and whether this may lead to any 
penalties. Therefore, in this sense, the perception that one might be under surveillance is 
far more important in controlling one‘s behavior than the actual surveillance.  
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Periodic crackdowns on the Internet cafés and chat rooms have encouraged ISPs 
or Internet cafés to police their own customers (Boas, 2004). In China, doing business is 
conditional upon maintaining good relations with the government. These intermediaries 
have both political and market appeals to comply with government regulations. In order 
to meet all the requirements, ISPs, ICPs, and Internet cafés set up their own monitors. For 
example, organizations like Sohu.com, a portal based in Beijing, have incorporated 
certain approaches to monitor the chat rooms and the bulletin boards, and delete materials 
that are mentioned in the 2000 PSB Provisions. Even foreign companies like Yahoo! 
signed a pledge to eliminate subversive materials from its website (―Yahoo‘s China 
concession‖, 2002). In Internet cafes, managers have appointed people to patrol the 
monitors and check what material appears on the screen.  
Both ICPs such as Sohu.com and Internet Cafés have issued their own sets of 
guidelines for users. Sohu.com, for instance, gives the following message to clients who 
want to enter Sohu‘s chat rooms: 
Please take note that the following issues are prohibited according to Chinese law:  
1. Criticism of the PRC Constitution  
2. Revealing State secrets, and discussion about overthrowing the Communist 
government  
3. Topics that damage the reputation of the State  
4. Discussions that ignite ethnic animosity, discrimination or regional separatism  
5. Discussion that undermines the state's religious policy, as well as promotes evil 
cults and superstition  
6. Spreading rumors, perpetrating and disseminating false news that promotes 
disorder and social instability  
7. Dissemination of obscenity, sex, gambling, violence, and terror. Cyber-sex is not 
permitted within the English chat room.  
8. Humiliating or slandering innocent people  
9. Any discussion and promotion of content which PRC laws prohibit  
10. If you are a Chinese national and willingly choose to break these laws, Sohu.com 
is legally obliged to report you to the Public Security Bureau.  




(Freedom of expression and the Internet in China, Human Rights Watch, 2001).  
 
 Harsh penalties and high-profile arrests work effectively as deterrence. Internet 
users in China commonly engage in self-control or self-censorship. Essentially, loosely 
exercising regulations is to the state‘s advantage. With a certain degree of vagueness, the 
Internet users and ISPs would always have to practice cautiousness when it comes to 
assessing the risk associated with radical online behaviors. 
Consequently, when the users perceive a real threat, they would tend to avoid 
using the Internet for political purposes. On the other hand, when they have a sense of 
control or consider the censorship to be ineffective, they would ignore the threats and not 
self-censor. The question that really matters is not whether or not the political censorship 
of the Internet is perfect. Rather, the fundamental question that should be asked is 
whether or not the users perceive a real threat and how much sense of security they 
possess. Relying on research about perceived threat, the following section analyzes why 
perceived threat matters and in what way, in influencing political Internet use in China.  
  
Perceived Censorship, Security and their Implications 
 
So far, this chapter has reviewed the extensive regulatory agencies of the Internet, 
numerous laws and regulations that have been issued by these agencies, how regulations 
and laws are loosely interpreted, and how these censorship approaches are only 
sporadically exercised. Knowing well that no censorship is perfect, the government aims 
for an effective censorship instead. By provoking self-censorship, even imperfect 
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censorship of the Internet can work effectively in scaring people off from using the 
technology for politically sensitive purposes.  
Politics has been a sensitive topic in China for years. The Chinese saying, ―never 
talk about politics‖ indicates how conservative Chinese people can get about involving in 
politically sensitive matters and speaking out about politics. Even with the Internet, 
threats can be perceived easily. Internet users are well aware of potential consequences 
involved in using the Internet for political activities. Before going online, users need to 
sign an Internet Access Responsibility Agreement, where they pledge not to participate in 
any online activities that would endanger state secrecy or security (Shie, 2006). 
Violations of these rules can result in serious punishments. For instance, an activist, Wu 
Yilong was sentenced to 11 years in prison for distributing articles about the China 
Democracy Party on line (―In China, the Net grows up‖, 2000). As Chinese Internet users 
perceive different levels of threats, they may react differently depending on how they 
evaluate these threats. When perceived threats are high, they could refrain from using the 
Internet for politically sensitive purposes, in order to avoid any potential troubles. 
Limited research has been done on perceived threat and its consequences in 
Internet studies, which is not entirely surprising. In democratic countries, the topic of 
perceived threats while using the Internet is not at all common, whereas in authoritarian 
countries like China, a study about government censorship is not likely to be permitted. 
Nevertheless, any serious attempt to understand Internet use in politics in China should 
consider the issue of perceived threat from the users‘ perspective and its attitudinal and 
behavioral implications. Fortunately, studies in social psychology in explaining the 
association between perceived threat and its attitudinal/behavior implications provide a 
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good theoretical framework for understanding perceived threats associated with using the 
Internet for political purposes in China.  
 
Perceived censorship comes from evaluations of probability & consequence of 
Internet censorship, as well as estimations of the Chinese government’s intention & 
capability to execute the censorship.  
Where does perceived threat come from? According to Butler and Mathews 
(1983), perceived threats have origins from estimates of the probability of danger and 
estimates of the consequence of danger (Butler & Mathews, 1983). Both perceived 
probability and consequence of threats have been linked to psychological and behavioral 
outcomes like fear or approaches to cope with phobic objects (Menzies & Clarke, 1995; 
Zane & Williams, 1993; Williams & Watson, 1985). For instance, when someone 
perceives a higher probability of a danger or a more serious consequence of this danger, 
he/she is more likely to be frightened, and try to avoid this danger. If a Chinese Internet 
user does not perceive a serious punishment for criticizing the government online, or 
he/she does not believe in the existence of Internet censorship at all, this user would not 
refrain from posting articles online to criticize the government. Contrarily, when users do 
see the possibility of serious punishment associated with Internet censorship, they would 
stay away from any dangerous online activities. 
Moreover, as Singer (1958) and Pruitt (1965) pointed out, perceived threat also 
derives from the target evaluation of the threatener‘s intention to harm and capability of 
carrying out harmful acts. The threatener, which can be a person or a social structure, is 
the Chinese government in the current study. In fact, the possibility of Internet censorship, 
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consequences of censorship, and the government‘s intention to censor are all correlated. 
A determined authoritarian government would rely on tight Internet regulation and harsh 
punishment to control the information flow. Indeed, this is mostly what the Chinese 
government has been practicing. On the other hand, however, if a target does not perceive 
a serious intention in the threat or he/she does not believe that the threatener can carry out 
the threat, he/she is likely to ignore the threat. In China, the government‘s intention to 
censor has been widely recognized by the Internet users. However, different people might 
have different evaluations about the government‘s capability to censor the Internet due to 
their individual backgrounds or skill sets. This leads to another component of perceived 
threat: perceived control or efficacy as many researchers have described, or as perceived 
security as I herein prefer to term. 
 
Perceived security comes from the sense of control, and works hand in hand 
with perceived censorship in determining people’s political Internet use. 
As discussed earlier, when perceived censorship is high, people would self-censor. 
It seems natural that people take avoidant actions due to perceived threats; however, 
some researchers disagree with this theory. Bandura (1977), for instance, argues that 
perceived inefficacy is the main reason for both expected threats and avoidance behavior. 
According to Bandura, people would not avoid any potential threats if they judge 
themselves with capabilities of coping with the situation. Other scholars also echo that 
fear and avoidance behaviors, as psychological and behavioral outcomes, can both be 
results of perceived control over negative events (Barlow, 1991; Beck, Emery, & 
Greenberg, 1985). Indeed, experimental studies indicated that manipulations of control 
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have resulted in corresponding levels of anxiety (Geer, Davidson, & Gatchel, 1970; 
Sanderson, Rapee, & Barlow, 1989). More convincingly, Williams and Watson (1985) 
found that significant results from perceived probability and consequences of threats 
disappeared after the self-efficacy measure was added in predicting phobic behaviors.  
Perceived censorship and perceived security are actually two aspects of the same 
matter. When people believe in their ability to avoid Internet censorship, for instance, 
even if they perceive a high possibility of Internet censorship with serious consequences, 
they would still ignore the threat and proceed as they wish. On the other hand, if an 
individual‘s own perceived security is weak, the perceived censorship could step in to 
become the main behavioral determinant. 
Which construct is more important in predicting phobic feelings or actions? 
Would the Chinese users be more affected by their evaluations of perceived probability 
and consequence of threats, or their assessment about threatener‘s intentions and 
capabilities? Or perhaps the Chinese users are more susceptive to perceived security? 
While the existing literature is rather mixed and inconclusive, this study analyzed both 
constructs in predicting political net use in China.  
When using the Internet for political reasons, the main threat derives from the 
government censorship. Thus, perceived probability and consequence of threats in the 
current study are essentially the perceived probability and consequence of Internet 
control, such as Internet monitoring and tracking, and penalties for violating Internet 
regulations. Internet users would evaluate the possibilities of whether personal behaviors 
online could be tracked or punished. In addition, perceived intentions and capabilities 
from the threatener reflect the estimate of the government‘s intention and capability to 
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censor. The Chinese government has demonstrated its determination of censoring the 
Internet by periodic crackdowns on Internet cafés or chat rooms, and filtering or blocking 
of the unwanted websites, which are easily detected by ordinary Internet users. 
On the other hand, Internet users‘ perceived security derives primarily from 
personal computer and network skills, as well as their general confidence in the Internet 
as a technology, which allows circumvention of any censorship. For instance, a user who 
believes that the Internet can hide his/her identity, or he/she has sufficient skills to avoid 
the possible censorship, is more likely to ignore the threats associated with Internet 
control. Therefore, perceived censorship and perceived security work as two aspects of 
perceived threats; both have potential attitudinal and behavioral impacts on people‘s 
political net use. Notably, neither perceived censorship nor perceived security measure 
actual levels of censorship or people‘s concrete network skills; instead, they are 
measurements of people‘s subjective judgments.   
 
Research Hypotheses 
Social psychology studies on perceived threat demonstrate the origins of 
perceived threat and how such threats have the potential to affect people‘s attitudes and 
actions. Applying this research to the study of political net use in China, it is proposed 
that perceived threats have the potential of changing people‘s political net use, with 
higher levels of perceived censorship and lower levels of perceived security associated 
with a decreased possibility of using the Internet for political purposes. Therefore, 
perceived threats include two components, specifically, perceived censorship and 
perceived security. While perceived censorship originates from evaluations of a 
144 
 
threatener‘s intention and capability to threaten, as well as the possibility and 
consequence of the threats, perceived security comes from a target‘s evaluations of their 
control over the situation. Naturally, when people sense serious danger in a threat but 
lack the capability to cope with the danger, avoidance of involvement in potential 
troubles is most likely to follow. The following hypotheses are proposed: 
 
H5a: As a user’s perceived censorship level increases, the greater the decline of 
Internet use for political purposes.  
 
H5b: As a user’s perceived security level increases, the greater the Increase of 
Internet for political purposes.  
 
 
As Chapter 4 shows, younger, wealthier, more politically interested users and 
users who employ traditional news media more frequently are more likely to engage in 
political net use. However, these relationships could be potentially moderated by 
perceived censorship and security. Indeed, Marcus, Sullivan, Theiss-Morse, and 
Woodand (1995) found that perceived threats interact with individual characteristics in 
predicting people‘s judgments over tolerance. Apparently, not everyone is affected by 
perceived threats uniformly. Diversification of susceptibility to potential threats could 
result in varying subsequent behaviors. 
Some individuals may be more conservative and protective of their safeties. For 
instance, older people and females may be less likely to become politically aggressive 
and more attentive to harmful consequences of political behaviors. When conservative 
Internet users perceive a high level of threats or low level of control, the likelihood of 
being affected by the perceptions of threats and engage in avoidant behaviors, such as not 
using the Internet for political reasons, increases. Thus, a high level of perceived threats 
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could reinforce negative associations between age, being female, and using the Internet 
for political purposes. 
In an alternative scenario, some people may be more careful because they are 
more established and have more to lose. As Hachigian (2001) pointed out, successful 
Chinese Internet users are not willing to become involved in politically sensitive 
activities, due to the increased risk compared to others. Norris (2001) discovered that 
active Internet users tend to be of a higher social economic status and exemplify a higher 
level of political interests. In addition, political interest has been found to be positive 
related to use of the traditional news media (Delli Carpini, 2004). While better educated, 
wealthier Internet users, possessing higher levels of political interests and the habit of 
using the traditional news media could increase the use of the Internet for political 
activities in general, this group also most likely has established successful careers and 
maintains better financial status. Unlike Internet users in Western contexts who are free 
to engage in political activities on the Internet, the active Chinese Internet users must take 
into consideration Internet censorship. As a result of the perceived threats, the potential to 
use the Internet for political reasons could diminish significantly, even if similar profiles 
are shared with Western counterparts. Consequently, when this population perceives a 
higher level of threats, they would be more concerned about possible losses and try to 
protect personal interests, which in turn, may prevent them from using the Internet for 
political purposes.  
In other words, whether education, political interest, income, or traditional news 
media use is positively associated with political Internet use essentially depends on the 
Internet users‘ perceived threats of Internet censorship. Without the perceived threats, 
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this is the population most likely to engage in political activities online. However, if this 
population perceives threats, they also represent the group most likely to stay away from 
political use of the Internet despite their otherwise high likelihood in participating in such 
activities. 
Another scenario of moderating effects from perceived threats would entail the 
various levels of securities different groups may perceive. For instance, less educated, 
older, and female users may be less likely to understand the Internet-related knowledge 
and possess lower levels of perceived securities, which could subsequently lead to 
decreased utilization of the Internet for political purposes.  
While people have diverse technological, educational, psychological, or financial 
characteristics, they are predisposed to differ in their responses to perceived danger. 
Various decisions over Internet use could be reached. Therefore, while younger, male, 
more educated, politically interested people who use traditional news media more have a 
potentially greater likelihood of using the Internet for political purposes generally; in 
China, these relationships may be contingent upon Internet users‘ levels of perceived 
censorship and security.  
 
H5c: When perceived censorship is low or perceived security is high, male, young, 
better-educated, more politically interested individuals, and those who use 
traditional news media more often are more likely to use the Internet for political 
purposes.  
 
When perceived censorship is high or perceived security is low, the positive 
associations between being male or young, education, political interest, and 





As Figure 5-2 demonstrates, the main relationship exists between individual 
characteristics and political Internet use; however, the connection is moderated by 
perceived censorship and security. Other than acting as moderators, perceived censorship 
and security could also work as direct influences on political net use. When perceived 
censorship is high and perceived security is low, they will lead to less use of the Internet 
for political purposes. 
 
Figure 5-2. Perceived Threats & Net Political Use 
 
                              Perceived Threats 
     ↓ ↘ 




Political Net Use 
 To measure political net use, respondents were asked to report on a 10-point scale 
how frequently they use the Internet for expressing their opinions about political issues 
(Mean=1.87, SD=2.75). 
Perceived Censorship 
 To measure perceived censorship, three aspects are identified: the probabilities of 
the censorship, the government‘s capability to censor, and the consequences of the 
censorship. Respondents were asked if they strongly disagree, disagree, agree, or strongly 
agree with the following three statements: 1) The government can track you down on the 
Internet. 2) What you do online is always monitored by cyber-police. 3) If what you do 
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online upsets the government, you will be punished severely. A separate index was 
created for perceived censorship (Cronbach  = .74; Mean=2.56, SD=0.69). 
Perceived Security 
Milburn and Watman (1981) argue that an intended threat may be weakened in 
the target‘s mind when the target possesses a sense of control. Two aspects are identified 
for measuring perceived security. The first aspect specifically estimates people‘s trust in 
the Internet. When people trust the Internet‘s power in hiding user identity or defeating 
government censorship, with the Internet‘s sheer volume of information, fear of 
censorship could diminish. The second aspect evaluates users‘ judgments about their own 
technological knowledge for bypassing any attempted control. The higher the estimation 
of their technological ability, the less likely would users fear the censorship.  
Responders were given three questions again: 1) Do you have enough computer 
knowledge to make sure that you will not be caught doing anything undesirable online? 2) 
The Internet is a technology that protects the anonymity of a users‘ identity. 3) There are 
so many people and messages online no one would notice what you do on the Internet. 
An index on perceived security was created (Cronbach  = .46; Mean=2.53, SD=0.62). 
Political Interest 
Political interest was included as a control variable because prior research has 
shown the political significance of this attitudinal measure (Jeffres, Atkin, & Neuendorf, 
2002). Respondents were separately asked to report on a 10-point scale to what extent 
they were interested in national and local politics. Responses were summed to form an 
index (inter-item correlation = .76; Mean: 6.70; SD: 2.99). 
News Media use 
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For both newspaper and television, respondents were asked on a 10-point scale 
how much time they spent on three categories of news content: international affairs, 
national politics, and local politics. A separate additive use index was created for 
newspapers (Cronbach  = .73) and television news (Cronbach  = .75). The scale on 
traditional news media use was then created by summing newspaper and TV news use 
(Cronbach  = .82; Mean: 5.21; SD: 2.96).   
Demographic variables 
Key demographic variables such as age (Mean: 29.16; SD: 9.47), gender (43.7% 
female), location (160 from Beijing and 258 from Urumqi), household income (Mean: 
1542 RMB, SD=2364 RMB), party ID (19% CCP members, 34% Youth League 
members, 2% other party members, 34% no party affiliation), and education (mean: 
14.37 years; SD: 2.48), were included as control variables. 
Interactions between Perceived Censorship, Security & Demographic Factors 
Perceived censorship and security may also interact with people‘s individual 
characteristics, which in turn could influence whether or not people use the Internet for 
political reasons. For instance, politically interested users are more likely to use the 
Internet for political purposes, but this tendency may become weaker when the user 
perceives a high probability and serious threat from the government censorship. To 
understand the moderating effects of perceived threats on the association between 
demographic characteristics and using the internet for political purposes, this study 
creates twelve interaction terms between perceived censorship, perceived security and 
users‘ individual characteristics. To reduce potential problems with multicollinearity 
between interaction terms and their components, all the component variables were 
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standardized prior to the formation of the interaction terms (Cronbach, 1987; Eveland, 
1997; Jaccard, Turrisi, & Wan, 1990). 
 
Findings 
A hierarchical regression was run for political net use. The control block consists 
of seven variables, including gender, age, education, party ID, location of responders 
(Beijing or Urumqi), traditional news media use, and political interest. As table 5-1 
shows, younger, male and politically interested responders are more likely to use the 
Internet for political purposes.
27
 The control block accounted for a significant 11% of the 
variance for political net use.  
Table 5-1. Predictors of Political Net Use 
 
N=242 
                                                 
27
 The findings here are slightly different from the findings in Chapter 4, because different predictors were 
used, therefore, the sample sizes are not the same in the two analyses. 
 Control Variables Only Control Variables + 
Censorship Scales 
   
 Standardized 
β 
t value Standardized 
β 
t value 
Control Variables     
   Age -.19** -2.79 -.16* -2.56 
   Gender (High: Female) -.14* -2.26 -.11# -1.86 
   Education -.08 -1.31 -.12# -1.93 
   Party ID (High: CCP 
Member) 
-.10 -1.47 -.06 -.99 
   Location (Hi: Beijing) .07 1.05 .06 1.00 
   Political Interest .21** 2.89 .17* 2.50 
   Media Use .11 1.41 .10 1.40 
Perceived Censorship & 
Security 
    
   Censorship   -.05 -.87 











# p <.10; * p <.05; ** p <.01 
 
 
Hypotheses 5a and 5b predicted that individuals‘ perceived censorship and 
security should significantly relate to their political Internet use. Findings in Table 5-1 
partially support the hypothesis. Variables representing perceived censorship and security 
accounted for an incremental 13.3% of the variance in political net use. The result shows 
that after considering the control variables, perceptions of security (β =.36) is still 
significant in predicting political net use. That is, the higher the perceived security is, the 
more likely it is for Chinese Internet users to use the Internet for political purpose, as 
expected in the hypothesis. However, perceived censorship is not significant in predicting 
political net use.  
 





 Political Net Use 
 Standardized β t value 
 Prior Block (R
2
) 24.3%  
Interaction terms   
   Perceived censorship * Gender  -.10 -.63 
   Perceived censorship * Age .06 .96 
   Perceived censorship * Education -.13* -2.07 
   Perceived censorship * Party ID  -.01 -.17 
   Perceived censorship * Media Use -.06 -.96 
   Perceived censorship * Interest -.03 -.47 
   Perceived security * Gender  -.03 -.16 
   Perceived security * Age .10# 1.69 
   Perceived security * Education .05 .84 
   Perceived security * Party ID -.00 -.06 
   Perceived security * Media Use .12* 1.99 
   Perceived security * Interest .06 1.02 
N=242 
# p <.10; * p <.05; ** p <.01 
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Hypothesis 5c predicted that responders‘ perceived censorship and security also 
moderate the association between users‘ individual characteristics and political net use, 
which is measured by interaction terms. As Table 5-2 demonstrates, after considering the 
prior blocks with R
2
 of 24.3%, the block of interaction terms accounted for an additional 
4.1% of the variance in political net use.  
For interaction terms between perceived censorship and demographic variables, 
one interaction term is significant at p< .05 in accounting for political net use. For 
interaction terms between perceived security and demographic variables, one term is 
significant at p < .05 and the other interaction term is marginally significant at p < .1. 
Findings on significant interaction terms between perceived censorship, security, and 
demographic variables are plotted in Figure 5-3.  
As Table 5-1 shows, when perceived censorship and security are not considered, 
education is not related to political net use. However, once the perceived threat 
measurements are included in the model, education shows a negative relationship with 
political net use, which is contradictory to the hypothesis. As Table 5-2 shows, the 
interaction of perceived censorship and education (β = -.13) is significant, suggesting that 
the main relationship between educational level and political net use is moderated by the 
perceived censorship. The significant interaction term indicates that more educated 
people are slightly more likely to use the Internet for political purposes, but this is only 
true when they perceive a low level of censorship (see the first panel of Figure 5-3). 
When the responders perceive a high level of censorship, the relationship is reversed. In 
other words, how education level is associated with net political use depends on the 
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perceived level of effective censorship. This finding supports Hypothesis 5c on 
moderating effects of perceived censorship on users‘ Internet behaviors. 
Age has a consistently negative relationship with political net use, before and 
after the measurements of perceived threats are considered. As people get older, the 
tendency to get more conservative and careful about what one participates in is a natural 
progression. Table 5-2 shows that the interaction of perceived security with age (β = .10) 
is significant. The second panel of Figure 5-3 suggests that older people are less likely to 
get involved in political usage of the Internet in general, but this relationship is stronger 
when the responders perceive a low level of security.  
As Chapter 4 shows, traditional news media use is marginally significant with 
political net use. However, Table 5-1 illustrates that this main relationship is no longer 
significant in this analysis, suggesting the relatively weak association between traditional 
news media use and political Internet use. Table 5-2 indicates that the interaction of 
perceived security with traditional news media use (β = .12) is significant. As the last 
panel of Figure 5-3 reveals, traditional news media use is not clearly related to political 
net use when perceived security is low, but when perceived security is high, there is a 
positive relation between Internet political use and traditional news media use. The 
influence of traditional news media consumption can only be identified when responders 
perceive a high level of security.  
 
Figure 5-3. The Interaction Terms between Perceived Threats & Demographic  
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All three significant interaction terms support Hypothesis 5c, where perceived 
censorship and security are expected to interact with individual characteristics in 
predicting political net use. When perceived censorship is high, higher educated people 
are less likely to engage in political net use, contrary to the expectation of the main 
relationship. When perceived security is low, older people are even more declined to 
engage in political net use. When perceived security is high, traditional news media 
consumption can have a positive influence on using the Internet for political purposes. It 
is safe to conclude that both perceptions of censorship and senses of security have 
important influences on how people use the Internet, specifically, for political purposes.  
Internet censorship in China has been studied by many scholars. Several scholars 
have reached the same conclusion that the current Internet control employed by the 
Chinese government has been successful in scaring people away from using the Internet 
for politically sensitive purposes (e.g., Hachigian, 2001; Shie, 2004). Furthermore, the 
success of China‘s Internet censorship is not only caused by the extensive legal and 
technological control methods employed by the government, but more importantly, the 
reason lies at self-censorship practiced by the Chinese public. As Shie (2004) argues, for 
instance, people are more interested in leading a better life than taking substantial risk to 
change the regime. If Internet users perceive threats associated with political net use, and 
lack sufficient confidence in the technology or themselves to circumvent the Internet 
censorship, they are likely to avoid involvement in troubling situations.  
This is confirmed by the findings here. The analysis in this study suggests that 
better educated people are only inclined to use the Internet when they perceive a low 
level of censorship. When they believe that there is a high level of threats, they are less 
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likely to engage in political activities online. This could be caused by the fact that better 
educated people are usually more successful and tend to worry more about things they 
could lose. Similarly, older people are even more likely to stay away from political 
Internet use when they sense a lower level of control over the situation. It is likely that 
older people know relatively little about new technology and lack the confidence in the 
technology or themselves to bypass Internet censorship. Consequently, the negative 
relationship between age and political net use is strengthened if the perceived security is 
lower. People using the traditional news media more frequently are only more likely to 
engage in political activities online when their perceived control is high. It is possible that 
the ones who are more likely to use traditional news media are more conservative and 
lack the efficient Internet-related knowledge. For this population who does not usually 
have perceived security when using the Internet for political purposes, therefore, the 
positive influence of traditional news use on political net use can only be observed when 
perceived security is high.   
The reason that perceived threat is not significant might be caused by the fact that 
almost all Internet users perceive some threats associated with political net use. The fact 
that the average political net use is only 1.87 out of 10 indicates how rarely people 
engage in political application of the Internet.  It is possible that people can only be 
differentiated by their levels of perceived security.  
This finding echoes Shie (2004) and Hachigian (2001) that few Chinese Internet 
users care to get involved in political actions. Although the profile of Chinese Internet 
users keeps changing, with more and more common people obtaining Internet access now, 
the Chinese government‘s control over the Internet is still likely to be effective in the 
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near future, limiting the political facet of the Internet use. Since Chinese users are willing 
to practice self-censorship and stay away from potential troubles, the mobilizing effect of 
the Internet could be rather constrained.  
The political culture in China, such as Internet censorship, has shown some strong 
effect on citizens‘ political lives, as demonstrated in this chapter. Political values, too, 
may also influence people‘s political participation. While this chapter focuses on how 
individuals use the Internet for political purposes, the next chapter attempted to 
understand how political Internet use correlates with political participation in the real 
world. Although the Internet can certainly facilitate the political involvement, it does not 
necessarily lead to more political involvement offline. This may be caused by many 
reasons, one of which lies at Chinese nationalism. As nationalism becomes one of the 
most salient ideologies in China today, nationalists may be willing to avoid political 
actions that are not supported by the government, in order to maintain the ongoing 





CHINA‘S NEWLY FOUND NATIONALISM IN THE AGE OF THE INTERNET 
 
On March 24, 2008, the Olympic torch was lit in Olympic, Greece and was 
supposed to be relayed through 20 countries before being carried into the opening 
ceremony in Beijing on August 8. Much to Beijing‘s surprise, several demonstrations 
disrupted the progress of the 2008 Beijing Olympic torch relay in London, Paris, and San 
Francisco. The torch relay, which was meant to be a celebration of Olympic sporting 
ideas, turned into an angry contest between China‘s supporters and demonstrators who 
gathered to protest against China‘s recent crackdown in Tibet and its wider human rights 
record.  
To get the torch safely to its destination, more than 2,000 police officers were 
deployed in London; however, many protesters broke through police barriers and 
attempted to snuff the torch‘s flame. Thirty-seven people were arrested as protesters 
(Burns, 2008). In Paris, despite the presence of 3,000 police along the route, the torch 
was extinguished at least three times. Some stops were skipped and the torch had to be 
carried on a bus several times to avoid protesters (―Protests cut short Olympic relay‖, 
2008). In San Francisco, the only U.S. city on the 23-city global torch relay, both 
protesters against and supporters of China showed up along the route as police watched 
nearby (―Torch relay in San Francisco draws massive protest‖, 2008). 
In response to these abruptions of torch relay, nationwide demonstrations against 
France were launched in China. Although the relay in London was also badly disrupted, 
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and thousands of protesters demonstrated along the route in San Francisco, events in 
Paris triggered anger in many Chinese most. A photograph of a man trying to grab the 
torch from a young, disabled, Chinese athlete girl in Paris was widely circulated. 
Protesters demonstrated outside the French Embassy (Drew, 2008). In several other cities, 
hundreds of protesters gathered in front of French-owned supermarkets Carrefour, 
waving flags, calling for a boycott, and opposing Tibet independence.
29
 An Internet 
appeal circulated on chat rooms and bulletin boards, where users exhorted one another to 
fight back against Western countries (Drew, 2008).  
Protesters had also been targeting at Western news outlets, especially CNN, for 
what was alleged to be biased coverage of unrest in Tibet (Jacob, 2008). In the U.S., 
Chinese protesters demonstrated in Washington, D.C., New York City, and LA calling 
for the dismissal of commentator Jack Cafferty, who in a discussion about China said the 
goods from the country were ―junk‖ and referred to the Chinese as ―a bunch of goons and 
thugs‖ (Pierson, 2008). 
―Many Western people misunderstand China and Beijing‘s policy in regard to 
Tibet‖, Says a Chinese professor, ―And this is made worse by the way the Western media 
portrays the country. I read news from the BBC and CNN very often and I feel stories 
crudely stereotype China‖. A Chinese lawyer also condemned linking the issue of Tibet 
to the Olympic Games, ―The games should actually be a golden opportunity to improve 
communication between China and the rest of the world‖. He also believes that ―there is a 
growing hostility towards China…this may be because China is developing so fast – at a 
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greater speed than anyone could have imagined…so people feel threatened by our 
advance‖ (―Olympic protests: Chinese reaction‖, 2008). 
―Nationalist sentiment is running high‖, as a Washington Post journalist observed 
from Chinese reactions to the Western protests (Drew, 2008). Indeed, whether it was the 
rally of Chinese people all over the world to protect the Diaoyu Islands after a Japanese 
group erected a lighthouse on the island in 1996, large demonstrations in major Chinese 
cities after the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Yugoslavia by the NATO force in 
1998, or the largest protests to denounce Japanese textbooks that omitted any mention of 
Japan‘s wartime atrocities in China, all reflected outpourings of the Chinese people‘s 
nationalistic fury. As a Washington Post headline signifies, ―New Nationalism Drives 
Beijing‖ (Pomfret, 2000).  
Many scholars have also noticed China‘s increasingly nationalistic sentiments 
ever since the early 1990s (e.g., Unger, 1996; Zhao, 1997; Zheng, 1999). Some seem to 
fear that the rising China will pose a threat to other countries. Bernstein and Munro (1997) 
claim that ―driven by nationalist sentiment, a yearning to redeem the humiliations of the 
past, and the simple urge for international power, China is seeking to replace the United 
States as the dominant power in Asia‖ (Bernstein & Munro, 1997, p. 19); Friedman (1997) 
warns that ―an extraordinarily strong and sensitive nationalism infuses elite political 
circles in Beijing at the end of the twentieth century‖ (p. 5); Huntington (1991) predicts 
that China will resume their role of ―preeminent power in East Asia‖ and ―bring to an end 
the overlong century of humiliation and subordination to the West and Japan‖ (p. 229). 
Others however, believe that nationalism in China is conservative, pragmatic, and 
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reactive, instead of proactive, assertive, or aggressive as many Western scholars fear (e.g., 
Zhao, 2000; Ross, 1997). 
The emerging trend of Chinese cyber nationalism in the past years has also 
attracted great attention. Nam (2006) suggests that increased Internet availability 
decisively contributed to the proliferation of Chinese nationalism. As Wu (2006) notes, 
Chinese nationalists around the world have been taking advantage of the Internet as a 
communication tool and platform to promote nationalism.  
Nationalistic sentiments have important attitudinal and behavior implications. As 
a cultural, political, and historical phenomenon, nationalism makes individuals feel 
inseparable from their nation. This feeling however, is not transmitted biologically from 
one person to another; it is an ―acquired character‖ (Hayes, 1928). Possessing nationalist 
proclivity, people would find gratifications from the glories of collective national identity 
and favor state government, national trade, or national cultures. In fact, empirical studies 
have shown that nationalistic people are more likely to have favorable leadership 
evaluation (Wu, 2005).  
Moreover, when their nation interacts with other nations, nationalists would fight 
for national interests, as long as they see any potential danger coming from the foreign 
countries. The strike for political unity and independence can be seen clearly in the 
Chinese people‘s protests against Tibet independence movements. As Stanley Hoffmann 
(2000) commented on the power of nationalism, ―[i]deologies need mobilized believers 
who will propagate it and do battle for it. Few ideologies have been so resourceful in 
their choices of vehicles of propagation‖ (Hoffmann, 2000, p. 198). 
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In this section, I attempt to explore whether there is a direct linkage between 
Chinese nationalism and people‘s political behavior outside of cyberspace, and what role 
the Internet plays in the mix. This chapter begins with a discussion on what nationalism 
entails. It continues by describing origins and characteristics of Chinese nationalism, 
from the perspective of state-led and grassroots. The state-led perspective believes that 
Chinese nationalism is a result of the CCP‘s nationalism campaign in response to its 
political legitimacy crisis. The grassroots perspective believes that nationalism is a 
natural reaction from the general public. I contend that the Chinese nationalism is 
essentially rooted in China‘s traditional culture and bitter history of defeats from the 
West, but the state-led campaign has definitely initiated and facilitated the resurgence of 
the nationalism in the 1990s.  
Next, survey data were analyzed to understand the influence of Chinese 
nationalism. This section finds that nationalism interacts with using the Internet for 
political purposes, and has strong associations with people‘s political involvement that 
reaches beyond cyberspace.  
 
What is Nationalism? 
 Although nationalist sentiments or national identities seem to be natural instincts 
today, nationalism is not a phenomenon that has existed for long. Nationalism made its 
first appearance in Western Europe several hundred years ago. Carlton J. H Hayes (1931) 





mainly due to three reasons. First, intellectuals who fight for democracy find that 
democracy could most easily be established within national boundaries. Second, as these 
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educated ones became suspicious about supernatural religion, they need a new ideology 
to fill that spiritual void. Third, they needed a national state to promote human progress 
(Hayes, 1928). Nationalism has been linked to collapses of dynasties, the Enlightenment 
movement and the idea of public sovereignty, and the process of modernization (e.g., 
Anderson, 1991; Gellner, 1983; Smith, 1995).  
After the two World Wars, nationalism helped free a number of colonized nations 
to become independent states (Wu, 2005). The end of the Cold War precipitated another 
wave of nationalistic conflicts. Nationalism conveniently stepped in after Communism 
became obsolete in those former Communist countries. Meanwhile, fast economic 
developments and introductions of new communication technology have strengthened 
nationalistic attitudes in Asia and South America (Wu, 2005). Although nationalism is 
alleged to have led to aggression and war (Comaroff & Stern, 1995; Chafetz, 1996-7), the 
linkage between the two is far from convincing.  
 Over the years, nationalism has drawn many academic discussions, scholars have 
debated the definitions of this concept. Is nationalism an ideology, some historical 
movements, cultural factors, political events, or common beliefs shared by ethnic groups? 
As Anthony Smith (2004) describes, ―nationalism presents great difficulties of definition, 
classification and explanation…there is no agreement even on basic definitions‖ (p. 108). 
 For some nationalism scholars, nationalism was created as a result of historical 
evolution through industrialization and modernization (Gellner, 1983), as well as the 
process of colonialism, imperialism, and de-colonization (Fukuyama, 1992). War has 
been singled out as the foremost important historical driver for nationalism. As Paul 
Kennedy (1989) argued, ―The frequent wars induced national consciousness, in a 
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negative fashion at least, in that Englishmen learned to hate Spaniards, Swedes to hate 
Danes, Dutch rebels to hate their former Habsburg overlords‖ (p.70).  
Others believe that nationalism has cultural and ethnical origins. For instance, it 
has been argued that nationalism in the West is civic nationalism based on ideas like 
liberty and equality, whereas in the East nationalism originated from ethnographic 
foundations and ethnic orientations (McCrone, 1998).  
So what is nationalism? While originated and evolved in parallel to a series of 
historical events, nationalism encompasses cultural, political, economic, ethnographical, 
and ideological paradigms in establishing a collective national identity among people, 
promoting and protecting ―the nation‘s integrity and uniqueness‖ (Hoffmann, 2000), and 
proclaiming ―national self-defense‖ (Zhao, 2000) and ―its superiority over other‖ 
(Hoffmann, 2000).   
 
Chinese Nationalism 
China does not fit in very well with the Western nationalism studies, which were 
primarily developed out of Western European countries. For example, Pye (1996) 
suggested that China is not a conventional nation-state; Joseph Levenson (1958) also 
believed that nationalism did not occur in China until recent history. Instead, culturalism, 
which represents a universal set of values, has been the primary focus of China‘s 
civilization. China would accept anyone who holds these principles. For China, 
nationalism has been a relatively new idea. It was only introduced in the late nineteenth 
century as a result of bitter defeats and consequent humiliations from Western 
imperialism (Ogden, 2002). Joseph Whitney (1969) describes it as a shift ―from cultural 
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entity to political entity‖ as the Western notion of nationalism made obsolete the 
Confucian values that governed China for two millennia.   
Although some argue that Chinese nationalism is mainly a result of government 
maneuvering, other scholars argue that the state-led perspective overstates the CCP‘s 
capacity in manipulating the Chinese people‘s minds and underestimates the Chinese 
people‘s autonomy (Wu, 2005). It is believed that instead of merely being led by the 
government, nationalism in today‘s China originated from grassroots movements among 
the Chinese people (Zhang, 1997; Wu, 2005). Wu (2005) suggests that nationalism 
comes from the shared memory of glory in ancestry and a deeply rooted sense of injustice 
and agony from imperialism invasions.  
Nevertheless, undeniably, the government has made tremendous efforts trying to 
revitalize the ideology of nationalism in China. Not until the 1990s did nationalism regain 
its popularity. Nationalism‘s recent success has at least partially been attributed to the 
CCP‘s legitimacy crisis, as people were losing faith in Socialism, the CCP regime, and 
the future of the country after the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident. The government 
found itself most credible when wrapping itself in the banner of nationalism, since 
nationalism appeals to most people in China regardless of their political beliefs or 
economic standings (Downs & Saunders, 1998/9; Zhao, 1997, 2000).  
In the next section, Chinese nationalism is reviewed from two distinctive 
perspectives: grassroots and state-led. Chinese nationalism originated from China‘s bitter 
history of defeats by the Western countries. Then, as Communism became outmoded, the 




The perspective of popular grassroots nationalism believes that Chinese 
nationalism is rooted in recent Chinese history (Friedman & McCormick, 2000; Wu, 
2005). China was once a great empire that rivaled Rome (Edwards, 2004). Even until 
the1800s, China still led the world in total world exports (Bairoch, 1982). However, by 
the early 1900s, China had been defeated by the Western countries and Japan. For the 
past 100 years, China has been exploited, invaded, and even slaughtered with its people 
by foreign countries. As Wu (2005) described, Chinese people were agonized by the 
bitter history and sensed strong feelings of humiliation, which is even more painful when 
looking back at the glorious history of China. The so called ―victimization complex‖ is 
not simply a cultural habit about face (Gries, 1999). It has its roots in the strong pride of 
China‘s past and equally strong anger and insecurity about more recent defeats. The past 
conflicts with the West also contribute to the suspicions towards Western countries‘ 
international policies, as some people believe that human rights and individual freedom 
are merely tools to extend Western hegemonic power (Ogden, 2002).  
Indeed, some Chinese people, no matter whether they are communists or 
democrats, are nationalists first. As Zhao put it, ―the pro-democracy demonstrators in 
Tiananmen Square in 1989, while confronting the government, claimed that patriotism 
drove them to take to the streets in the spring of 1989‖ (Zhao, 2000, p. 9). These shared 
mixed feelings of pride and agony make Chinese people especially susceptible to the 
government‘s nationalism campaigns. Although Chinese liberalists sometimes criticize 
the government, they are also defensive towards the Western countries, especially when 




This feeling of threat becomes even more relevant as China‘s rapid economic 
development seems to alarm the West about China‘s potential threat to the rest of the 
world (Bernstein, & Munro, 1997; Chang, 2001; Gertz, 2000). The failure of China‘s bid 
on the 2000 Olympic game as well as the disputes with the U.S. regarding China‘s 
attempt to enter the WTO all appeared to confirm the Chinese people‘s belief that the 
West is afraid of the emergence of a strong China (Zhao, 1997). Zhao (2004a) made the 
comment that ―At the intellectual level…the main discourse drastically shifted from 
enthusiastic worship of the West in the1980s to deep suspicion of the West in the 1990s‖ 
(p. 10). Similarly, Wang (1996) also observed that in a sharp contrast to 1989, talking 
about democracy and political reform could be regarded as unpatriotic; and nationalism 
has dominated students and scholars, if not the whole nation.  
The rising nationalism sentiments are most clear during the time of crisis. For 
instance, in the summer of 1996, the long-time disputes between China and Japan over 
the Diaoyu Islands provoked widespread nationalistic sentiments and public protests in 
China (Downs & Saunders, 1988/9). Although the traditional media were not able to 
cover these events, students from several universities in Beijing used emails, BBS or 
chat-rooms to disseminate pertinent information, exchange their opinions, and organize 
unauthorized protests. In 1999, after the May 1999 mistaken U.S. bombing of the 
Chinese embassy in Belgrade, People became outrageous, believing that this incident was 
a deliberate act of aggression to China by the United States. Students and others 
demonstrated in front of several U.S. embassy and consulates in China, and threw stones 
and eggs to express their anger (Symonds, 1999). In the spring of 2005, the largest anti-
Japan protest against Japan‘s United Nations Security Council (UNSC) accession and its 
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whitewash of wartime atrocities in history textbook caused millions of people in China to 
take to the streets. More than 100,000 people in Shanghai protested.
30
 
The government realizes that nationalism is a double-edged sword. The controlled 
nationalism or patriotism that emphasizes loyalty and pragmatic concerns could help 
legitimize the ruling party, but at the same time, the state is starting to fear that the 
growing grassroots nationalism sentiments could turn into criticism on the government‘s 
foreign policies. The state has been cautious in controlling the grassroots nationalism. To 
maintain a good relationship with the rest of the world, the government has tried to 
restrain people from protesting against the U.S. or Japan during times of crisis. For 
instance, in the 2005 demonstrations against Japan, the government sent a number of text 
messages to cellular phone users in major cities warning against ―spreading rumors, 
believing rumors, or joining illegal demonstrations‖ (Kahn, 2005, A3). ―All this makes 
nationalism a particularly interesting force in China‖, a China observer commented, 
―given its potential not just for conferring legitimacy on the government but also for 
taking it away‖ (Kristof, 2001, p.1). 
 
State-Led Nationalism 
After the Soviet Union collapsed in the early 1990s, Communist ideology grew to 
be increasingly unattractive and outdated. The internal legitimacy of the Communism 
regime became the major concern for the Chinese government. The legitimacy crisis 
grew to be especially salient after the Tiananmen Incident in 1989. The CCP saw the 
urgent need for a new cohesive ideology, an ideology that can be shared by most of the 
people. Nationalism was their answer.  
                                                 
30
 See more information at 2005 Anti-Japan demonstrations, Wikipedia. 
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The Chinese government has employed a series of campaigns to promote 
nationalism. These nationalism campaigns covered many areas, including reintroduction 
of traditional and cultural values; reemphasis on the historical sufferings from Western 
invasions; and a focus on ―national interests‖. Led by the Party, these campaigns often 
identify the nation closely to the Communist state. Nationalism sentiment is officially 
expressed as ―aiguo‖, or patriotism (Zhao, 2005/6). As Zhao (2005/6) pointed out, 
Chinese patriotism can be understood as a state-led nationalism. These patriotism 
campaigns ―appealed to nationalism in the name of patriotism as a way to ensure the 
loyalty of a population stewing in domestic discontent‖ (p. 135). 
The government tried to define nationalism as independent of Communism or 
Socialism doctrines, but more to do with China‘s culture, history, and the ongoing 
economic development. To connect the CCP with China‘s non-communist history, the 
party tried to reconstruct a sense of national esteem and dignity by reviving traditional 
symbols like the Great Wall, and by promoting the CCP‘s image, depicting the party as a 
savior of China from humiliations of foreign imperialism (Zhao, 2004b).  
The government also reintroduced Confucian values like hierarchy and harmony. 
Many destroyed Confucian temples have been rebuilt (Thomas, 2002). In October 1995, 
an international conference to celebrate the 2,545
th
 anniversary of Confucius‘s birth was 
held. While Communist officials have never attended occasions like this, Li Ruihuan, a 
Standing Committee member of the Political Bureau of the CCP Central Committee, 
among other officials, appeared at the conference. He made the opening remarks and 
praised the ―ancient‖ and ―brilliant‖ idea of harmony, an essential value in Confucianism, 
for its stabilizing effects, which are claimed to be prerequisites for economic growth 
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(Wang & Zheng, 2003). Tu Weiming (1993) notes that ―traditional symbols are widely 
exploited to inspire nationalist sentiments‖ in the 1990s (p. xxi). 
Every country‘s political ideology is deeply rooted in its traditional culture; China 
is no exception. The major part of Chinese civilization centers on the philosophical 
principles of Confucianism. Developed 2,500 years ago, Confucianism was used by the 
government to guide the everyday lives of both the ruling and the ruled. Confucianism 
considers the Great Harmony as the highest goal. To reach ultimate harmony, individuals 
have to fulfill their responsibilities, instead of rights, through virtues, instead of laws 
(Ogden, 2002). As Zhang Shichao (1999) illustrates, ―Our state was founded on the idea 
that the interests of the common people are to be sacrificed for the benefit of those at the 
top of society‖ (p. 50). The vital qualities of behaviors, according to Confucian standards, 
are subordination, obedience, and loyalty to higher officials, father, older brother, and 
husbands. Naturally, one expectation of the Chinese people, embedded in this Chinese 
philosophy, is that the leaders and government should take care of them, like a father 
taking care of a family.      
This cultural and historical influence in China is particularly evident when it 
comes to the relationship between rulers and the ruled. Hierarchic and obedient attitudes 
have been dominant characteristics for Chinese people; and the individual rights to 
criticize government, to participate in politics, and to be informed with government 
behaviors are rather constrained. Freedom is rarely a major theme in traditional China‘s 
political ideology. Unlike some Western philosophers whose concern is to restrain the 
government from controlling the people, Chinese Confucian thinkers, throughout history, 
have helped the government control the general people, and encouraged people to stay 
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loyal to the government. For Confucianism, the main concern is to maintain societal 
order and stability. At its very core, Confucianism awards rights hierarchically and 
unevenly (Ogden, 2002). Confucianism‘s emphasis on hierarchy and social harmony 
agreed well with the ruling dictators, who usually needed a doctrine to legitimize and 
secure their ruling (Wu, 2005). 
The traditional values of Confucianism resonate with the state-led nationalism 
respective to several aspects. They shared some important common grounds, which could 
help explain the success in state-led nationalism. For instance, both ideologies single out 
the importance of a strong government. Second, sacrifices of individual rights for the 
collective goods are valued by both doctrines. Finally, loyalty to the ruling class and the 
nation is one of the most important tenets from both beliefs.  
Nationalist intellectuals often believe that liberal Democracy simply will not work 
in China. For them, the individualism and liberalism that are central to Western 
democracy are considered detrimental to collective harmony valued by Confucianism, 
and therefore should be restrained (Friedman & McCormick, 2000). Aligning with 
nationalism, the majority of political elites and intellectuals in China also favor a strong 
government (Zheng, 1993; Zhao, 1997). The contrast between China‘s economic success 
and the former Communist Eastern European countries‘ financial hardship seems to 
confirm their opinions. These people concur with the government, and give high priority 
to economic development. They agree that politics must be subordinate to economics. 
When they believe that the democratic process is harmful for economics, they are willing 
to replace democracy with a tightly controlled authoritarian regime. In other words, they 
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propose that political reform can only be meaningful to the extent the economic 
development is facilitated and secured. 
While democracy remains a long-term goal, in the current stage, many Chinese 
people support the official party line that a strong government is what China needs now, 
and sudden democratization may result in social disintegration, as witnessed in Eastern 
Europe (Zhao, 1997). Indeed, empirical evidence has shown that the Chinese people tend 
to admire and respect authoritarian leaders and a strong government more than 
democratic ones (Ogden, 2002). Additionally, nationalistic people are more likely to 
favor the CCP leadership than less nationalistic ones are (Wu, 2005). 
Other than appealing to Confucian values and principles, the Chinese government 
has also launched a series of patriotic campaigns through media and schools since the 
1990s. Students were organized to watch patriotic films and documentaries, and patriotic 
curriculum have been taught in high schools and universities (Friedman & McCormick, 
2000). In 1994, a conference on education adopted Guidelines for Patriotic Education, 
which replaced the old Marxist indoctrination with patriotic programs (Friedman & 
McCormick, 2000). Marxism was eliminated from the high school curriculum and 
college entrance examinations, instead, patriotic programs like ―I am Chinese‖, which 
features being proud of great Chinese achievements, were added. On June 28, 1990, the 
National People‘s Congress passed a National Flag Law, which commands a daily flag-
raising ceremony at all government and public locations. All elementary and middle 
schools are asked to execute a flag raising and lowering ceremony. Patriotic education 
shows great success. A Los Angeles Times article cited a 1995 official survey that young 
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people in China now value patriotism much more than before, patriotism ranked from 
number five in 1984 to number two in 1995 (Chu, 1999).  
The CCP leadership also portrayed itself as the protector of the country and of the 
Chinese people. As Jia (1999) pointed out, the term ―national interests‖ was rarely used 
before the 1980s, and even when it was used, it was merely a substitution for interests of 
the ruling class. As ideological emphasis has shifted, however, the government has 
started to use ―national interests‖ to defend its rule, especially in matters of international 
relations (Jia, 1999). The argument that every country acts upon its own national interests 
in international affairs, revoked Chinese intellectuals‘ suspicions towards Western 
countries, especially with the United States. The sanctions imposed on China after 1989, 
disputes over human rights, intellectual property, and Taiwan created a sense of crisis 
among Chinese people, and strengthened the CCP‘s leadership in struggling against the 
hostile international forces. One of the nationalism campaigns featured the so-called 
Guoqing jiaoyu, which literally means education in the national condition. The Guoqing 
jiaoyu clearly states that China‘s current condition is so unique that only one-party rule 
rather than Western style democracy would guarantee political stability and economic 
development in the current stage (Zhao, 2005/6).  
In response to criticism of human rights issues in China, the CCP leaders 
reminded the Chinese people how Western countries had forgotten their principles of 
human rights while invading and exploiting China in the century of humiliation. To argue 
against the idea of having a democracy in China, the leaders asserted that China needs a 
strong government and forceful measures to maintain domestic order, which is a 
precondition for economic advancement (Zhao, 2000). It seemed that ―if not for the 
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strong leadership of the CCP in fighting against these conspiracies, China would fall 
apart‖ (Zhao, 1998, p. 298). 
These strategies have worked well. In 1989, many Chinese students and people 
trusted the West more than the CCP leadership as if the Western countries represented the 
Chinese interests better than the Chinese government, but now the concerns over social 
stability and a strong nation have overshadowed the idea of political liberation. People 
are beginning to accept the government‘s defender role (Sisci, 2001). 
Chinese nationalism, being state-led, has two clear focuses, namely, loyalty and 
being pragmatic. The public loyalty to the government secured the regime‘s ruling status; 
and the priorities on economic growth and its prerequisite, political stability, justify the 
importance of a powerful government at the time being. It is claimed that only a strong 
government can maintain political stability (Zhao, 2005/6). The recent chaos in former 
Eastern European Communist regimes seemed to confirm these claims that Western style 
democracy does not work for all countries, and people need to stay subordinate to the 
strong government to have stability and prosperity.  
Although the Chinese government is merely exploiting nationalist sentiments in 
serving its own purposes, the reintroduction of Confucian values and principles, the 
revoking of past defeats from the West and Japan, and emphasizing the pragmatic focus 
have worked effectively in eliciting the loyalty of Chinese people to the nation as well as 
the government (Zhao, 2005/6). Consequently, people are more likely to support the 
government‘s agenda on developing economics and maintaining a stable political 
environment, even at the expense of sacrificing individual rights, freedom, or democracy. 
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Nationalism is a relatively new idea to China, but it shares many principles with 
China‘s deep rooted traditional culture. The historical defeats by foreign countries have 
made the Chinese people keen to the ideas of nationalism, and the state-led nationalism 
campaigns have revitalized nationalism among the general public. Consequently, Chinese 
nationalism is not a simple product of state propaganda, it can also be observed in the 
popular society (Zhao, 2004).  
By highlighting the principle of loyalty and the pragmatic focus on prosperity, the 
state-led nationalism has helped the CCP successfully fill the ideological void left by 
Socialism, and legitimized its rule in China. Today, under the influence of state-led 
nationalism, many Chinese people also value the strong government and the state priority 
on economic development and political stability. Grassroots nationalism, on the other 
hand, is most reactive when foreign forces potentially violate national interests of China. 
Incidents like anti-Japan, anti-U.S., or anti-France protests are all manifestations of 
grassroots nationalism, reflecting the Chinese people‘s strong will to protect China‘s 
autonomy and interests. Although grassroots nationalists support the Chinese 
government‘s rule in fighting against international forces, nevertheless, they sometimes 
criticize the government for its soft international policies. As a result, at times the 
grassroots nationalism ventures beyond the control of the Chinese government, and could 
even act as a rebellious force to the CCP rule.  
Having divergent emphases, the state-led nationalism and grassroots nationalism 
could lead to various behaviors. For instance, while state-led nationalism places loyalty 
and stability above everything else, grassroots nationalism values China‘s independence 
and prosperity before supporting the Chinese government and maintaining the social 
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order. Consequently, state-led nationalists would avoid any potential uprising protests in 
an effort to preserve the political stability and economic advancement. Grassroots 
nationalists, in contrast, would be willing to engage in such actions if they believe that 
China‘s interests are in danger. 
 
Research Hypotheses 
As one of the most visible ideologies in China today, Chinese nationalism 
certainly has its impact on people‘s everyday political lives. Characterized as Confucian 
and pragmatic, state-led nationalists tend to be loyal to the government and support 
China‘s focus on economic development and political stability. In line with the official 
agenda, state-led nationalists are likely to participate in government supported activities, 
such as voting and contacting public officials, but stay away from unapproved political 
activities, such as protests. Rooted in pride in China‘s ancient glorious history and recent 
humiliations from the Western invasion, the grassroots nationalism reacts most strongly 
at times of international crisis. Based on the analysis, the following hypotheses are 
proposed: 
 
H6a: State-led nationalism will be positively related to participation in traditional 
participation, and negatively related to protests.  
 
H6b: Grassroots nationalism will be positively related to outwards protests.  
 
 
Described as grassroots originated, outward directed, and culturalism driven, the 
emerging Chinese cyberspace has been used by nationalists to disseminate information 
and opinions (Wu, 2005). Active democrats or dissident groups also use the Internet to 
organize activities according to their agendas (Kalathil & Boas, 2003). Although many 
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Western scholars have argued that the Internet would provide democratic ideologies to 
the Chinese people (e.g., Chase & Mulvenon, 2002), others claim that the Chinese 
cyberspace is flooded with nationalistic sentiments (e.g., Wu, 2005). Several scholars 
have attempted to understand the political discourse on the Internet by examining certain 
famous political forums (Wu, 2005; Yang, 2003). However, by singling out some 
specialized forums normally only visited by political elites, these attempts have failed to 
document how a regular Chinese Internet user would use the Internet for political reasons. 
Most Chinese users would probably never go to these highly political forums. As 
evidenced in Chapter 4, the average use of the Internet for political expression was rather 
low. After all, the Internet is only a medium, where both political and entertainment 
messages can be distributed by the Internet. Even among political messages, the Chinese 
users can be exposed to both nationalistic and democratic messages.  
Although nationalists are more likely to follow the government‘s agenda and 
engage in permitted political actions while avoiding protests, exposure to alternative 
political ideologies on the Internet may change that. In other words, exposure to different 
messages online could alter the relationship between nationalism and political 
participation offline. While exposure to nationalistic views could strengthen the impact of 
nationalism on political outcomes; exposure to democratic views could potentially 
weaken or reverse that relationship. 
 
Research Question: How does using the Internet for political purposes interact with 
nationalism in influencing political participation? Do the interactions differ 





As Figure 6-1 shows, nationalistic sentiments could affect political outcomes 
directly, and the political use of the Internet could either directly affect people‘s political 
activity offline, or through moderating the relationships between nationalistic values and 
political outcomes. 
Figure 6-1 Nationalism, Net Political Use and Political Participation 
 Nationalistic Value     Political Participation                                                                   
↑           
Political Internet Use        
 
The following section discusses the operationalizations of the main concepts and 




Political Net Use 
 To measure political net use, respondents were asked to report on a 10-point scale 
how frequently they use the Internet for expressing their opinions about political issues 
(Mean=1.87, SD=2.75). 
Traditional Participation 
 Respondents were asked about three types of traditional forms of participation: 
voting for deputies to the local People‘s Congress, contacting leaders, local people‘s 
deputies or authorities, and contacting editors/reporters from the media about any issue.  
The percentage of people having reported voting for the People‘s Congress was 27.2% 
(n=114), while 16.7% (n=70) of respondents claimed to have contacted leaders, local 
people‘s deputies or authorities, and 18.9% (n=79) reported having contacted media 
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about an issue. An index was created for the three items for a traditional participation 
measurement (Cronbach  = .46; Mean: 0.28; SD: 0.35). 
Political Protests 
Outwards Protest Respondents were asked, ―Have you done any of the following 
things or whether you might do the following things under certain circumstances when 
your country is threatened by a foreign country: sign a petition, join a boycott, attend a 
demonstration, or join a strike.  
Inwards Protest Respondents were asked similar questions, ―Have you done any of 
the following things or whether you might do the following things when you object to a 
domestic leader or domestic issue: sign a petition, contact media,
31
 attend a 
demonstration, or join a strike.  
Forty-two percent of respondents said they would petition against an international 
force (30% ―No‖); the number is only 24% when responders need to protest against the 
Chinese government (38% ―No‖). Of all respondents, 25% reported they would 
demonstrate against an international threat (42% ―No‖), while 15% said they would 
demonstrate against domestic policy or the government (47% ―No‖). Seventeen percent 
responded that they would go on strike against an outside force (49% ―No‖), and only 11% 
were willing to go on strike against a domestic issue or government (59% ―No‖). Fifty-
four percent would boycott another country‘s products (19% ―No‖) and 39% of the 
people would contact media when concerned about a domestic issue (28% ―No‖). 
                                                 
31
 When the threat comes from within, boycotting is not an appropriate choice to protest. Therefore, 
contacting media is used instead. 
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The index on outwards protest was created using the four measurements 
(Cronbach  = .62; Mean: 0.56; SD: 0.37). The index on inwards protest was created 
using the four measurements (Cronbach  = .68; Mean: 0.37; SD: 0.35). 
Nationalism 
 Nationalism represents an ideology that helps create a national identity and 
protect the nation‘s autonomy and interests. Two measurements are created to assess 
people‘s nationalistic levels in China. The first measure refers to grassroots nationalism, 
or a general sense of pride (Chen, 2004). Responders were asked, on a 0-10 scale, how 
much they agree that China should and will become a stronger power in the world (Mean 
8.55, SD 2.69); and China should play a more important role in Asia and the world 
(Mean 8.93, SD 2.38). An index was created using the two (inter-item correlation = .72; 
Mean 8.69, SD 2.42). This scale would be referred to as grassroots nationalism. 
Another measurement for nationalism focuses on the pragmatic side of Chinese 
nationalism. Relying on China‘s economic achievement to strengthen people‘s 
confidence in China, the Chinese government has effectively legitimized its rule with 
state-led nationalism. In the past decades, the state-led nationalism has thrived on the 
great economic growth. In fact, much of Chinese people‘s pride in China today may be 
based on the extraordinary economic improvement witnessed in the country. As a result, 
many Chinese people agree with the government that the political reform should be 
sacrificed for economic development at the current stage. Therefore, to measure the 
success of state-led nationalism, it is best to measure how much people agree with the 
government‘s agenda in prioritizing economic development and maintaining social order. 
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Inglehart (2005)‘s measurements for materialist and post-materialist were 
modified and used here. Responders are asked to choose between democratic values 
against top-down pragmatic values from the state. When asked to choose between 
political stability and freedom of expression, 64.4% (n=270) chose political stability, and 
6.9% (n=29) chose freedom of expression. When asked to choose between economic and 
democratic development, 67.8% (n=284) believed economic development is more 
important, and 8.8% (n=37) chose democratic development.
32
 Choices for economic 
development and political stability were coded as 1, while choices for freedom of 
expression and democratic development were coded as 0. The two answers were then 
used to derive an average. The state-led nationalism index was created using the two 
(inter-item correlation = .18; Mean 0.90, SD 0.25). 
 
Findings 
A hierarchical regression was run for three measures of political participation: 
traditional participation that is approved by the government, protests against foreign 
forces that are at times permitted by the government but frowned upon, and protests 
against the domestic leaders or policies that are most feared by the government. As 
Chapter 4 evidences, political Internet use is not associated with any form of political 
participation. By adding nationalism into the mix, this chapter aims to understand if 
political Internet use has a direct or a moderating effect on political outcomes when the 
specific political culture in China is taken into consideration. 
Traditional Participation 
                                                 
32
 The rest of the cases are missing values. 
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The control block consists of seven variables, including gender, age, education, 
party ID, location of responders (Beijing or Urumqi), traditional media use measures, and 
political interest.
33
 The control block and political use of the Internet accounted for a 
significant 10.3% of the variance for traditional participation.  
State-led nationalistic individual are hypothesized to be more likely to support the 
government. Wu‘s (2005) survey study also found a positive association between 
government support and nationalism. Since traditional political participation is endorsed 
by the government as ways of political involvement, state-led nationalistic people should 
be more likely to follow the government agenda and engage in these activities.  
Table 6-1. Predictors of Traditional Participation 
 
N=242 
# p <.10; * p <.05; ** p <.01 
                                                 
33
 The results are slightly different from findings in Chapter 4. This is caused by different predictors entered 
in the models and different sample sizes. This is also true for Table 6-3 and Table 6-5. 




t value Standardized 
β 
t value 
   
Control Variables     
   Age .17* 2.41 .15* 2.22 
   Gender (High: Female) -.02 -.34 -.03 -.41 
   Education -.05 -.74 -.04 -.54 
   Party ID (High: CCP 
Member) 
  .25** 3.82    .24** 3.70 
   Location (Hi: Beijing) .11# 1.69 .11 1.67 
   Political Interest .13# 1.74 .11 1.49 
   Media Use .02 .20 .01 .19 
   Political Internet Use .00 .07 .03 .41 
Scales on Nationalism     
   Grassroots Nationalism   .05 .71 













Findings in Table 6-1 support the hypothesis. Similar to Chapter 4, age (β =.17) 
and party ID (β =.25) are still positively associated with traditional participation. Being in 
Beijing (β =.11) and politically interested (β =.13) are also marginally significant in 
predicting traditional participation. 
Variables representing two nationalism scales accounted for an incremental 1.9% 
of the variance in traditional participation. After considering the control variables, the 
scale on state-led nationalism (β =.13) is still significant in predicting traditional 
participation. As expected, state-led nationalists who tend to concur with the government 
are also more likely to engage in participation that is supported by the government.  
As Table 6-2 shows, after considering the prior blocks with an R
2
 of 12.2%, the 
block of interaction terms accounted for an additional 1.9% of the variance in traditional 
participation. The interaction term between grassroots nationalism and political net use is 
marginally significant (β = -.12, p<.051). 
Table 6-2 Interactive Relationships between  




 Political Net Use 
 Standardized β t value 
Prior Block (R
2
) 12.2%  
Interaction terms   
   Grassroots*Political net use -.12# -1.97 
   State-led*Political net use .05 .67 
N=242 
# p <.10; * p <.05; ** p <.01 
  
Findings on significant interaction term between grassroots nationalism and 
political net use is plotted in Figure 6-2. The interaction of grassroots and political net use 
indicates that for people who only use the Internet for political purposes on a low or 
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medium level, higher grassroots nationalism leads to more involvement in traditional 
participation. However, if people use the Internet heavily for political purposes, the 
relationship is reversed, with higher grassroots nationalism leading to lower involvement 
in traditional participation.  
 
Figure 6-2. The Interaction Term between  
Grassroots Nationalism & Political Net Use on Traditional Participation 
 
 
Analyses in Chapter 4 seem to suggest that there is no relationship between 
political Internet use and political participation. After nationalism is taken into 
consideration, however, the political net use appears to have an impact on political 
participation through its interaction with nationalism, depending on the intensiveness of 
political Internet use. This finding confirms the moderating effects of political Internet 
use on nationalism and political participation offline. 
Grassroots nationalism is most likely to manifest when there is potential danger 
from abroad. It is not clear how grassroots nationalism relates to traditional participation. 
This finding here suggests that grassroots nationalism could also lead to more traditional 
participation when political Internet use is not high. This is likely since grassroots 

































not exist, grassroots nationalists are also inclined to follow the government‘s agenda. 
However, this relationship only exists when the political net use is not high. As discussed 
earlier, nationalism could threaten the government‘s legitimacy, partially because the 
Chinese government‘s foreign policy has been criticized by grassroots nationalists for not 
firm enough. If Chinese cyberspace is truly flooded with nationalistic sentiments, as Wu 
(2005) claimed, then it is possible that heavy exposure to that content could lead people 
to disobey the government‘s agenda, and avoid conventional political participation such 
as voting and contacting. 
 
Outwards Protest 
 Again, although the Chinese government has effectively used nationalism to 
legitimize its regime, a powerful force as nationalism has the potential of spinning out of 
control from time to time. During the Chinese people‘s demonstrations against foreign 
countries like Japan or the United States, the government has witnessed how nationalistic 
sentiments can turn people‘s anger against the government‘s ―soft‖ international policies 
(Zhao, 2004). Although the government welcomes state-led nationalistic values on 
loyalty and ―national interests‖, it fears that these grassroots nationalistic protests could 
hurt China‘s relationship with other countries, and as a result, threaten China‘s economic 
growth. As discussed earlier, the grassroots Chinese nationalists react most strongly 
during times of crisis. State-led nationalists, however, are more likely to support 
pragmatic priorities in maintaining fast development of economics, and therefore avoid 
outwards protests.  
Table 6-3 shows the result for outwards protests. The control variables and 
political net use accounted for 7.2% of the variance in outwards protests. Similar to the 
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results in Chapter 4, political interest (β =.13) is marginally significant in predicting 
outwards protests. When two measures of nationalism are added, political Internet use (β 
=.12) is also marginally significant with outwards protests, suggesting a possible 
interaction between the two forms of nationalism and political Internet use. Two 
nationalism scales contribute additional 2% of the variance in outwards protests.  
 
Table 6-3 Predictors of Outwards Protest 
 
N=237 




The hypothesis states that a grassroots nationalistic responder is more likely to 
engage in outwards protests when they see a threat from a foreign force. A state-led 
nationalist, however, might act differently. This hypothesis is partially supported by the 




t value Standardized 
β 
t value 
   
Control Variables     
   Age .09 1.34 .08 1.13 
   Gender (High: 
Female) 
-.07 -1.1 -.06 -.94 
   Education .08 1.21 .07 1.06 
   Party ID (High: CCP 
Member) 
-.01 -.17 -.01 -.12 
   Location (Hi: 
Beijing) 
.04 .58 .05 .74 
   Political Interest .13# 1.68 .10 1.26 
   Media Use .07 .86 .06 .81 
   Political Internet Use .11 1.60 .12# 1.80 
Scales on Nationalism     
    Grassroots 
Nationalism 
  .15* 2.18 














findings presented in Table 6-3. After controlling for the demographic variables and 
political net use, the grassroots nationalism measure (β =.15) is still significant.  
This confirms that grassroots nationalism reacts most strongly during times of 
threat. Rooted in China‘s histories, grassroots nationalists tend to fight against foreign 
power when they believe that China‘s interests or sovereignty are violated. However, 
state-led nationalism is not associated with outwards protests. The non-significant result 
could be caused by the characteristic of Chinese nationalism. As Zhao (2000b) pointed 
out, many Chinese people are patriots first. Although some state-led nationalists are 
likely to follow the government order and not participate in outwards protests, others may 
be willing to fight against international power over national interests. Thus, it is possible 
that there is no monotonic effect from state-led nationalism on outwards protests. 
 
Table 6-4. Interactive Relationships between  




 Political Net Use 
 Standardized β t value 
Prior Block (R
2
) 9.2%  
Interaction terms   
   Grassroots*Political net use .02 .31 
   State-led*Political net use .05 .69 
N=237 
# p <.10; * p <.05; ** p <.01 
  
 
The interaction terms accounted for another 0.2% in the variance in outwards 
participation. Neither of the interaction terms is found to be significant (See Table 6-4).  
 
Inwards Protest 
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Inwards protests are the kind of participation the Chinese government objects to 
most. Although there have been events where public demonstrations push the government 
to change domestic policies, such as what happened in the Sun Zhigang accident 
mentioned earlier, these events are rarely covered by traditional media and concern the 
government most. State-led nationalism values loyalty and subordination, supports the 
official agenda of political stability and economical development, and therefore are less 
likely to participate in inwards protests. 
Table 6-5. Predictors of Inwards Protest 
 
N=226 
# p <.10; * p <.05; ** p <.01 
 
 
As Table 6-5 shows, the control variables contributed to 10.6% of the variance in 
inwards protests, while the two nationalism scales add another 0.7%. Similar to findings 




t value Standardized 
β 
t value 
   
Control Variables     
   Age -.13# -1.85 -.13# -1.88 
   Gender (High: Female) -.07 -1.13 -.07 -1.05 
   Education .06 .90 .05 .78 
   Party ID (High: CCP 
Member) 
.07 1.09 .08 1.19 
   Location (Hi: Beijing) -.02 -.30 -.01 -.17 
   Political Interest .18** 2.42 .17* 2.23 
   Media Use .13# 1.66 .13 1.61 
   Political Internet Use -.05 -.78 -.06 -.84 
Scales on Nationalism     
    Grassroots Nationalism   .07 1.04 














in Chapter 4, age (β = -.13) is found negatively related to inwards protests, while political 
interests (β = .18) are positively related to protests against domestic issues or leaders. 
Traditional news media (β = .13) is also marginally significant in predicting more 
participation in inwards protest.  
It is predicted that state-led nationalistic people are less likely to participate in 
inwards protests. However, the hypothesis is not supported here. Neither of the 
nationalism scales is significant, as shown in Table 6-5.  
The interaction terms accounted for another 2.4% in the variance in inwards 
participation. As Table 6-6 shows, the interaction term between political net use and 
state-led nationalism (β = .15) is significant at p < .05.  
 





 Political Net Use 
 Standardized β t value 
Prior Block (R
2
) 11.3%  
Interaction terms   
   Grassroots*Political net use -.02 -.35 
   State-led*Political net use .15* 2.22 
N=226 
# p <.10; * p <.05; ** p <.01 
 
As Figure 6-3 shows, for people who do not heavily use the Internet for political 
purposes, as their state-led nationalism level goes higher, they are less likely to engage in 
inwards protests, as expected. However, this relationship disappeared if not reversed 
when the person uses the Internet for political application extensively. What this suggests 
may be that although state-led nationalism has a negative impact on inwards protests, its 
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impact tends to be offset by heavy political activities online. This finding is similar to the 
finding with traditional participation, where heavy use of the Internet for political 
purposes reverses the relationship between grassroots nationalism and political 
participation.  
Figure 6-3. The Interaction Term between State-led Nationalism & Political Net Use 
on Inwards Protest 
 
 
Before nationalism is taken into consideration, political Internet use does not have 
a clear impact on political actions in the real world, as shown in Chapter 4. Nevertheless, 
when nationalism is taken into account, political Internet use is indicated as having an 
impact on political participation through the interactions with nationalism. It appears that 
as Internet users are exposed to political expression extensively online, they would be 
less likely to follow the government‘s order in engaging in traditional participation or 
avoiding protests against domestic issues or leaders.  
As the two significant interactions suggest, it is possible that the Chinese 
cyberspace is full of nationalistic sentiments that criticize the government for its 
international policies, or democratic messages where the government is usually portrayed 
as an authoritarian rule with no intention of democratic reforms. Thus, as people are 


























grassroots nationalists could become less likely to engage in traditional participation, and 
state-led nationalists could become more likely to protest against the Chinese government 
or domestic policies. Indeed, Miles (2002) described China this way, ―If public sentiment 
had to be judged by the outpourings on the country‘s numerous Internet bulletin boards, it 
would appear alarmingly chauvinistic and bellicose‖ (p. 15). As the Chinese government 
has been repeatedly criticized for its soft international policies by netizens, it is possible 
that the government would be deemed too weak to rule the country by the netizens. Thus, 
exposure to these negative depictions of the government online could lead to more 
protests and less approved participation. 
Of course, without a content analysis of Chinese cyberspace, understanding why 
heavy use of the Internet for political purpose could reverse or weaken the taming effect 
of nationalism is not easy. However, this study here seems to suggest that more 
involvement in political expression online could lead to actions that diverge from the 







FACE-TO-FACE INTERVIEWS WITH CHINESE INTERNET USERS 
 
Many westerners assume that China‘s Internet users must take advantage of the 
freedom provided by the Internet to fight against the authoritarian Chinese government, 
and possibly work on a revolution towards democracy; and the Chinese users must be 
appalled by the government‘s control over the Internet. However, a study from Pew 
research center actually revealed that contrary to these assumptions, the majority of 
Chinese approve of Internet control and censorship. According to their survey studies in 
China, 85% of the participants think the government should manage or control the 
Internet (Fallows, 2008).  
Why would Chinese Internet users welcome control from the government? Would 
the censorship make their Internet use more difficult? Would the Chinese users use the 
Internet to fight for democracy, or support the government? While the survey study in 
previous chapters analyzed the general trends in people‘s Internet use and political 
activities, this chapter relied on the interview approach to understand the individual cases 
about how the Chinese users use the Internet, and how that intertwines with people‘s 
values and political actions in the real world. 
In the spring of 2007, I interviewed 10 Internet users from Beijing and Urumqi, 
Xinjiang, respectively. All interviews were conducted in a public space, such as a coffee 
or tea house. The researcher guaranteed the respondents‘ anonymity. Interviews were 
conducted in Mandarin, recorded on tapes, and later translated into English for analysis. 
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All these interviews were semi-structured and open-ended. These interviews started with 
questions about people‘s Internet use habits, followed by these users‘ perceptions of 
Internet control, their values, as well as their political lives in the real world.  
Upon detection of the previously overlooked topics, new questions were added in 
later interviews. Similarly, some questions were later dropped if they did not seem to be 
relevant. For instance, questions regarding protests were later expanded, as the 
interviewees shared with the researcher many possible ways for protests, including 
petitions or boycotting, etc. Questions about conversation with government officials 
online were later dropped, since no one seemed to try to use the Internet as a tool to 
communicate with the government. In analyzing these materials, a summary was written 
to record recurring themes or significant ideas that emerged during these interviews. 
Common themes were identified to form the general theories about the research 
questions. 
In the end, four major questions were explored in these interviews: 1) How do 
Chinese people use the Internet for political purposes? 2) How do people evaluate the 
Chinese government‘s control over the Internet? Are their perceptions of Internet 
regulations related to their political net use? 3) What are these Chinese people‘s values? 
Are they nationalistic? 4) How do these Chinese Internet users engage in political actions 
in their real life? Are there any influences from people‘s Internet use and their 
nationalistic ideologies on their offline political life? Relationships among different 
constructs were also explored through interview conversations. Insights generated from 
these conversations provided great help in developing the survey questionnaire, which 
was conducted after the interviews.  
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An in-depth interview was appropriate to help gauge people‘s political net use, 
their political values, and their political activities offline, sometimes even the only 
possible approach to study people‘s political activities in China. As Wimmer and 
Dominick (1997) recommend, in-depth interviews could yield rich information about 
respondents‘ opinions, values, motivations, and feelings. This approach could encourage 
respondents to give answers to subjects that could otherwise be considered too sensitive, 
like perceptions of Internet censorship or protests against the government in this case.  
 Out of the total twenty people interviewed, ten were from Beijing, and the other 
ten were from Urumqi, Xinjiang. The participants ranged from 20 to 67 years in age 
(Mean=38). Ten were female, and the other ten were male. One of the twenty (5%) 
participants had a graduate degree, twelve (60%) were college educated, and seven (35%) 
were high school educated.  
These participants have significantly higher levels of education, due to several 
reasons. First, the flyer for the interviews explained that these interviews were about 
Internet use, and Internet users tend to be better educated. Second, the participants later 
revealed to the researcher that the reason they would like to participate in studies like 
these is that they understand social science research methods and how important these 
studies could be. Less educated people might not even comprehend why a graduate 
student from an American school would be interested in speaking with them about their 
Internet use habits. Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that this population was 





 Conversations with Chinese Internet users showed that the Internet clearly 
changed their horizon. Even though many of the participants said they do not express 
their opinions about political matters online frequently, they did enjoy reading other 
people‘s political discussions from the Internet forums. Unlike many Westerners might 
think, however, the Chinese Internet users in this study mostly support the government 
and think the Chinese government is trying hard to meet people‘s needs. Although all of 
the participants wanted a freer Internet, they believed that if anyone should control the 
Internet, it should be the government. Political activities in the real world were not 
common for these participants. The majority of the participants did not think voting was a 
valid way to get involved in politics. Contacting leaders on the other hand was 
meaningful to some extent. Protest was considered dangerous, although all of the 
participants claimed that they would boycott foreign merchandise if this foreign country 
threatened China‘s interests. All of the participants agreed that democracy is the ultimate 
solution for China. However, most of them did not think that democracy is worth 
sacrificing the current economic development and social stability. 
How do Chinese people use the Internet for political purposes? 
 Ten out of twenty participants expressed that they browse political information 
online frequently. Although five people said they rarely pay attention to political 
information normally, they would also like to read more discussions online when major 
events happened. For instance, a 32-year-old female, who works in an American firm in 
Beijing explained, 
―Some news, such as negative coverage about government or 
some officials can only be available on the Internet. You can‘t get any 
of the coverage from TV or newspaper. The traditional media always 
cover Party conferences or international news. They don‘t have guts to 
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report real scandals. Plus, it‘s interesting to read what other people 
think about some events. Some of the comments from netizens are 
really funny.‖ 
  
Most of the participants obtained their political information from 
Bulletin Board Systems (BBS). While BBS is a dying form of communication 
in many other countries, it is thriving in China. All of the participants had 
been to some major forums, including forums on big portals like Sina or 
Tianya. None of the participants had visited government websites recently, 
which were reportedly updated rarely. Some also expressed how much 
contribution they think the Internet has made to people‘s political life in China. 
As a 35-year-old male professional in Urumqi, Xinjiang described, 
―The Internet is truly amazing. You can clearly see that even the 
government pays attention to the online opinions now. This is the only 
place where people can express their opinions freely. And the Internet 
can make a difference in reality too.‖  
  
Although most of participants gave a great deal of credit to the Internet, only three 
of them said they regularly expressed their opinions online. Some say logging in and 
expressing ones‘ views is too much trouble. Other feel they do not understand issues well 
enough to make a valid point online. As a 62-year-old retired female who lives in Urumqi 
claimed, ―It is better not to get involved in other people‘s trouble‖. They are apparently 
cautious about what they do online, especially when politics are involved.  
How do people evaluate the Chinese government’s control over the Internet? 
 Seventeen out of twenty participants admitted that they had encountered some 
forms of censorship when they used the Internet, mostly blocked websites. Only three 
participants stated that they had been warned by someone not to post certain materials 
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online due to the sensitive nature, or their posts were deleted without their permission. 
One participant said that although she had never met any Internet police, she was certain 
that others must have. However, fifteen people believed that censorship does not make 
their online experiences any harder. For instance, a 20-year-old Beijing student said, 
―Ninety-nine percent of Chinese people don‘t use the Internet for 
political purpose. They go online for business, gaming, chatting or 
shopping. I don‘t look for information about China‘s politics, and I 
don‘t care if the government blocks some foreign websites, because 
we never go to those websites anyway.‖ 
 
 When asked if they know how to get around censorship, seven participants 
believed that they know how, or they could ask other people to find out how. A 24-year-
old high school teacher from Urumqi said, 
―You can always ask people you know from online about these 
stuffs, especially friends you made in Internet games or online poker 
playing, they know everything.‖  
 
Others however, believed that they lack the necessary skills to bypass censorship 
or online monitoring. For instance, a 33-year-old female professional from Beijing 
admitted, 
―I know nothing about how to use a proxy server, or hide my IP. 
But I have never personally encountered any trouble online either. I 
always stay out of trouble. I won‘t participate in any discussions that 
are sensitive or might upset the government.‖ 
 
 Clearly, the participants are conscious about Internet control from the government. 
Although most of them had not personally met any web police, they are careful about 
what they do online. When asked if there were a censorship free Internet, would they act 
differently online, all of them said they would. For instance, a 22-year-old college student 
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from Beijing claimed, ―I‘d definitely want to check out Youtube!‖ As a 37-year-old 
professional from Urumqi put it, 
―I love to post my opinions online. But now I can‘t type some 
key words, like Fa Lun Gong.
37
 I have to use initials of each word or 
other code to write what I‘d like to write. The Internet is getting freer 
these days. You can criticize corruptions of the government, one-child 
policy, etc. You won‘t believe how bold some of those comments are! 
But there are still things you can‘t talk about. I think the more the 
government tries to censor the Internet, the more people want to fight 
for the Internet freedom. I‘d appreciate a more relaxed Internet, and 
I‘m sure that day is not far.‖ 
 
Although all of the participants welcomed a freer Internet, they also believed that 
some control of the Internet is necessary. In fact, like a 67-year-old retired government 
official believed, 
―There are too many frauds or fake information online. And 
since children today grow up with the Internet, we need to have some 
way to protect children or other people from Internet predators. No one 
else could manage the Internet, except for the government.‖ 
 
Similar to the Pew study, participants in this study were also concerned about the 
safety of cyberspace and the government seems like the only choice when it comes to 
managing a complex communication media such as the Internet. 
Are perceived threats associated with Internet censorship or security related to the 
choice of using the Internet for political purposes?  
 
Out of twenty interviewees, five of them said they had never engaged in political 
activities online. As a 21-year-old college student from Urumqi said, ―It has nothing to do 
with Internet censorship. I just have no interests in political issues.‖ This seems to be the 
common feeling for half the interviewees. Although five of them said they would browse 
political information when highly publicized events happen, they also admitted that they 
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 A spiritual group banned by the Chinese government. 
199 
 
would not normally use the Internet for political applications. For these people, having no 
interest seems to be the most important reason for not browsing political information or 
opinions, and participating in online political discussions. 
One 40-year-old accountant in Beijing had strong interests in political issues, but 
did not think she could have any meaningful inputs for others. For instance, she believed 
that, 
―I am very interested in current affairs and policies. I want to 
understand the future of this country. That‘s why I browse online a lot 
about political information. There is this website I go to almost 
everyday, and I pay close attention to discussions about government 
corruptions, financial industry reform, or policies about real estate. But 
I wouldn‘t post my opinions online. I don‘t think I understand these 
issues as well as others.‖  
 
The influence of opinion leaders is clear on some people. As some participants 
have limited understanding about certain issues, they would like to learn what other 
people think. However, this 40-year-old female also admitted that an Internet with less 
control would give others more freedom to discuss political issues.  
For the rest of the group however, the evaluation of Internet control appears to be 
an important concern when they browse online. For instance, as a 37-year-old 
professional in Urumqi said, 
―There are certain things the government has no sense of humor 
about. For instance, you can‘t criticize top leaders publically. Your 
posts for sure would be deleted right away. And you could run into 
trouble. Although no one knows how the web police works exactly, we 
all heard of stories where people were put in jail just for saying 
something candidly online.‖  
 
The deterring effect of potential danger associated with political discussion online 
is clear. Several participants have mentioned that they would only discuss issues that 
would not upset the government. As a 44-year-old businessman in Beijing argued, ―As 
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much as I want to see changes in the political systems in China, I know there is little I can 
do. Why risk my personal life for something that‘s going to fail anyway?‖ These 
concerns are especially clearly expressed by older people who have already established 
success in their careers and perhaps have more that they could lose.  
Although seven participants claimed that they have enough knowledge to bypass 
government censorship, only two of them expressed interests in using their knowledge in 
the political area. It seems that for the respondents in this study, the technical concern is 
not a big determinant in deciding whether to use the Internet for politics. 
What are these Chinese users’ values? Are they nationalistic?  
As nationalism has gained popularity in China in recent years, it has become a 
somewhat competing ideology as opposed to democracy. A democrat would put 
individual rights and freedom ahead of the country‘s stability and development, whereas 
a Chinese nationalist might have a different choice. When asked if China should become 
more powerful and have a greater influence in world politics, all of the participants 
strongly agreed that China should be more powerful. Like a 32-year-old female from 
Beijing put it, 
―Every country should develop to become a more powerful 
country. If you don‘t move forward, you would move backward. And 
China needs to protect its rights in international politics. Otherwise, 
countries like the USA would take advantage of us.‖ 
 
Participants were also asked to choose what is more important for China today, a 
political reform for a more democratic society, or developing the economy. Without 
exception, all participants believed that democracy is the ultimate solution for China; 
however, only three out of twenty participants believed that China should sacrifice 
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economic development and political stability for democracy. For instance, a 53-year-old 
male professional from Urumqi believed that, 
―China will become a democratic country one day, but it should 
not be now. China had gone through some tough time, and people‘s 
lives are just getting better now. If we had a drastic reform, China 
might collapse. That may be some other countries want. So better than 
talking about democracy all the time, what‘s more important is to get 
wealthier and stronger, have better education and healthcare. That 
matters more to the Chinese people.‖ 
 
Another 47-year-old female from Beijing also thought that China needs ―Chinese 
democracy… Individual rights and freedom are alright, as long as they don‘t threaten the 
national interest‖. From these participants‘ comments, signs of the state-led nationalism 
are clearly visible. While democracy seems an ultimate solution, what these Chinese 
people appear to care more about now is a more developed China and better personal 
lives in financial terms. 
How do these Chinese Internet users engage in political actions in their real life?  
When first asked what kind of political activities they would engage in, most of 
the participants could not answer that question. Political activity is a fairly vague term in 
Chinese society. There is no popular way of getting involved in political life, such as 
voting in Western countries. Although eleven participants did vote for China‘s People‘s 
Congress, six of them believed that voting was useless, and three of them believed that 
although voting did not matter much, it was better than nothing. For instance, a 45-year-
old newspaper editor from Beijing commented, 
―Most of voters don‘t know anyone on the ballot. The candidates 
are screened by the government; the voters can‘t decide who gets on 
these ballots. Sometimes even the ones who are on the ballots don‘t 




Another 35-year-old female from Urumqi argued that voting in its current format 
is rather insignificant, but it is still people‘s right to get involved in politics. Although 
voting is not appealing to the participants, fifteen of them thought contacting leaders 
personally would be useful in dealing with problems in their work or other matters. A 33-
year-old female from Beijing claimed, 
―It all depends on the leader. If the leader is attentive and really 
cares about your situation, then communicating with the leader is 
useful. Otherwise, it‘s just a waste of time.‖ 
 
The majority of participants believed that resorting to the media to reflect issues 
could be a bad idea. ―I‘d only do it when there is absolutely no other way to deal with it‖, 
said a 28-year-old male from Beijing. Similarly, fifteen out of twenty participants thought 
protest in general is not a reasonable way to get involved in politics. Protests were 
described as ―too emotional‖, ―meaningless‖, or ―could threaten the social order‖. When 
asked if they wanted to protest against the Chinese government if they see an unfair 
policy or situation, only one participant said he would get in the street and protest. Three 
other participants claimed that they would protest only if they knew for sure they would 
not get in any trouble. A 22-year-old girl from Beijing said, 
―If I see something really unfair or made me really angry, I might 
protest in street against the government, but only if I see people in 
street already so I know it‘s not illegal or anything.‖ 
 
Even though protest is a form of participation protected by China‘s constitution, it 
seems that many people believe it is illegal. Furthermore, it is clear that unless these 
protests are well organized by someone else and approved by the government, very few 
of the participants in this study would risk their safety against the government. On the 
other hand, all but one claimed that if China‘s interests were threatened by a foreign force, 
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they would not hesitate to boycott that foreign country‘s commodities. Seven people said 
they would try anything to fight against a foreign force, including petition, demonstration, 
strike, and boycotting. A 33-year-old professional woman from Beijing stated, 
―Every Chinese should fight against foreign bully. We Chinese 
have been beaten by the foreign countries for too long, and now as we 
are developing, we should show the world we are strong now, and they 
should not do whatever they want with us Chinese anymore.‖ 
 
The distinction in attitudes towards protest against the Chinese government and 
foreign forces is apparent. Part of the reason is that all participants have personally seen 
some form of protests against foreign countries. Two of them even participated in 
demonstrations against Japan in 2005. Protests against the government, however, are not 
something well publicized. Although the majority of the participants did not want to 
engage in protests in their real life, eight said they would want to sign online petitions. 
Clearly, when it comes to fighting against the big brother, the Internet might come in as 
the only choice where people can be heard. 
Are people’s nationalistic sentiments related to their offline political actions?  
Seventeen out of twenty interviewees believed that China should focus on 
economic development now while maintaining a stable social order. The three people 
who preferred an immediate democratic reform did not buy the government‘s claim of 
developing economics for all Chinese people. For instance, as a 41-year-old engineer in 
Urumqi stated, a political reform should be the top priority in China. ―We must change 
our political system first; otherwise, all the power and money just go to government 
officials‖. 
The rest of the group, however, overwhelmingly supports the government‘s 
priority on economic development and political stability. Like a 45-year-old newspaper 
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editor described, ―I wouldn‘t go to the media to criticize the government, or protest, 
nothing good would come out of it‖. He also believed that the Internet could be an 
unstable force sometimes. ―There are so many stories online these days. Some of them 
might not even be true. Bust most netizens won‘t bother to verify these stories. They just 
blame the government for whatever bad things that are going on‖. 
This newspaper editor, being a CCP member and clearly in strong favor of official 
agenda, is against protests in general; however, even he is willing to boycott foreign 
merchandise when threats come from abroad. Many share this editor‘s opinion in 
believing the importance of stability. Like a 28-year-old college staff from Urumqi 
described, ―We can‘t afford any riot like what Eastern European countries went through. 
We have to be strong first‖. 
The influence of state-led nationalism can be easily detected in conversations with 
these interviewees. Protests, in general, were considered illegitimate forms of political 
participation; and respondents showed a clear favoring of economic developments over 
democratic ones. Also, everyone showed some level of grassroots nationalism, which was 
reflected in respondents‘ willingness to boycott foreign merchandise or participate in 
other forms of outwards protests.  
Although the majority of the respondents do not believe in protests, they do think 
public opinions need to be heard by the government. One executive who works for a big 
international firm said, ―What China needs is organizations. One person can‘t be heard, 
but if this one person represents a group, then the group can be heard.‖ The executive 
believes that the Internet could help create these organizations one day, ―When the voice 
online is organized and valid, it could help monitor government behaviors‖.  
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These views echo Yang‘s (2003) argument that the Internet is critical in helping 
strengthen ties of unofficial civic organizations in China, which in turn could promote 
demands for freedom and individual rights. Although the implications of Internet use 
might not be detected through political participation such as protests, they could be 
channeled into other outcomes such as creating a civic society, which did not exist in 
China before the Internet. 
  These interviews revealed some rather puzzling and compromised attitudes 
towards the Internet, politics, and China‘s future. All of the participants believed that 
democracy is the right future for China, and that the Internet could help them obtain more 
information and opinions, and express their own views freely on the Internet. They would 
want a freer Internet, but they are mostly content with the current Internet environment. 
They also believe that China‘s current task is to remain stable and develop the economy, 
instead of having a democratic revolution like what Russia went though. They don‘t have 
many choices in participating in politics in China, and most of them would stay away 
from dangerous forms of participation, like protests; however, all these attitudes change, 
if the target of the protest is a foreign force.  
Based on these interview conversations, the researcher sensed a great deal of 
confidence in the government and the country‘s future. This could be caused by the 
ongoing state-led nationalism campaigns, and more likely, the result of the astonishing 
economic success China has witnessed over the past three decades. Perhaps this is why 
the Chinese public is willing to put up with the government‘s control and avoid any 






On June 20, 2008, China‘s most powerful leader Hu Jintao visited the People’s 
Daily on its sixtieth anniversary. One of the pre-planned features of this visit was for Hu 
to participate in online chat on the newspaper‘s website with Chinese netizens. This was 
the first time a senior party official had publicly tried communicating with the public 
using the Internet (Li, 2008).  
The government had realized that there is no better way to find out what the 
public really thinks than by going online. Why is this the case? Apparently, as the 
traditional media are so tightly controlled by the government, the CCP leaders cannot 
find any criticism of the government or public officials from newspapers or TV 
programs. As a Chinese journalist Li Datong put it, ―An effective government needs 
accurate information. But what if its own policy of media censorship makes that 
impossible?‖ Luckily, the Internet comes to rescue. Indeed, many senior officials have 
been reported to surf the cyberspace regularly. Hu Jintao himself claimed that he wanted 
to know what netizens are thinking about and take advice from them (Li, 2008).  
It is truly ironic that the CCP leaders now need a free Internet to find out about 
real public opinions. The Chinese government has become famous for going through a 
great deal of trouble trying to control the Internet. Now, however, the Chinese 
government has found themselves in a dilemma where they have two conflicting goals: a 
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controlled Internet without a second voice, or a true information source and 
communication forum. China‘s leaders may never find out what the public really thinks if 
they do not stop their censorship, and it may be a price they are willing to pay today. 
Nevertheless, one must admit that it is already a progress for them to realize the 
significance of a true public opinion, which is only enabled by the Internet in China.  
Even an article from the official newspaper, People’s Daily acknowledged that 
people‘s expressions and exchanges of opinions online have become powerful social 
forces and promoted socialist democracy. Not only could the public enjoy the free 
information flow online, the government officials too could listen to the public 
discussions online and accept people‘s suggestions or comments (―Democracy in China's 
Internet politics”, 2007). 
The Internet has changed China‘s political discourse profoundly. More than ever 
the public has the ability to seek for political information, exchange opinions, and discuss 
political issues they are interested in online. On the other hand, many cases show that the 
government also takes the online public opinion seriously. There have been several 
incidents where the Internet discussions have changed the political agenda in the real 
world. Yet, the question remains, will the Internet bring democracy to China?  
While many technological breakthroughs have lent hopes for democracy, such as 
radio or television, the Internet certainly has the most potential. This new technology 
offers almost unlimited information and communication with lower cost, higher speed, 
broader reach, and most importantly, minimal gate keeping from the government. 
Especially in a country like China, where the free flow of information and 
communication was not available prior to the Internet, the Internet has made a substantial 
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difference in people‘s political lives. However, this does not necessarily mean that the 
Internet will lead to democracy right away.  
To tackle all these questions, this research relied on secondary analysis, survey of 
Chinese people, and in-depth interview of Chinese Internet users, in order to understand 
the political implications of Internet use from the following two perspectives: First, how 
is the Internet being used, more specifically, who is using the Internet for political 
purposes? Second, how does political net use transform into political actions beyond 
cyberspace? The previous chapters have examined how multi-level predictors could 
affect people‘s ways of using the Internet and how their political Internet usage could 
change their offline participation. Both perceived threats associated with Internet 
censorship and the rising Chinese nationalism, were evaluated in understanding people‘s 
online and offline political behaviors.  
Based on the findings in this study, it is concluded that the Internet is not likely to 
bring democracy to China soon. In this chapter, the researcher reviews the main findings 
from the previous chapters, and answers the question why the Internet is unlikely to lead 
to immediate regime change in China. Then the theoretical and practical implications of 
these findings are discussed. The limitations of this research are also evaluated and 
suggestions for future studies are recommended. 
 
Main Findings 
To understand the democratic implications of Internet use, this research proposed 
a two-stage model. The main relationship model hypothesizes the aggregate and 
individual predictors of Internet adoption on the provincial and individual level, as well 
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as the impact of political Internet use on political participation offline. The two 
moderation models evaluate the two specific phenomena of Chinese politics: Internet 
censorship and nationalism. The moderation model on censorship proposes that the 
perceived threats associated with Internet censorship are likely to affect whether or not 
people use the Internet for politics either directly or through interactions with individual 
characteristics. The other moderation model predicts that as nationalism drives people to 
engage in corresponding political actions, political net use could alter that relationship. 
Internet Adoption & Divide 
There are now an estimated 258 million Internet users in China (CNNIC, 2009). 
As the Internet development exploded in China, the growth rate of Internet users in China 
has outpaced many other countries, including the U.S. (Fallows, 2008). Nevertheless, the 
Internet development in China is highly unbalanced. The penetration rates in big cities 
like Beijing and Shanghai have reached almost 50%, whereas in western and central 
regions, the penetration rates continue to remain low. The clear disparity in Internet 
adoption has generated many concerns from the Chinese government as well as scholars. 
The Internet offers promises for economic, political, educational, and technological 
opportunities, however, for the central and western regions of China that lag behind in 
terms of adopting the technology, the existing gap between these regions and more 
advanced eastern regions could even be widened. So what has caused the unbalanced 
fashion of Internet adoption within China? 
As Chapter 3 demonstrates, many factors have contributed to the different Internet 
penetration rates in Chinese provinces, such as policy, economic conditions, educational 
levels, telecommunication infrastructure, population density and urbanization, as well as 
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social openness. However, not all factors are equally important in predicting Internet 
development in Chinese provinces. As Norris (2001) and Hargittai (1999) have 
discovered, among all predictors, economic conditions have the greatest influence in 
predicting Internet penetration. Measured by GRP, service GRP, and household income, 
the economic factors in this study also contributed to over 95% of the variance in Internet 
penetration rates. Economic condition is certainly the foundation for developing the 
Internet. A province needs to have enough financial power to build the information 
technology. At the same time, consumers in this province must be able to afford the 
Internet to maintain Internet growth. The evidence on the telecommunication 
infrastructures indicates that if a provincial government wants to rely on information 
technology to develop a technology extensive economy, it should give more attention to 
infrastructures, including telephone, cable, and mobile phone capacities. Additionally, 
urbanization is found to be positively associated with Internet penetration rates. 
Perhaps what is even more interesting is that within each region, different 
determinants of Internet adoption have been singled out in predicting Internet growth. For 
instance, economic factors are the most important predictors in the eastern region; 
however, for the central region, the telecommunications infrastructure is the single most 
important determinant. Also, although the policy factor only contributed to 0.1% and 1.9% 
of the variance in Internet penetration in the eastern and central regions, it accounts for 18% 
of the variance in Internet adoption in the west. Clearly, to develop the Internet adoption, 
the local government needs to focus on different areas. For the eastern region, addressing 
economic development is the most important factor in developing the Internet; for the 
western and central regions, developing the telecommunication infrastructures is equally 
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important compared to developing economic conditions, if not more important. In 
addition, in the west, the government should invest more in science and technology in 
order to catch up with the east. 
Political Internet Use & Perceived Threats 
Chapter 4 examined the individual characteristics associated with using the 
Internet for political purposes. Similar to previous studies, this research confirmed that 
younger, wealthier, and more politically interested users are more likely to use the 
Internet for political activities.  
In China, where media censorship has been practiced for years, the perceived 
threats associated with Internet control could also influence how the internet is used. 
These threats could come from the evaluation of the government‘s determination and 
ability to censor, the consequences of violating the Internet control, as well as users‘ 
perceptions of security, which entails their confidence in the Internet and their own 
computer skills to bypass possible censorship.  
As results from Chapter 5 suggest, the perceived security has a positive impact on 
political net use. In other words, when users believe that the government cannot monitor 
their online behaviors, or they have enough knowledge to avoid possible Internet 
censorship, they are more likely to engage in political activities online. 
Furthermore, three individual characteristics were found to be interactive with 
perceived threats. For instance, a more educated user is more likely to participate in 
online politics, but this is only true when he/she perceives a low Internet censorship. An 
older user is less likely to participate in online political activities, and this relationship is 
even stronger when the older person‘s perceived security is low. Consumption of 
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traditional news is only associated with political net use when users‘ perceived security is 
high.  
These findings could be explained by Hachigian‘s (2001) argument that Internet 
users in China might have a lot at stake, therefore, they try to avoid potential risks 
associated with using the Internet for political purposes. When perceived threat is low or 
perceived security is high, educated users and the ones who like to seek for political 
information from traditional news are slightly more likely to participate in political 
activities online. However, this group also represents the population most likely to have a 
successful career worth protecting. Therefore, once this population perceives less security 
or more threats over the situation, they would rather stay away from possibly dangerous 
activities on the Internet. Similarly, since older people tend to have little knowledge 
pertaining to the Internet, their weak sense of perceived security would strengthen the 
existing negative association between age and political Internet use.  
Perceived threats are clearly one of the key determinants for engaging in online 
political activities. Not only would individual characteristics like age, education or 
political interests affect people‘s patterns of using the Internet, whether or not they 
believe there is a real danger associated with political net use could also change their 
decision on using the Internet for politics. 
Political Internet Use, Nationalism, & Political Participation Offline  
Trying to evaluate the mobilizing effect of the Internet, the previous research has 
identified the informational or political use of the Internet as the most powerful 
mobilizing dimension of the Internet experience (e.g., Bimber, 2001). Applying the 
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previous findings in the Chinese context, this study has attempted to understand whether 
or not the political activity online would lead to political activity offline. 
To answer this question, the current research looked at two forms of political 
participation: conventional participation including voting and contacting; and protests 
including inwards protests against domestic leaders or issues and outwards protests 
against a foreign force. As evidence in the Western context shows, more Internet use, 
especially political or informational use, leads to mobilization (Jennings & Zeitner, 2003, 
Gibson, Lusoli, & Ward, 2005). Nevertheless, Chapter 4 reveals that the political net use 
appears unassociated to any forms of political participation studied here. 
So is the Internet use really irrelevant to political participation offline in China? 
Not even when the Internet is used for political activities? To fully comprehend the 
political environment in China, this study also examined the effect of rising nationalism. 
Nationalism is a relatively new ideology in China. It originated from the century of 
humiliation, when China was defeated by the West and Japan. Nationalism was 
revitalized by the CCP after the Tiananmen Square incident, to fill the ideological void 
left by the obsolete Socialism or Communism. The state-led nationalism speaks to the 
public for a number of reasons. It shares grounds with the Chinese traditional political 
culture, which values loyalty and obedience. In addition, it gives priorities to pragmatic 
goals such as political stability and economic development, which are also favored by the 
general public. Nationalism has been found to positively relate to political support for the 
government (Chen, 2004).  
A state-led nationalist is hypothesized as being more likely to support the 
government by participating in conventional political actions while avoiding any protests 
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that are disapproved by the government, such as protests. The grassroots nationalism, on 
the other hand, is most likely to manifest when China‘s national interest is threatened by 
an outer force. These hypotheses were mostly supported by the findings in Chapter 6. The 
state-led nationalism is positively associated with traditional participation, and the 
grassroots nationalism is positively associated with outwards protests.  
Going back to the original question on political implications of Internet use, it 
seems that the associations between nationalism and political outcomes depend on 
people‘s political Internet use. As discovered in Chapter 6, although grassroots 
nationalism is associated with more traditional participation when political net use is low 
or medium, that relationship is reversed if the political Internet use is high. Similarly, 
state-led nationalism is found to be negatively associated with inwards protests when 
political net use is low or medium. However, once political net use is intensive enough, 
that relationship almost disappears. 
Although these findings are not entirely clear, it appears that the Internet plays an 
opposing impact to the official agenda. Heavy use of the Internet for political purposes 
could change the positive influence of grassroots nationalism on traditional participation 
and the negative influence of state-led nationalism on inwards protests. Of course, no 
conclusion can be reached about what the Internet entails without a content analysis of 
online information or communication. Nevertheless, it is interesting to see that once the 
political net use becomes intensive enough, it could become a significant power, even 
competing with deep-rooted ideologies like nationalism. 
Chapter 7 provided a holistic view concerning the Chinese public‘s Internet use, 
political values, and their political lives in the real world. The interview conversations 
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reveal that the influence of Internet use may not be so easy to detect. Not many people 
use the Internet for political purposes to begin with, and additionally, Internet censorship 
is likely to scare people away from participating in online political activities. As 
interview results from Chapter 7 suggest, political net use was certainly not the main goal 
of most users when they accessed the Internet. Yet, even the ones who did not use the 
Internet for political information and discussions had to admit that they relied on the 
Internet as their information source when controversial incidents or scandals occurred. 
This is because in China, where traditional media are heavily controlled by the 
government, the Internet is perhaps the only source that provides relatively uncensored 
information. Clearly, the Internet as an information source and communication forum has 
been greatly appreciated by the public.  
The connection between political Internet use and offline political actions is not 
that easy to detect either. Although several respondents were willing to petition online, 
very few were inclined to take their actions to the real world. Compared to the Internet 
actions, which often protect people‘s identities, real world political actions require more 
active involvement and entail more danger. In China, where censorship and the 
associated threats are deeply rooted in people‘s minds, the Chinese public is rather 
cautious about their political behaviors, especially in the real world where they can be 
easily identified or tracked.  
Moreover, as the rising nationalism appeals to the general Chinese people, the 
respondents were supportive of the Chinese government and their policies, and therefore 
were less likely to engage in any activities that would violate the government agenda.  
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To sum up all the findings, this study draws four conclusions. First, the Internet 
divide is still evident on both the aggregate and individual levels. Among Chinese 
provinces, more economically developed and urbanized regions with better 
telecommunication infrastructures are more likely to have higher levels of Internet 
penetration rates. On the individual level, younger, wealthier, and more politically 
interested individuals are more likely to use the Internet for political activities. Given that 
only a small proportion of users express their political opinions online, political Internet 
use is hardly a popular choice for Chinese Internet users.  
Second, perceptions of threats associated with Internet censorship have a key 
impact on how people use the Internet. When perceived security is high, that is when the 
user believes in their own computer skill to avoid Internet censorship, or they believe that 
the Internet could hide their identities, they would be more likely to engage in political 
activities online. In addition, influences of individual characteristics on political net use 
could be changed when perceptions of threats are taken into consideration. For instance, 
better-educated users are only more likely to engage in online political activities when 
they perceive low levels of threats. 
Third, nationalism as an increasingly influential ideology has a clear impact on 
people‘s political behaviors. As state-led nationalists, the users are more likely to 
participate in conventional political actions supported by the government. As grassroots 
nationalists, the users are most likely to react when they perceive a threat from a foreign 
force.  
Finally, although there is no significant result directly associating political 
Internet use with political actions offline, using the Internet for political purposes could 
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have influences on political actions through their interactions with nationalism. As state-
led and grassroots nationalism drive people to line up with the government agenda, heavy 
use of the Internet appears to suppress that taming effect of nationalism.  
The explosion of Internet development has certainly lent some hope to 
democratize China, one of the few Communist countries remaining in the world. It has 
been asked by many, will the Internet bring democracy? The answer is probably no, or at 
least not in the immediate future. Although the Internet has reached almost 50% of 
residents in big cities, in the western and central regions, the penetration rate is still low. 
The current Internet users tend to be young, male, highly educated, and live in big cities. 
This portfolio does not represent an average Chinese.  
When looking at using the Internet for political purposes only, which was found 
to be the most mobilizing dimension of Internet use, it is clear that only a small portion of 
the Internet users engage in online political activities regularly. Why? This is caused by 
many factors, including age, education, or political interest, as well as perceived threats 
associated with the Internet censorship. 
Furthermore, for individuals who engage in online politics, they are not 
necessarily more likely to engage in democratic actions offline. They could believe in 
nationalism, and therefore want to support the government by avoiding protests against 
domestic issues. Even though heavy use of political activities online may change that 
relationship, one has to recognize how few people would participate in online political 
activities so heavily to begin with. 
Based on this evidence, it is safe to say that the Internet is unlikely to bring any 
democratic revolution to China in the foreseeable future. Nonetheless, the Internet is 
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certainly able to provide people with more objective information and free exchange of 
opinions. In some cases, where people do feel the urge to discuss political matters online 
and participate in political actions offline, the Internet definitely facilitates that process. 
To the government as well, the power of online public opinions could change their real 
world political agenda. Although the influence of the Internet does not seem to extend 
significantly beyond the cyberspace at the time being, the free flow of information and 
communication provided by the Internet, as well as online political activities are already 
great advances in the progress of liberalization in China. Consequently, although a 
fundamental change in political system may not happen in China soon, the process of 
political liberalization, where more public could participate in politics and more voices 
can be heard by the government, is being realized.  
 
Limitations of This Research 
There are three main limitations of this current research. First of all, to study the 
Internet, which is still evolving, the results from this study can only be evaluated within 
the present context. As the CNNIC reports show, the recent new users come from rural 
areas and are not as educated as the early adopters were. The portfolio of Internet users 
could change rapidly within years. The online environment is changing as well. For 
instance, blogs only became popular fairly recently. New forms of online activities would 
continue to appear, which may eventually outgrow any of the existing Internet 
censorships. In that case, online political activities would be expected to increase, 
intensify, and diversify. Even the Chinese government has been evolving. The online 
environment is becoming much freer than before. The government is starting to see how 
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much value the Internet could provide. Although it is not likely to happen soon, perhaps 
one day in the future, the Chinese government could relinquish Internet control. It is quite 
possible that the results observed today will not be true in the near future.  
Second, Internet use is a complex and dynamic process that embodies many 
phases. For instance, as Shah, Cho, Eveland, and Kwak‘s (2005) study indicates, seeking 
information online does not lead to civic engagement directly. Rather, the influence of 
online information seeking leads to political discussion and online civic messaging first, 
which in turn, leads to increased civic engagement. By looking at the association between 
political Internet use and offline political participation only, this study could have 
overlooked some important linkages in the complex process of Internet use. Particularly, 
since political Internet use is measured by a single item – political expression online, the 
multifaceted experience in using the Internet may not be fully captured. 
The third limitation comes from the methodology. Only convenient samples were 
used in the survey study and in-depth interviews. Thus, results from this study could only 
be generalized in terms of relationships among different variables; any findings on 
individual variables cannot be extended to other samples (Manion, 1994). In addition, 
since the respondents in this study have a much higher educational level than the general 
Chinese Internet user, the same result is not likely observed with users who are poorly 
educated.  
Finally, this study focused on the flow from Internet use to political participation, 
and inevitably downplayed the flow from offline political participation to online political 
involvement. In reality, political Internet use and political participation offline are 
probably reinforcing each other. For instance, it is possible that people who are active in 
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offline political participation are also more likely to use the Internet to obtain political 
information and opinion, express their political views or participate in political activity 
online. Emphasizing the one-way influence from Internet use to political participation, 
however, this study has attempted to understand the direction that bears more social 
significance in today‘s China. As Shah, Schmierbach, Hawkins, Espino, & Donavan 
(2002) discovered, a causal flow from Internet use to social and political engagements 
was indeed identified from these reciprocal relationships. 
Being one of the few studies that attempt to systematically understand political 
implications of the Internet in China, the current research is fairly preliminary. Having 
said that, however, this current research has indeed provided some important insights on 
the topics. Several areas that were not examined or fully comprehended by this study 
need to be further examined in future studies. First, a systematic analysis of the online 
sphere is critical in understanding the exact impacts of Internet use. Although several 
studies have analyzed certain well-known online political forums (e.g., Wu, 2005; Yang, 
2003), few have tried to understand how a regular Chinese Internet user employs the 
Internet for political reasons. What kind of messages would a Chinese Internet user 
obtain from the cyberspace? Is it overly critical of the Chinese government, as the current 
study seems to suggest? Second, to understand Internet diffusion, longitudinal data will 
be more helpful in explaining the trend of Internet development and varying effects of 
predictors at different stages. For instance, at the early stage of Internet development, 
telecommunication infrastructure and government policy may be more important, but as 
the technology advances, the individual income level may become more predictive in 
adopting the technology. Third, comparative study can help better understand the 
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political implications of Internet use. By comparing different countries, exactly how 
powerful the Internet is within a particular country can be better estimated. Fourth, the 
measurement of political Internet use should be expanded in future studies. The current 
research used one item to evaluate political net use, oversimplifying the multifaceted 
functions of Internet experiences. Future studies should include political information 
seeking, expression, or online political actions in order to fully capture the construct of 
political Internet usage. Finally, a representative sample should be used in the future, so 








My name is Xiaoru Wang. I am a student at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. 
I am conducting a survey for my dissertation. I’d like to ask you a few questions 
about your media use habits and political/social lives. I want to assure you that all of 
the information you give me is confidential, and none of it will be released in any 
way that would identify you or your family. Your participation is voluntary.  
 
This questionnaire shouldn’t take longer than 30 minutes. Thank you very much for 
your time! 
 
1). To begin, I would like to ask you some questions about your media use. How many 
days a week do you read a newspaper? 
 
a. 7 days  b. 6 days  c. 5 days  d. 4 days  e. 3 days  f. 2 days  g. 1 day  h. never (GO TO 
Q.3)  i. Don‘t know 
 
2). Where one means Rarely and ten means All The Time, how often do you read each of 
the following types of newspaper content? (0 Indicates Never)    
                                                                                                                           Never 
a. News about international affairs?                        1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10    0 
b. New about national government and politics?    1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10    0 
c. News about local government and politics?        1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10    0 
d. News about societal issues?                                1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10    0 
 
3). On an average weekday evening, how many hours of television do you watch after 5 
p.m.?  
______________Hours   _____________Minutes    
Don‘t know   
Never watch (GO TO Q.5) 
 
4). Where one means Rarely and ten means All The Time, how often do you watch each 
of the following types of TV programs? (0 Indicates Never)    
                                                                                                                           Never 
a. News about international affairs?                        1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10      0 
b. New about national government and politics?    1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10      0 
c. News about local government and politics?        1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10      0 
                                                 
38
 When responders were asked about political matters, questions were worded in a way that they refer to 
broad areas, such as government events, international news, or current affairs, not constrained to sensitive 
political issues only. 
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d. News about societal issues?                                1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10       0 
 
5). What about the Internet? Have you used the Internet in the last month? 
a. Yes   b. No (GO TO Q. 7) 
 
6). How often are you involved in each of the following types of Internet activities? Let‘s 
use a ten-point scale where one means RARELY and ten means FREQUENTLY; or tell 
me if you never use it for that purpose. On average, how often do you                                                                                       
                                                                                         NEVER 
a. Use email to communicate with people you know? 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10                                                   0 
b. Follow news developments over the Internet? 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10                                                   0 
c. Search for information over the Internet 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10                                                   0 
d. Express your opinion about issues and politics? 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10                                                   0 
e. Shop or make travel plans? 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10                                                   0 
f. Game and entertain 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10                                                   0 
 
7). Now, I would like to ask you some questions about your participation in political life. 
Would you please tell me if in the past two years you have… 
 
a. Voted for deputies to the local People‘s Congress?            Yes__ No __ Don‘t know __ 
b. Contacted leaders, local people‘s deputies or authorities?  Yes__ No __ Don‘t know __ 
c. Worked on behalf of a social group, cause or organization? 
                                                                                                 Yes__ No __ Don‘t know __ 
d. Contacted editors/reporters from the media?                      Yes__ No __ Don‘t know __ 
e. Donated blood, food, or clothing?                                       Yes__ No __ Don‘t know __ 
 
8). Have you actually done any of the following things (or whether you might do the 
following things under certain circumstances) when your country is threatened by a 
foreign country (such as Diaoyu Island incident)?  
 
a. Sign a petition                                         Yes__ No __ Don‘t know __ 
b. Join a boycott                                          Yes__ No __ Don‘t know __ 
c. Attend a demonstration                           Yes__ No __ Don‘t know __ 
d. Join a strike                                             Yes__ No __ Don‘t know __ 
 
9). Have you actually done any of the following things (or whether you might do the 
following things under certain circumstances) when your object to a domestic leader or 
domestic issue (such as Sun Zhigang incident)?  
 
a. Sign a petition                                         Yes__ No __ Don‘t know __ 
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b. Join a boycott                                          Yes__ No __ Don‘t know __ 
c. Attend a demonstration                           Yes__ No __ Don‘t know __ 
d. Join a strike                                             Yes__ No __ Don‘t know __ 
 
10). Where one means not at all interested and ten means very interested, how much do 
you say you are you interested in… 
                                                                                   Don‘t know 
a. National affairs?             
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10                                              99 
b. Local affairs?                
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10                                              99 
c. Talking to friends/family members about politics? 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10                                              99 
 
11). On a scale of 1-10, where one means don‘t agree at all and ten means agree 
completely, how much do you agree with the following statements? 
                                                                                Don‘t know 
a. People like you can have sayings about what the government does. 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10                                             99 
b. Public officials care about what people like you think.  
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10                                             99 
 
12). On a scale of 1-10, where one means don‘t agree at all and ten means agree 
completely, how much do you agree with the following statements? 
                                                                                 Don‘t know 
a. China should play a more important role in Asia and the world. 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10                                            99 
b. China should and will be a stronger power in the world in the future.  
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10                                            99 
 
13). Of the following two pairs of issues, which one do you think is more important in 
today‘s China (circle the one you think is more important, or don‘t know)? 
 
a. Political stability             vs.  Freedom of expression               Don‘t know 
b. Economic development  vs.  Revolution to democracy           Don‘t know 
  
14). Now you will read three statements, which you need to evaluate. 
 
a. Having a democratic political system is… 
Very good ____ Good ____ Bad ____ Very Bad ____ Don‘t know ____ 
 
b. Democracy can have problems but it is better than any other form of government. 





c. Having a stronger leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections 
is… 
Very good ____ Good ____ Bad ____ Very Bad ____ Don‘t know ____ 
 
d. Having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best 
for the country  
Very good ____ Fairly Good ____ Bad ____ Very Bad ____ Don‘t know ____ 
 
15). Now you will read a statement about the Internet. Do you strongly agree, agree, 
disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements? 
 
a. The government can track you down on the Internet. 
Strongly agree ____ Agree ____ Disagree ____ Strongly Disagree ____ Don‘t know 
 
b. What you do online is monitored by cyber-police. 
Strongly agree ____ Agree ____ Disagree ____ Strongly Disagree ____ Don‘t know 
 
c. If what you do online upsets the government, you will be punished severely. 
Strongly agree ____ Agree ____ Disagree ____ Strongly Disagree ____ Don‘t know 
 
d. You have enough computer knowledge to make sure that you will not be caught doing 
anything undesirable online. 
Strongly agree ____ Agree ____ Disagree ____ Strongly Disagree ____ Don‘t know 
 
e. The Internet is a technology that protects anonymity of users‘ identity. 
Strongly agree ____ Agree ____ Disagree ____ Strongly Disagree ____ Don‘t know 
 
f. There are so many people and messages online no one would notice what you do on the 
Internet. 
Strongly agree ____ Agree ____ Disagree ____ Strongly Disagree ____ Don‘t know 
 
************************************************************************ 
Because I try to get responses from people who come from different backgrounds, I 
would ask you a few questions that will help me make sure that I have reached people of 
different age, gender and so on. 
 
16). What is your gender? Male ____ Female ____ 
 
17). What was your age on your last birthday? ____ 
 
18). How many years of school have you completed? ____ 
 
19). What is your marital status? Single ____ Married ____ Divorced ____ Widowed 
____  
 




21). What is your political affiliation?  
Communist Party member ____ Youth League member ____ Other party ____ Non-party 
affiliation ____ 
 
22). What is your estimated monthly income? ____RMB 
 
That concludes the survey. Thank you very much for your time and patience in answering 




FLYER FOR SURVEY INTERVIEWS 
 
Hi, I am a Ph.D. student working on my dissertation, which is about the Internet and 
China. I‘d like to invite you to participate in my study. Both Internet users and non-users 
are needed.  
 
In this survey session, I would like you to fill out a short questionnaire. You will get $10 
if you complete the questionnaire! The survey is about your Internet use habits if you are 
an Internet user, your other media habits if you are not an Internet user, your world view, 
opinions about the media, and so on.  
 
The survey won‘t take longer than 30 minutes. If you are interested in, please contact me 
at 13909910007 (phone number), we will assign a random number to you (so your 
identification information will not be disclosed), and you will then go to a classroom at 
Tsinghua University/Xinjiang Agriculture University, where the survey will be conducted. 





FLYER FOR IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS  
 
Hi, I am a Ph.D. student working on my dissertation, which is about the Internet and 
China. I will need to interview 10-15 people individually, on their Internet use habits, 
world view, opinions about the media, and so on. Only Internet users are welcome to 
participate in the interviews. The study won‘t take longer than an hour. If you are 
interested in, please contact me at 13909910007 (phone number), we will then meet at a 



































DEMOGRAPHIC STATISTICS OF SURVEY RESPONDERS 
 




Variable Indicator Survey Responders General 
Chinese 
  M SD M 
Age Years 29.16 9.47 32.26 




Education Years of school 
completed 
14.37 2.48 8.5 
Income In Chinese RMB 1542 2364 1345 
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